VGK rate. The headquarters of the main command (the headquarters of the supreme command) was created in the USSR

STAFF OF THE SUPREME HIGH COMMAND, the supreme body of strategic leadership USSR Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War.

It was formed by a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated 23.6.1941. Initially it was called the Headquarters of the High Command, which included: People's Commissar of Defense Marshal Sov. Soyuz S.K. Timoshenko (Chairman), Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Gen. army G.K. Zhukov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I.V. Stalin, his first deputy V.M. Molotov, marshals of Sov. Union K.E. Voroshilov and S.M. Budyonny, People's Commissar of the Navy of the USSR Adm. N.G. Kuznetsov. By the same decree, the institution of permanent advisers to the Headquarters was formed, consisting of marshals G.I. Kulik and B.M. Shaposhnikova, Gen. Army K.A. Meretskov, head of the Air Force Kr. Army P.F. Zhigarev, Deputy Chief of the General Staff N.F. Vatutin, head of the Main Directorate of Air Defense of the Red Army N.N. Voronova, A.I. Mikoyan, L.M. Kaganovich, L.P. Beria, N.A. Voznesensky, A.A. Zhdanova, G.M. Malenkov and L.Z. Mehlis.

On July 10, 1941, by a decree of the State Defense Committee, the Headquarters of the High Command was transformed into the Headquarters of the High Command, which was headed by the chairman of the State Defense Committee Stalin (Timoshenko, Molotov, Zhukov and Budyonny remained in the composition, Shaposhnikov was additionally introduced).

With the appointment of Stalin as Supreme Commander-in-Chief on August 8, 1941, the Headquarters became known as the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

During the war, the composition of the Headquarters changed. The last time it was reorganized on February 17, 1945 by a decree of the State Defense Committee. Then it included: Supreme Commander and People's Commissar of Defense Stalin, Deputy. People's Commissar of Defense Marshals of Sov. Union Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky and Gen. Army N.A. Bulganin, Chief of the General Staff Gen. Army A.I. Antonov, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Adm. Fleet Kuznetsov. Stalin and Zhukov remained permanent members of the Supreme Command Headquarters throughout its activities.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command gave a fundamental assessment of the military-political and strategic situation that was developing on the fronts; made strategic and operational-strategic decisions on the conduct of military campaigns and operations; the creation of strategic groupings in accordance with the plans of military operations; resolved issues of interaction between groups of fronts, fronts, fleets and individual armies. Her competence also included the creation and preparation of strategic reserves, placement of personnel, logistics of troops, and many others.

The preparation of recommendations and proposals on the strategic leadership of the troops and forces of the fleet, considered and approved by the Headquarters, was in charge General Staff of the Red Army, which closely interacted with the NPO departments and the Main Naval Headquarters on the basis of the Regulations on the General Staff, approved by the GKO resolution of 28.07.1941.

As a rule, decisions to conduct campaigns and strategic operations were made after discussion at the Headquarters, with the invitation of the relevant commanders of the fronts, as well as major state. figures and members of the Politburo.

The headquarters, especially at the initial and final stages of the war, exercised direct control over the fronts, fleets and long-range aviation. In order to bring the strategic leadership closer to the troops of the active fronts, with the beginning of the war, the main commands of the troops of the directions (Western, North-Western, South-Western and North Caucasian) were created. However, this intermediate link of management did not fully justify itself and was subsequently abolished.

Since the spring of 1942, an institute of strategic management appeared - representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, who were endowed with broad powers and were usually sent to where the main issues were decided. this moment tasks. At the end of 1942, Zhukov, Vasilevsky and Voronov were appointed representatives of the Stavka near Stalingrad. For the longest time, the duties of representatives of the Headquarters were performed by Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Timoshenko. Periodically, Budyonny, Voroshilov, S.M. were sent to the fronts as representatives of the Headquarters. Shtemenko, Kuznetsov, Voronov, A.A. Novikov, Malenkov, Mekhlis. The Stavka representatives were also K.K. Rokossovsky, L.A. Govorov, G.A. Vorozheikin, A.E. Golovanov, I.T. Peresypkin, Ya.N. Fedorenko and others.

Speaking about the style of work of the Stavka, A.M. Vasilevsky recalled: “It is impossible to understand under the Headquarters a body that constantly met in the literal sense of the word under the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in the composition in which it was approved. After all, most of its members simultaneously performed responsible duties, often being far outside of Moscow, mainly at the front ... But here's what was constant: each of the members of the Stavka kept in touch with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Since May 1945, the activities of the Headquarters of the All-Russian Supreme Command focused on the preparation of military operations against Japan. For the direct management of the grouping of the Armed Forces in the Soviet-Japanese. war, by the decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of 30.7.1945, the High Command of the Soviets was created. troops on Far East headed by Vasilevsky. The bet ceased operations on Oct. 1945. Thanks to her, the domestic military art was enriched with valuable experience in the creation and functioning of an effective system of strategic leadership, which has a direct impact on the course and outcome of the war.

Research Institute ( military history) VAGSH RF Armed Forces

SVGK) in 1941-45 - the body of the highest. military management, carried out in the years of Vel. Fatherland. war 1941-45 strategic. leadership of the Soviet Armed. Forces. Post has been created. Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on June 23, 1941 and was originally called the Headquarters of the Armed Forces. Forces of the USSR; July 10, 1941 in connection with the formation of the main commands of the North-Western (disbanded on August 29, 1941), Western (existed until September 11, 1941, restored on February 1, 1942, disbanded on May 3, 1942) and South-Western (disbanded on June 21, 1942) directions The Headquarters of the High Command was transformed into the Headquarters of the High Command, and on August 8. 1941 in SVGK. Previous The headquarters was originally S. K. Timoshenko, members - I. V. Stalin, B. M. Shaposhnikov, K. E. Voroshilov, S. M. Budyonny. From July 10, 1941 until the end of the war before. SVGK was I. V. Stalin, appointed on August 8. 1941 Supreme Commander. Member SVGK from July 10, 1941 to February 17. 1945 were V. M. Molotov, K. E. Voroshilov, B. M. Shaposhnikov, S. M. Budyonny, G. K. Zhukov, from 17 Feb. 1945 - G. K. Zhukov (deputy chairman), A. I. Antonov, A. M. Vasilevsky, N. G. Kuznetsov, N. A. Bulganin. SVGK determined the overall strategic. the goal at one stage or another of the war, which was divided into a number of successive tasks, each of which was the basis for the development of military plans. campaigns and operations. The idea of ​​the SVGK determined the ways of strategic. actions Armed. Forces in various sectors of the front. The presence of reserves at the disposal of the SVGK allowed it to provide directly. influence on the course of operations by introducing new forces into battle, coordinating the operational efforts of the fronts, redirecting their actions, changing their composition, setting new tasks, changing previously set tasks, etc. for what purpose, where, when, with what forces the front should prepare the operation, in what direction to concentrate its main efforts, what additional forces and material and technical means are provided to the front for the operation, and by what date should it submit the plan of operation to the SVGK. The most important instructions were given to the commanders of the front troops personally by calling them to the SVGK or by sending representatives of the SVGK to the fronts. In order to approach the strategic leadership to the troops and coordination of the efforts of several fronts solving one common task, the SVGK often singled out its representative. Having great authority, a comprehensive orientation in the plans and plans of the Top. Commander-in-Chief, a representative of the SVGK assisted the command of the fronts in quickly resolving issues that required the competence of the SVGK. As representatives of the SVGK in different time and in various directions there were marshals of Sov. Union A. M. Vasilevsky, K. E. Voroshilov, G. K. Zhukov, S. K. Timoshenko, Ch. Marshal of Artillery H. H. Voronov and others. The General Staff of the Armed Forces was the working body of the SVGK. Forces of the USSR. Its functions included: preparation for the SVGK of all necessary materials on operational and strategic setting; development of strategic plans. operations, their comprehensive support and control over their implementation; development of questions of the organization of the Armed Forces. Strength; control over the formation and restoration of connections and associations; organization of operational and strategic transportation; the study and generalization of the experience of the war, etc. The SVGK also led the partisans. movement behind enemy lines through the Center. partisan headquarters. movements and rep. partisan headquarters. movements during the military councils of front-line associations. Ya. M. Gorelik. Moscow. -***-***-***- SVG bodies formed after the October Revolution %%%

On June 22, 1941, the Great Patriotic War began. In its scale, violent nature and the number of victims, it has no equal in the history of mankind.

With the beginning of it, the Soviet state found itself in a difficult situation. He had to solve a whole series of problems almost simultaneously. the most difficult tasks, including:

Suspend the rapid advance of the German troops;
- to conduct a general mobilization of those liable for military service and compensate for the losses in manpower suffered in the first days of the war;
- evacuate to the east industrial, primarily defense, enterprises, as well as the population and the most important property from areas threatened by the German occupation;
- to organize the production of weapons and ammunition in the quantity necessary for the Armed Forces.

The solution of these and other issues required a fundamental change in the entire system of political, state and military leadership.

The country's constitution at that time did not provide for the procedure for the implementation of state and military administration in wartime conditions, and the structure of the relevant bodies was not fixed. Therefore, with the beginning of the Great Patriotic War the general leadership of the armed struggle of the Soviet people was carried out by the CPSU (b), or rather its Central Committee, headed by I. V. Stalin. In accordance with the Constitution of the USSR in force, the supreme body of state power in the country was the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

The body reporting to him - the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, headed by M. I. Kalinin - was endowed with the right to declare a state of war, general or partial mobilization, martial law in the interests of the country's defense and state security.

The highest executive and administrative body of state power - the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR headed by V. M. Molotov - took measures to ensure public order, protect the interests of the state and protect the rights of the population, determined the annual contingent of citizens subject to conscription for active military service, led general construction Armed Forces.

Under the Council of People's Commissars, there was a Defense Committee headed by Marshal Soviet Union K. E. Voroshilov. He supervised and coordinated the issues of military construction and direct preparation of the country for defense. Military administration, as envisaged before the war, was to be exercised by the Chief Military Council, headed by the People's Commissar of Defense.

Such a system of state and military administration essentially corresponded to the experience of the First World War and the Civil War. However, the very first days of the war showed that it did not meet the new requirements for armed struggle, did not provide the necessary centralization of leadership of the state and the Armed Forces in a complex and rapidly changing situation, the forced withdrawal of Soviet troops, and the mobilization of all the forces and resources of the country. As a result, the reorganization of the highest bodies of state and military administration took place already during the war, which was often associated with certain miscalculations.

The issue of reorganizing the system of state power was resolved on June 30, 1941, when the decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR created the State Defense Committee - the emergency supreme state body of the USSR, concentrating all power in the country. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I. V. Stalin became the chairman of the committee, and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov became his deputy. The GKO included L.P. Beria, K.E. Voroshilov, G.M. Malenkov, L.M. Kaganovich, later N.A. Bulganin, N.A. Voznesensky, A.I. Mikoyan were introduced. Each of them was in charge of a certain range of issues.

The State Defense Committee was endowed with broad legislative, executive and administrative functions. He united the military, political and economic leadership and had full power in the country. The decrees and orders of the State Defense Committee had the force of wartime laws and were subject to unquestioning execution by all party, state, military, economic and trade union bodies.

At the same time, the constitutional bodies of state administration - the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, its Presidium, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, people's commissariats - continued to operate, implementing the decrees and decisions of the State Defense Committee. Thus, the Supreme Soviet met three times during the war years: on June 18, 1942, from January 28 to February 14, 1944, and from April 24 to April 27, 1945. At these sessions, the country's budgets were approved, the treaty between the USSR and Great Britain was ratified, and the Law on the expansion of the rights of the union republics was adopted.

The following tasks were entrusted to the State Defense Committee:
- directing the activities of state departments and institutions, directing their efforts to the full use of the material, spiritual and military capabilities of the country to achieve victory over the enemy;
- addressing issues of restructuring the economy on a war footing;
- mobilization of the country's human resources for the needs of the front and the national economy;
- training of reserves and personnel for the Armed Forces and industry;
- evacuation of industrial facilities from threatened areas and transfer of enterprises to liberated areas;
- restoration of the economy destroyed by the war;
- determination of the volume and terms of deliveries of military products by the industry.

In addition, the State Defense Committee set military-political tasks for the military leadership, improved the structure of the Armed Forces, determined the general nature of their use in war, and assigned leading cadres.

In its activities to lead the country, the State Defense Committee relied on the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, people's commissariats and departments, local party and government bodies, and city defense committees. The working bodies of the GKO on military issues, as well as the direct organizers and executors of its decisions in this area, were the people's commissariats of defense and the Navy.

Already in the first weeks of the war, a number of measures were taken to improve the management of the national economy, primarily the military industry. New people's commissariats were created, responsible for certain branches of military production - the tank industry, mortar weapons and others. By a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of July 1, 1941, the rights of people's commissariats were expanded in wartime conditions.

To carry out the evacuation of industrial enterprises and the population from the front-line regions to the east, a Council for Evacuation Affairs is being created under the State Defense Committee. In addition, in October 1941, the Committee for the Evacuation of Food Stocks, Industrial Goods and Industrial Enterprises was formed. In October 1941, these bodies were reorganized into the Directorate for Evacuation Affairs under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

As a result of the efforts made, the output of military products in March 1942 only in the eastern regions of the country reached the pre-war level of its output throughout the entire territory of the Soviet Union. The industry, reoriented to a military way, relying on the country's production capacities, began the mass production of modern aircraft, tanks, weapons and ammunition.

The problems of providing the national economy with trained personnel required the creation in 1941 under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of the Committee for the Accounting and Distribution of Labor. At the same time, bureaus for the mobilization of the able-bodied population were created under the regional and regional executive committees. These measures made it possible to significantly strengthen the Armed Forces already in the first weeks of the war. In the first week of the war alone, 5.3 million people were mobilized into the army.

In order to improve the management of the most important sectors of the economy, which ensured an increase in the production of weapons, military equipment, ammunition, equipment, on December 8, 1942, the Operations Bureau of the State Defense Committee was created. He was in control of current work all people's commissariats defense industry, as well as monitoring the preparation and execution of plans for the production and supply of industries and transport.

Thus, the State Defense Committee became the main link in the mechanism of centralized management of the mobilization of the country's human and material resources for defense and armed struggle against the enemy.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the military administration was also reorganized.

On the second day of the war, June 23, 1941, by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Headquarters of the High Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR was created. It was headed by People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko. It included members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, Marshal of the Soviet Union K. E. Voroshilov, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny, People's Commissar of the Navy Admiral of the Fleet N. G. Kuznetsov and Chief of the General Staff General of the Army G. K. Zhukov.

By the same resolution, an institute of permanent advisers was formed at the Headquarters, which included Marshals of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov and G. I. Kulik, generals K. A. Meretskov, P. F. Zhigarev, N. F. Vatutin, N. N. Voronov, as well as A. I. Mikoyan, L. M. Kaganovich, L. P. Beria, N. A. Voznesensky, A. A. Zhdanov, G. M. Malenkov, L. Z. Mekhlis.

It should be noted that the question of creating the Headquarters of the High Command was raised by the People's Commissariat of Defense before I.V. Stalin back in the spring of 1941. At the same time, it was supposed to conduct strategic command and staff exercises with its participation at the turn of Valdai, Orsha, Gomel, the Psyol River. Unfortunately, apart from reconnaissance of these exercises, nothing could be done. The issue of the Civil Code rate also remained unresolved.

The very first days showed that the appointment of the people's commissar of defense as chairman of the Headquarters of the High Command turned out to be erroneous. The dynamism of military operations, the rapid and abrupt changes in the situation on a huge front, required high efficiency in command and control of troops. Meanwhile, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko could not independently, without the consent of J. V. Stalin, make any serious decisions on the leadership of the Armed Forces. He did not even have the right to make decisions on the preparation and use of strategic reserves, not to mention the issues of material and technical support related to the management of the country's national economy.

In order to ensure centralized and more efficient control of the armed struggle, by the Decree of the USSR State Defense Committee No. 10 of July 10, 1941, the Headquarters of the High Command was transformed into the Headquarters of the High Command. It was headed by the chairman of the GKO I. V. Stalin. By the same decree, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov was introduced to the Headquarters.

On August 8, 1941, I. V. Stalin was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Since that time, the Headquarters became known as the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Thus, only on the 48th day of the war, by trial and error, the supreme body of strategic leadership was finally formed.

The last time the composition of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was radically revised on February 17, 1945. By the decision of the State Committee of Defense of the USSR, it included the Marshals of the Soviet Union I. V. Stalin (chairman), G. K. Zhukov and A. M. Vasilevsky, Army Generals N. A. Bulganin and A. I. Antonov, Admiral of the Fleet N. G. Kuznetsov. It was this "composition of winners" that led the armed struggle of the Soviet people at the final stage of the Second World War.

Initially, the members of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command gathered in the Kremlin office of I.V. Stalin. But with the beginning of the bombing, she was transferred from the Kremlin to a small mansion on Kirov Street (now Myasnitskaya). In addition, an underground strategic control center for the Armed Forces was prepared at the Kirovskaya metro station. The offices of I. V. Stalin and B. M. Shaposhnikov were equipped there. The operational group of the General Staff and the departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense was also located here.

The activities of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command were large-scale and multifaceted. She carried out the strategic leadership of the Red Army, the Navy, the border and internal troops, and partisan forces. Its activities consisted in assessing the military-political and military-strategic situation, making strategic and operational-strategic decisions, organizing strategic regroupings and creating groupings of troops, organizing interaction and coordinating actions during operations between groups of fronts, fronts, individual armies, as well as between active army and partisan detachments. The Stavka supervised the formation and preparation of strategic reserves, the material and technical support of the Armed Forces, exercised control over the progress of the fulfillment of assigned tasks, supervised the study and generalization of war experience, and resolved other issues related to military operations.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command led the fronts, fleets and long-range aviation, assigned them tasks, approved plans of operations, provided them with the necessary forces and means, and led the partisans through the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement.

The main working body of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and personally of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was the General Staff of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, closely interacting with the departments of the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy.

The work of the General Staff during the war was complex and multifaceted. Its functions included the collection and processing of operational-strategic information about the situation on the fronts, the preparation of operational calculations, conclusions and proposals for the use of the Armed Forces, the direct development of plans for military campaigns and strategic operations in theaters of military operations. On the basis of the decisions of the Headquarters and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the General Staff prepared directives for the commanders of the fronts, fleets and types of the Armed Forces and their headquarters, orders of the people's commissar of defense, supervised their execution, led military intelligence, monitored the condition and provision of troops, as well as the preparation of strategic reserves and their correct use. The General Staff was also entrusted with the task of generalizing the advanced combat experience of formations, formations and units. The General Staff developed the most important provisions in the field of military theory, prepared proposals and applications for the production of military equipment and weapons. He was also responsible for coordinating the fighting of the partisan formations with the formations of the Red Army.

The Chief of the General Staff began to unite the activities of all departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense, as well as the People's Commissariat of the Navy. He was empowered to sign together with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief orders and directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, to issue orders on her behalf. During the Great Patriotic War, the General Staff was successively headed by four military figures - Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, B.M. Shaposhnikov, A.M. Vasilevsky and General of the Army A.I. Antonov. Each of them is a unique military personality. It was they who had the greatest influence on the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, it was their thinking that literally nourished his decisions and will during the war years. Therefore, it was these generals who were the most frequent visitors to I.V. Stalin during the war years.

Before becoming an effective working body of the Supreme High Command, the General Staff went through the path of searching for its place and role in strategic leadership, its organizational structure and methods of work. In the initial period of the war, under conditions of an unfavorable situation on the fronts, the volume and content of the work of the General Staff increased enormously. In this regard, in order to concentrate the efforts of the General Staff on the operational-strategic leadership of the Armed Forces, it was relieved of a number of functions not directly related to this activity. By Decree of the State Defense Committee No. 300 of July 28, 1941, the functions of mobilization, commissioning, conscription, organization of the Armed Forces, supplies, military transportation, and leadership of military educational institutions were removed from him. The organizational and mobilization management, the department for the arrangement and staffing of troops, the road department, the department for the arrangement of the rear, weapons and supplies, as well as the communications center. Subsequently, the negative aspects of this decision became visible, and most of these units again became part of the General Staff.

There have been necessary changes in management. In particular, directions were created for each active front, consisting of the head of the direction, his deputy and 5-10 officer-operators. In addition, a corps of representative officers of the General Staff was created. It was intended to maintain continuous communication with the troops, verify the implementation of directives, orders and instructions from the highest authorities, provide the General Staff with prompt and accurate information about the situation, and also to provide timely assistance to headquarters and troops.

An important place in the work of the General Staff, especially in the last period of the war, was occupied by the organization of communication and interaction with the headquarters of the allied armies. Almost from the beginning of the war, military missions of the allied powers were accredited to the General Staff: from the USA led by General Dean, from Great Britain - by General Berluz, from the government of the fighting France - by General Lattre de Tassigny. There were missions from Norway, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and other countries. In turn, Soviet military missions were established at the headquarters of the allied armies, which, through the General Staff, were subordinate to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and were not within the competence of the ambassadors.

The improvement of the organizational structure of the General Staff was carried out throughout the war, but the changes were not of a cardinal nature.

As a result of the reorganization carried out, the General Staff became a command and control body capable of promptly and adequately responding to changes in the situation on the fronts. Organizational restructuring, due to the nature and content of the combat situation on the fronts, allowed him to focus on solving mainly operational-strategic issues, developing and preparing the necessary data for decision-making by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

However, in the first years of the war, JV Stalin himself underestimated the role of the General Staff. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief not only ignored his suggestions, but often made decisions contrary to all his advice. In the first year of the war alone, five chiefs of the leading department of the General Staff, the operational one, were replaced. Many generals from among the leadership of the General Staff, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, were sent to the active army. In a number of cases, this was indeed caused by the objective need to reinforce the headquarters of the fronts and armies with experienced workers. Only towards the end of the first period of the war did Stalin's relations with the General Staff normalize to a large extent. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief began to rely more on the General Staff, even to perceive it as an important body of strategic leadership. Yes, and the General Staff by this time gained rich experience, began to work more organized. Therefore, it is no coincidence that from the second half of 1942, JV Stalin, as a rule, did not take a single decision without first hearing the opinion of the General Staff.

For a well-coordinated and fruitful activity, the work of the General Staff, its departments and departments had to be streamlined in accordance with the requirements of wartime. A certain order of work was needed around the clock. This routine developed gradually. It finally took shape with the arrival of General A. I. Antonov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Pedantic in the good sense of the word, the general outlined his proposals for improving the activities of the General Staff on three sheets. Having familiarized himself with them, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, without saying a word, approved them.

To a large extent, it was tied to the regulations of the Supreme Commander himself. Reports to I. V. Stalin were made, as a rule, three times a day. The first of them was done at 10-11 o'clock in the afternoon by phone, from 16.00 to 17.00 the second was held, and from 21.00 to 3.00 the final report for the day was carried out at Headquarters. In the course of it, in addition to the situation, draft directives, orders and orders were reported. Documents for the report were carefully worked out, the wording was perfected. They were sorted into multi-colored folders according to their importance. Priority documents were placed in the red folder - directives, orders, plans. The documents of the second order were intended for the blue folder. The contents of the green folder were mainly submissions for titles and awards, orders for movements and appointments. Documents were signed as important.

Along with the reorganization of the bodies of strategic leadership, there was a continuous search for ways to increase the efficiency of command and control and to establish closer cooperation between the fronts. Already in the first days of the war, when in the conditions of a rapidly changing situation in the absence of stable communication with the fronts and timely reliable information about the situation of the troops, the military leadership was systematically late in making decisions, the need to create an intermediate command authority between the Headquarters and the fronts became obvious. For these purposes, it was decided to send the leading people of the People's Commissariat of Defense to the front, but these measures did not produce results. Therefore, by the decree of the State Defense Committee of July 10, 1941, three Main Commands of the troops of strategic directions were created.

The High Command of the North-Western Direction, headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union K. E. Voroshilov, was entrusted with coordinating the actions of the Northern and North-Western fronts, as well as the Northern and Baltic fleets. The main command of the troops of the Western direction, headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko, coordinated the actions of the Western Front and the Pinsk military flotilla, and later - the Western Front, the Front of Reserve Armies and the Central Front. The high command of the troops of the South-Western direction, headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny, was to coordinate the actions of the South-Western, Southern, and later the Bryansk fronts. In his operational subordination was also the Black Sea Fleet. In August 1941, the staff of the field administration of the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Forces was approved.

The task of the High Commands included studying and analyzing the operational-strategic situation in the direction zone, informing the Headquarters about the situation on the fronts, directing the preparation of operations in accordance with the plans and plans of the Headquarters, coordinating the actions of troops in the strategic direction, and directing the partisan struggle behind enemy lines.

The introduction of intermediate bodies of strategic leadership in the difficult conditions of the first period of the war was justified. The main commands had the opportunity to ensure more reliable, accurate command and control of troops and the organization of interaction between the fronts, and to respond more quickly to enemy actions. At the same time, there were many shortcomings in the activities of the High Commands. The commanders-in-chief not only did not have clearly defined functions and sufficiently broad powers, but also did not have the necessary reserve of forces and material resources to actively influence the course of hostilities of troops subordinate to them. Therefore, all their activities were often reduced to the transfer of information from the fronts to the Headquarters and, conversely, orders from the Headquarters to the fronts. Often, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command exercised direct control over the combat activities of fronts, fleets and armies, bypassing the High Commands. As a result of these and other reasons, the Commanders-in-Chief of the troops of the strategic sectors failed to improve the leadership of the fronts.

At the same time, the experience of command and control of the troops of the fronts was accumulated, the connection between the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the front departments became more and more reliable and stable, the situation at the front more and more stabilized. Under these conditions, the main commands of the troops of the strategic directions were abolished one by one. On September 10, 1941, the High Command of the troops of the Western direction ceased to exist, on September 29 - the North-West, and in December - the South-West.

However, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command did not completely abandon them. Already in February 1942, she assigned to the commander of the Western Front, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, the duties of Commander-in-Chief of the Western Direction. He was tasked with coordinating fighting Western and Kalinin fronts during the Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation. Soon the High Command of the troops of the South-Western direction was restored. Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko, commander of the Southwestern Front, was appointed commander-in-chief. He was supposed to coordinate the actions of his and the neighboring Bryansk Front.

On April 21, 1942, to direct the actions of troops on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, the High Command of the troops of the North Caucasus direction was formed, headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny. The Crimean Front, the Sevastopol defensive region, the North Caucasian military district, the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov military flotilla were subordinate to him.

As practice has shown, combining the positions of Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Troops and Commander of the Front turned out to be inexpedient. Although such a combination gave the Commanders-in-Chief relative independence in resolving operational issues, their ability to coordinate the actions of other fronts narrowed. Ultimately, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command had to deal with this. Soon, such a control system had to be abandoned. In May 1942, the Main Commands of the Western and North Caucasian troops were abolished, and in June - the South-Western direction.

A similar system of strategic leadership, but in a more perfect form, was resorted to by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command only in 1945 during the military campaign in the Far East. Given the remoteness of the theater of operations from the center, the High Command of the Soviet troops in the Far East was formed, headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky. Unlike the previously created High Commands of the Strategic Directions, it had large forces and means at its disposal and was endowed with greater independence in resolving issues of preparing and conducting military operations. At the same time, here, too, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command retained the right to control the fronts and the Pacific Fleet.

Since the spring of 1942, the institution of representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command appeared, which became widespread during the Great Patriotic War. Representatives of the Stavka were appointed by it from among the most trained military leaders. They had broad powers and were usually sent to where, according to the plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the main tasks at the moment were being solved.

The functions of the Stavka representatives did not remain unchanged. Until the summer of 1944, they boiled down mainly to assisting the command of the fronts in the preparation and conduct of operations, coordinating the efforts of the fronts, and monitoring the implementation of decisions of the Supreme High Command. But representatives of the Headquarters did not have the right to make fundamentally new decisions during the operation without the sanction of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. In the future, the powers of the Stavka representatives were expanded. So, in the Belarusian offensive operation Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov directly supervised the actions of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts, and Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky - of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts.

Representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on the fronts at different times were G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevsky, S. K. Timoshenko, S. M. Budyonny, K. E. Voroshilov, A. I. Antonov, N. G. Kuznetsov, N. N. Voronov, A. A. Novikov, A. E. Golovanov, Ya. N. Fedorenko, G. A. Vorozheykin, S. M. Shtemenko, I. T. Peresypkin and others. JV Stalin personally assigned them tasks before leaving for the front and received them with reports upon arrival. If necessary, he called them to Headquarters during operations, especially when something went wrong. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief demanded from his representatives constant reports on the progress of the assigned tasks, presenting a high demand for omissions and failures.

The creation of the institution of representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command contributed to an increase in the effectiveness of strategic management. The Supreme High Command was able to coordinate efforts on the spot and maintain close interaction between the fronts, branches of the Armed Forces, branches of the armed forces and partisan formations, and use them more rationally in ongoing operations.

The institute of representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command lasted almost until the end of the war. Only in the final operations, due to a significant reduction in the front and a decrease in the number of front-line formations, the need for it disappeared.

On June 29, 1941, the Main Directorate for the Formation and Staffing of Troops (Glavupraform) was created in the People's Commissariat of Defense to manage the formation of reserves, prepare marching replacements, and manage spare and training units. It was headed by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union G. I. Kulik, but on August 6 of the same year he was replaced by E. A. Shchadenko.

The scale of the activity of this governing body is evidenced by the fact that only in 1941 it formed 286 rifle divisions, more than 500 brigades. The creation of such a governing body allowed the Supreme High Command to quickly resolve the issues of preparing marching replacements and creating reserves for the army in the field.

With the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, general military training of the working people was widely developed in the country on the job and in schools. In September 1941, by decision of the State Defense Committee, universal compulsory military training for men aged 16 to 50 was introduced according to a 110-hour program. For the centralized management of this type of military training, on September 17, 1941, the Main Directorate of General Military Training (GUVVO) was created as part of the People's Commissariat of Defense. In the military districts, republican, territorial and regional military commissariats, departments of general military training are being formed. These measures ensured the continuous replenishment of the active army with trained manpower.

To coordinate the work of the Logistics of the Armed Forces, the Main Directorate of Logistics was formed, and the post of chief of the Logistics of the Red Army was established with the headquarters of the Logistics, reporting directly to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Throughout the war, General A.V. Khrulev was the head of the Logistics.

July 16, 1941 with the aim of strengthening the combat power of the army and navy, raising the level of organizational and ideological work The institution of military commissars was introduced in the Armed Forces. At the same time, the organs of political propaganda are reorganized into political organs - the Main Political Directorate of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (GlavPU RKKA) and the Main Political Directorate of the Navy (GlavPU VMF). The powers of the political agencies were expanded - they began to manage both mass political and organizational-party work in the army and navy. These measures made it possible to intensify the activities of political agencies to ensure the implementation of orders and directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, to increase their role in solving combat missions, and to improve the leadership of party and Komsomol organizations.

In connection with the expansion of the scale of armed struggle, the increase in the number of formations and units of the branches of the Armed Forces and branches of service in the army in the field and the need for their more effective use in the course of hostilities, the positions of commanders of the branches and branches of the armed forces were established with the appropriate governing bodies - military councils and headquarters: chief, and from November 1942 - commander of artillery of the Red Army, commanders of guards mortar units, armored and mechanized troops, the Air Force, air defense troops, long-range aviation, airborne troops with their subordination directly to the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, as well as the head of the engineering troops.

Some commanders were elevated to the rank of deputy people's commissar of defense, but in 1943 they were deprived of it. By that time, the people's commissar already had about two dozen deputies, which began to create difficulties in the activities of the people's commissariat. As a result, the People's Commissar of Defense had only two deputies left - Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.

Already in the first period of the war, popular resistance to the enemy was widely developed in the occupied territory of the country. The scope of this popular movement was enormous. So, only in the summer and autumn of 1942, during the period of fierce battles for the Caucasus and Stalingrad, the fascist German command was forced to use up to 25 divisions to protect their rear and fight partisans.

However, the centralized control of the struggle of the Soviet people behind enemy lines was not established immediately, but as it unfolded. The beginning of the centralization of the leadership of the partisan movement was laid by the decision of the State Defense Committee of May 30, 1942. In accordance with this resolution, the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TSSHPD) was created at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. It was headed by a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Belarus P. K. Ponomarenko. The headquarters established contact with partisan formations, coordinated their activities, supplied the partisans with weapons, ammunition, medicines, trained personnel, and carried out interaction between partisan formations and regular units of the Red Army.

For the direct leadership of partisan detachments under the Military Councils of the fronts, the headquarters of the partisan movement were created: Ukrainian, Bryansk, Western, Kalinin, Leningrad and Karelian-Finnish.
On September 6, 1942, in order to further develop the partisan movement and increase its effectiveness, the post of Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement was established. Marshal of the Soviet Union K. E. Voroshilov, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a member of the State Defense Committee and the Supreme Command Headquarters, was appointed to this post. The Central Headquarters of the partisan movement was subordinate to him.

Soon, in accordance with the GKO decree of September 28, 1942, the headquarters of the partisan movement, which operated under the Military Councils of the fronts, were reorganized. They were transformed into representative offices of the TsSHPD at the fronts, and their leaders were included in the Military Councils of the fronts. The GKO determined the disorganization of the rear of the enemy as the main task of the struggle of the partisans. The measures taken made it possible to overcome the fragmentation that reigned in the partisan movement and reduced its effectiveness.

True, at the beginning of March 1943, the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement was disbanded, and the leadership of the actions of the partisans was entrusted to the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics and the regional committees of the CPSU (b). But the fallacy of such a decision became obvious almost immediately, and in April the headquarters was restored.

From the very beginning of the war, the rapidly changing operational-strategic situation on the flanks of the Soviet-German front required close cooperation between the fleets and the troops of the fronts operating in the coastal axes. Initially, fleets and flotillas for this purpose were transferred to the operational subordination of the fronts. However, their commanders often did not pay due attention to the fulfillment of independent tasks by the fleets in maritime theaters, and did not always fully orient the fleets about the general tasks and prospects for their activities. In connection with this, and also in view of the complication of the situation at sea, a need arose for a radical improvement in the operational-strategic leadership of the forces of the fleets.

The directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of March 31, 1944 established the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces of the USSR. People's Commissar of the Navy Admiral of the Fleet N. G. Kuznetsov was appointed to this position. By the same directive, the Baltic Fleet remained operationally subordinate to the Leningrad Front, while the Northern and Black Sea Fleets were directly subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. The directive stated that henceforth the tasks of the fleets would be set directly by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. From now on, the use of naval aviation in the interests of the ground forces was allowed only in exceptional cases and only with the permission of the Headquarters. Responsibility for the defense of the coast in coastal areas was assigned to the commanders of the fronts, and at the same time the degree of participation and responsibility of the fleets in solving these problems was determined. From now on, front commanders were forbidden to interfere in tactical naval matters and the internal service of the fleets transferred to them under operational control. The new command and control system of the Naval Forces gave the naval leadership more independence, which made it possible to more successfully solve the problems of defeating the enemy at sea.

At the beginning of the war, the Soviet Armed Forces were supposed to act according to pre-war operational plans. They provided for the conduct of defensive battles for three to four weeks by covering troops, and then, with the introduction of the second echelons of the border fronts and the approaching strategic reserves, it was supposed to go on the counteroffensive. But the situation on the fronts did not allow the implementation of these plans. The strategic initiative was entirely in the hands of the German troops. Under these conditions, contrary to the military doctrine adopted in the prewar period, the Soviet military leadership was forced to make a decision to switch to strategic defense.

As the front stabilized and the system of strategic leadership was reorganized, troop command and control improved. The planning of operations began to be characterized by more coordinated efforts of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the General Staff and the headquarters of the fronts. A feature of the strategic leadership of armed struggle was the combination of collegiality in the development of decisions with sole responsibility for their implementation. Campaign plans were accepted on joint meetings Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, State Defense Committee and Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The commanders of the fronts, branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms took the most active part in further work on the preparation of operations. All this made it possible to consider issues deeply and comprehensively, to develop expedient solutions, and to quickly implement them.

However, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command did not come to this immediately. In the first period of the war, and especially in its first months, the principle of collegiality was practically not respected. But as experience gained, a relatively coherent system of preparation and adoption of both fundamental long-term and private current decisions took shape. Clear principles of strategic planning, development of ideas and plans for military campaigns, strategic and front-line operations were developed and mastered. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff successively moved from solving individual urgent strategic tasks in an administrative manner to advance planning of front operations, then strategic operations of groups of fronts, and, finally, military campaigns.

An indicator of the increased level of leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces was the concreteness and purposefulness of plans for military campaigns in the second and third periods of the war. Unlike the first period, the campaigns of which were conducted without a clearly defined plan, subsequent campaigns were developed in advance on the basis of a deep and comprehensive analysis of the military-political and military-strategic situation, taking into account the goals put forward by the political leadership, the prospects for war and the real capabilities of the troops.

The activities of the State Defense Committee, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and other higher authorities during the war years were distinguished by their scale and diversity. Most of them were headed by I.V. Stalin, in whose image the state military and political leadership merged to a large extent. Therefore, the style of work of the highest bodies of state and military administration was largely determined by the style of work of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Often it was impossible to determine which body was sitting: members of the Politburo, the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command were gathering in the office of I.V. Stalin at the same time. However, the unifying body in the conditions of the most severe war, apparently, was still the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. It was she who became the core of the entire policy of the Kremlin during the war years. Here, in addition to plans for operations, military-political, economic and many other issues were discussed. For this, state and military figures of the highest rank were invited, as well as ordinary soldiers, partisans and workers.

JV Stalin knew how to make people act. The mode of operation of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was practically round-the-clock. The tone was set by the Supreme Commander himself, who worked 12-16 hours a day, and, as a rule, in the evening and at night. He paid the main attention to operational-strategic issues, problems of weapons, training of human and material resources.

Constantly in the field of view of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was the training of the highest military leadership - commanders, chiefs of staff and members of the Military Councils of fronts, armies, and sometimes corps and divisions. Often, I.V. Stalin, noticing a commander or commander who had shown himself, met with him, and then closely followed his career growth. As a result, during the war years, a new generation of commanders emerged, whose names are known all over the world.

The priority in resolving military issues belonged, of course, to the General Staff. Therefore, during the war, his superiors visited I.V. Stalin almost daily, becoming his main experts, consultants and advisers. After the heavy defeats of the first months of the war, the Supreme Commander was so imbued with the importance of the General Staff that he willingly listened to the opinions of ordinary General Staff officers.

Often, commanders of the fronts visited the Headquarters. Usually these visits were connected with the preparation of major operations or with the appointment of a new position. Sometimes members of the Military Councils came with them, less often - the chiefs of staff.

People's Commissar of the Navy N. G. Kuznetsov and the head of the Logistics of the Red Army A. V. Khrulev were regular visitors to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Repeatedly, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief met with the heads of the Main Directorates of the People's Commissariat of Defense, commanders and heads of military branches. On issues related to the adoption of military equipment or its supply to the troops, people's commissars of the aviation, tank industry, weapons, ammunition and others came with them. Often, leading designers of weapons and military equipment were invited to discuss these issues.

Ordinary soldiers were also invited to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command - pilots, tankers, artillerymen, partisans. In the Kremlin, one could meet military writers, directors of defense factories, workers, collective farmers and even priests.

On May 5, 1945, the State Defense Committee was abolished by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ceased its activities in October 1945.

In general, the military command and control system by 1945 basically corresponded to the nature of military operations, general requirements politics and military strategy. It ensured reliable and effective command and control of troops and forces, and the successful fulfillment of military-political and strategic tasks.

Thus, during the years of the Great Patriotic War, a coherent system of state and military leadership in wartime took shape in the USSR. It took shape gradually, with the accumulation of experience and the growth of the art of management in the highest levels of power. This system effectively managed the country and its military organization, which ultimately helped to achieve victory over the enemy.

At the same time, some negative features of the existing management system should also be noted. The main one was that in the very first months of the war, JV Stalin concentrated immense power in his hands. He, remaining the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), headed the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the State Defense Committee, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the People's Commissariat of Defense. At that cruel time, such a concentration of power was largely justified, objectively necessary. But gradually, the negative aspects of such centralization began to emerge more and more fully.

On June 22, 1941, fascist Germany, grossly violating the terms of the agreement with the USSR, attacked the Soviet country. 153 German divisions were thrown against the USSR, mobilized in advance, armed with the latest military equipment.

Together with Nazi Germany, Romania, Hungary and Finland came out in the war against the Soviet Union, which in the very first days put up 37 divisions.

Fascist Italy also spoke out against the USSR. Germany was assisted by Bulgaria and Spain. Imperialist Japan was waiting for the right moment to attack the USSR. To this end, she kept the million-strong Kwantung Army near the Soviet Far Eastern borders in combat readiness.

The enemy invasion began at 4 am on June 22. Large connections infantry and tank troops on a wide front crossed the Soviet border. At the same time, German planes subjected to severe bombardment of border points, airfields, railway stations, and large cities. An hour and a half after the start of the invasion, the German ambassador in Moscow made a statement to the Soviet government about Germany's entry into the war with the Soviet Union.

Mortal danger hung over the Soviet country. In its radio statement on June 22 at 12 noon, the Soviet government called on the entire Soviet people and its Armed Forces to fight the Patriotic War against the Nazi invaders, to a holy war for the Motherland, for honor and freedom. “Our cause is right. The gate will be broken. Victory will be ours" - these words of the government statement expressed the deep confidence of all Soviet people in victory over the enemy.

On the same day, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR announced the mobilization of those liable for military service in 14 military districts, and martial law was introduced in the European part of the USSR.

The treacherous attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR interrupted peaceful construction in our country. The Soviet Union entered the period of the liberation war.

The Soviet people, as one, rose to defend their homeland, to the holy nationwide war. The workers, peasants and intelligentsia were seized by a huge patriotic upsurge; they expressed their unshakable determination to defend every inch of their native land, to fight to the last drop of blood, until the complete defeat of fascist Germany. The Soviet people rallied even more closely around the Communist Party and the Soviet government.

Fascist Germany unleashed a predatory war designed to seize our lands and subjugate the peoples of the USSR. The Nazis set themselves the goal of destroying the Soviet state, restoring the capitalist system in the USSR, exterminating millions of Soviet people, and turning the survivors into slaves of the German landlords and capitalists.

The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany and its accomplices was a just war of liberation.

The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union merged with the struggle of the freedom-loving peoples of other countries against the fascist aggressors. It was carried out in the interests of all progressive mankind.

The armed forces of fascist Germany acted according to a previously developed plan, which received the name "Plan Barbarossa". The German command counted on the complete defeat of the Soviet Union during a short campaign. The main strategic task was to defeat the Soviet armed forces, seize the territory of the USSR up to the Arkhangelsk-Volga-Astrakhan line. At the same time, the Ural industrial region German command supposed to be destroyed by aviation forces after the exit of the Nazi troops to the Volga.

In accordance with the "Plan Barbarossa", the German command concentrated its forces on our borders in advance. A group of enemy troops, bearing the name "Norway", was intended to attack Murmansk and Kandalaksha. Army Group "North" was advancing on the Baltic states and Leningrad. In cooperation with this grouping, Finnish troops deployed their operations in the area of ​​​​Lake Ladoga. The most powerful group of the German fascist armies, Center, operated in the central direction, with the task of capturing Minsk and then advancing on Smolensk and Moscow. In the southern direction, on the front from Kholm to the Black Sea, Army Group South operated, the left wing of which struck in the direction of Kyiv.

The German command intended by sudden strikes to carry out a deep breakthrough into the areas where the troops of our border military districts were located, to prevent them from retreating into the interior of the country and to destroy them in the western regions. In the event of the complete success of this plan, the enemy would have been able to capture the most important vital centers of the USSR - Moscow, Leningrad and the southern industrial regions.

Hitler's Germany, even before the start of the war against the USSR, transferred the country's economy to a military footing, mobilized troops and carefully prepared a strong invasion army. This army had almost two years of experience in major combat operations in Europe. It was equipped with all kinds of the latest military equipment, consisted of selected soldiers and officers, brought up in the spirit of robber, fascist ideology, national and racial hatred for the Slavic and other peoples.

Despite the heroic resistance of the Soviet troops, the situation at the front at the beginning of the war was extremely unfavorable for our army.

Numerous, technically well-equipped and with experience in modern warfare, the fascist German divisions, taking advantage of the treachery of the attack, put the Soviet troops of the border districts, where significant forces of the cadre army were located, in an extremely difficult situation. Not being sufficiently concentrated and deployed for combat operations, the Soviet troops were unable to withstand the numerically superior enemy forces that operated in the main directions. The enemy strike groupings (tank and motorized divisions) cut through the battle formations of the Soviet troops and advanced deep into our territory. As a result, the management of Soviet military units was extremely difficult. Strong blows enemy aviation against troops and strategically important objects inflicted heavy losses on the Soviet troops, causing enormous damage to the rear and communications. The enemy quickly achieved a change in the balance of forces in his favor. The Soviet troops were forced to retreat, fighting hard and suffering heavy losses.

By the beginning of July 1941, the enemy managed to capture Lithuania, a significant part of Latvia, the western parts of Belarus and Ukraine, and reach the Western Dvina.

The failure of the Soviet troops in the initial period of the war was due to a number of reasons. Among these reasons, first of all, the belated conversion of industry to a war footing should be noted.

The industry of our country, which was at a high level of development, at which it could fully provide the Soviet Army with everything necessary, was not mobilized in time and really in order to produce the maximum amount of all types of weapons and combat supplies. This prevented the timely completion of the re-equipment of Soviet troops with new equipment before the war, replenishing losses and providing weapons to new formations at the beginning of the war. Major mistakes were made in the construction of mechanized troops. In 1937, mechanized corps were disbanded Soviet army. The tank brigade was adopted as the highest organizational unit, which did not meet the requirements of modern warfare. Only in 1940, taking into account the experience of the Second World War, mechanized corps began to form again in the Soviet Army. However, before the start of the war, their formation was not fully completed.

The shortfall in the creation of mechanized troops was aggravated by the fact that, while obsolete tank systems were being phased out, the mass production of new T-34 tanks and heavy KV tanks had not yet been deployed. As a result, a large shortage of tanks formed. The mechanized corps stationed in the border areas were not fully equipped with materiel.

Many artillery units had not yet been converted to mechanized traction, and there was not enough anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery.

Approximately the same situation was in the construction of our air force. Although by the beginning of the war, Soviet aviation had no fewer aircraft in its arsenal than the enemy, but these aircraft were mostly outdated systems and inferior to the German ones in their combat qualities. True, at that time, Soviet designers gave new figurative aircraft that were superior to the German ones.

But the rearmament of the air force was carried out slowly. By the beginning of the war, new aircraft in the aviation fleet accounted for only a small part. In addition, the pilots have not yet had time to really master the new material part.

The preparation of new defensive lines was not completed, and the weapons from the old long-term structures were removed. The network of airfields in the border areas was not sufficiently developed. Highways and dirt roads for the movement of troops were in poor condition.

One of the reasons for the insufficient readiness of the Soviet Army to repulse the enemy was JV Stalin's incorrect assessment of the military-political situation immediately on the eve of the war. Stalin believed that Germany would not dare to attack the USSR in the near future. Therefore, he hesitated to carry out defensive measures, believing that these actions could give the Nazis a pretext for attacking our country. JV Stalin also underestimated the military capabilities of Nazi Germany.

The underestimation of the threat of a fascist attack on the USSR was reflected, in particular, in the TASS report of June 14, 1941. This statement pointed out the groundlessness of rumors about the mobilization of troops by Germany and its preparation for war against the USSR. The message said that “according to the USSR. Germany just as steadfastly observes the terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, as does the Soviet Union, which is why, in the opinion of Soviet circles, rumors about Germany's intention to break the pact and launch an attack on the USSR are devoid of any ground.

In the border military districts, the creation and concentration of sufficient forces in threatening axes that could be countered by the enemy's large strategic groupings was not completed in a timely manner. It should also be taken into account that in the pre-war years a significant number of experienced commanders and political workers, especially at the highest level, were repressed as a result of the actions of hostile elements that broke into the state security organs. Young cadres who came to lead units and formations often did not yet have sufficient knowledge and experience. This also had a negative impact on the course of the fighting of the Soviet troops in the first period of the war.

As a result of all these mistakes and shortcomings, the Soviet troops, being taken by surprise, suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment in the very first days of the war.

Soviet aviation, which suffered heavy losses from sudden enemy strikes on the very first day of the war, was unable to properly fulfill its tasks in order to interfere with the operations of enemy ground troops. In connection with the rapid advance of enemy troops inland.

The Soviet Union was unable to use industrial enterprises in the western regions for the production of military products. Some of the enterprises were evacuated, and some remained in the occupied territory. This further aggravated the difficulties of the war for the Soviet state.

The retreat of the Soviet troops was forced. The temporary loss of a number of territories of the USSR resonated with acute pain in the hearts of all Soviet people. The actions of the enemy caused great damage to the Soviet state. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the Soviet troops acted according to a pre-developed plan of "active strategic defense", that the retreat of the Soviet troops in the first period of the war was supposedly calculated to wear down the enemy, and then go on the counteroffensive.

The enormous difficulties and setbacks of the initial period of the war did not break the morale of the Soviet Army. The formations of the Soviet troops, despite the extremely difficult and difficult situation, retreated with stubborn battles. In dozens of major battles and hundreds of skirmishes, Soviet soldiers fought with unparalleled courage. For a whole month after the German invasion, the heroic struggle of the small garrison of the Brest Fortress with the advancing enemy forces lasted.

The defense of the fortress was led by people of remarkable courage, selflessly devoted to the Soviet Motherland - Captain I. N. Zubachev, regimental commissar E. M. Fomin, Major P. M. Gavrilov and others. The resistance ended only when not a single defender of the fortress remained in the ranks. On the Bug, the outpost of Lieutenant Monin fought for a whole day against the Nazi battalion. Having received information that the Nazis crossed the Prut, occupied the railway bridge and began to make flooring on it for the passage of tanks, the border guards of the fifth outpost A.K. Konstantinov, V.F. Mikhalkov and I.D. Buzytskov penetrated the rear of the enemy, killed him guards and blew up the bridge. The advance of German tanks in this direction was delayed. For this feat, A.K. Konstantinov, V.F. Mikhalkov and I.D. Buzytskoz were awarded the title of Heroes of the Soviet Union. An unforgettable feat was accomplished on June 26, 1941 by Captain N.F. Gastello and the crew of his aircraft, consisting of A.A. Burdenyuk, G.N. Skorobogaty and A.A. Kalinin. When an enemy shell hit the gasoline tank of their plane, Captain N. F. Gastello led the burning car to a convoy (of enemy tanks and tanks. German tanks and tanks exploded along with the plane of the heroic crew.

Already in the first battles on the fronts of the Patriotic War, many thousands of Soviet soldiers accomplished unparalleled feats, sparing no life to defend their homeland.

The Headquarters of the High Command was established on June 23, 1941. Its composition was somewhat different from the project proposed by the People's Commissariat of Defense. It included: People's Commissar of Defense S. K. Timoshenko (Chairman), Chief of the General Staff G. K. Zhukov, I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, K. E. Voroshilov, S. M. Budyonny, N G. Kuznetsov. It was also proposed to include the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff N. F. Vatutin in the Headquarters. But IV Stalin did not agree.

At the Headquarters, a group of advisers was formed on various issues. In practice, the group played a nominal role, since all the advisers soon received other appointments, and their replacement did not take place.

Throughout the war, the Headquarters was in Moscow. This was of great moral importance. Due to the threat of enemy air strikes in early July, she was transferred from the Kremlin to the Kirov Gates area to a small mansion with a reliable working space and communications, and a month later, nearby, on the platform of the Kirovskaya metro station, the operators of the General Staff - the working body of the Stavka .

On June 30, 1941, following the exemplary model of the Leninist Council of the Workers' and Peasants' Defense during the period of foreign military intervention and the civil war, by decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, an emergency body was created - the State Defense Committee headed by I. V. Stalin.

The State Defense Committee became an authoritative body for the leadership of the country's defense, concentrating all power in its hands. Civil, party, Soviet organizations were obliged to comply with all his decisions and orders. To control their execution in the territories and regions, the military-industrial people's commissariats, at the main enterprises and lines, the State Defense Committee had its own representatives.

At meetings of the GKO, which took place at any time of the day, as a rule, in the Kremlin or at the dacha of I.V. Stalin, the most important issues were discussed and resolved. Plans for military action were considered by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party and the State Defense Committee. At the meeting, people's commissars were invited, who were to take part in the provision of operations. This made it possible, when the opportunity arose, to concentrate huge material forces in the most important areas, to pursue a single line in the field of strategic leadership and, backing it up with an organized rear, to link the combat activities of the troops with the efforts of the whole country.

Very often sharp disputes broke out at GKO meetings, while opinions were expressed definitely and sharply. If they did not come to a consensus, a commission and representatives of the extreme parties were immediately created, which was instructed to report the agreed proposals at the next meeting.

In total, during the war, the State Defense Committee adopted about ten thousand decisions and resolutions of a military and economic nature. These resolutions and orders were strictly and energetically implemented, around them the work began to boil, ensuring the implementation of a single party line in the leadership of the country at that difficult and difficult time.

On July 10, 1941, in order to improve the leadership of the armed forces, by the decision of the State Defense Committee, the Headquarters of the High Command was transformed into the Headquarters of the High Command, and on August 8 it was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. From then until the end of the war, I.V. Stalin was the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

With the formation of the State Defense Committee and the creation of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, headed by the same person - the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, the creation of a structure of state and military leadership of the war was completed. The Central Committee of the Party, ensuring the unity of action of all Party, state, military and economic bodies.

On July 19, 1941, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, I. V. Stalin was also appointed People's Commissar of Defense.

It must be said that with the appointment of I. V. Stalin as Chairman of the State Defense Committee, Supreme Commander-in-Chief and People's Commissar of Defense in the General Staff, the central departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the State Planning Committee of the USSR and in other government and national economy bodies, his firm hand was immediately felt.

Each member of the State Defense Committee received a specific task and was strictly responsible for the implementation of national economic plans. One of them was responsible for the release of tanks, the other - artillery weapons, the third - aircraft, the fourth - the supply of ammunition, food and uniforms, etc. to help them in their work on the implementation of the program for the production of certain military products exactly at the appointed time and of the required quality.

Under the influence of party political work, the improvement of the art of command and control, and the accumulated experience of armed struggle, the rebuff to the enemy intensified. Warriors of all types and types of weapons acted heroically and selflessly in battles. Military discipline has risen noticeably in the troops.

However, despite the vigorous measures taken by the Headquarters and the command of the fronts, the situation on the fronts continued to worsen. Under pressure from superior enemy forces, our troops retreated deep into the country. In the conditions of the unfavorable development of military events for us, the strategic defense of the Soviet Armed Forces was also taking shape. It was distinguished by very active forms and stubbornness of the struggle.

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the State Defense Committee showed serious concern about the state of the country's air defense, since the fascist German aviation was very active. The enemy had high hopes for the Luftwaffe. He counted on hitting a mass of aircraft to disrupt the mobilization in the western regions of our country, to disorganize the work of the nearest rear, transport and state apparatus, to undermine the will of the people to resist. Hitler showered the air robbers and their leader Goering with favors and awards,

Analyzing the situation and taking into account the unfavorable forecasts regarding air defense of the state's main facilities, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, with his characteristic energy, set about strengthening the combat capability of the air defense. He invited a group of leading air defense officials to his place and strictly demanded that, within two days, they submit fundamental considerations for strengthening anti-aircraft forces and means, improving their organizational structure and management. General N. N. Voronov, Chief of Artillery of the Red Army, Generals M. S. Gromadin, D. A. Zhuravlev, P. F. Zhigarev, N. D. Yakovlev and others provided him with great and useful advice.

The main task of the air defense then was to cover Moscow, Leningrad and other large industrial centers, where tanks, aircraft, artillery weapons were produced, oil was extracted and the most important railway communications, energy and communications facilities were located.

The most powerful grouping of forces and means of air defense was created for the defense of Moscow. In July, it already had more than 600 night-ready fighter aircraft, over 1,000 anti-aircraft guns, 370 anti-aircraft machine guns, up to 1,000 searchlights and a large number of barrage balloons.

This organizational structure of air defense has fully justified itself. Fascist aviation, taking massive actions, suffered huge losses, but still could not break through with large forces to Moscow. In total, many thousands of bombers took part in the raids, but only a few of them (two or three percent) managed to penetrate the city, and even those were forced to drop their deadly cargo anywhere.

Of course, the process of creating bodies of Soviet strategic leadership took some time and underwent a number of fundamental changes dictated by the course of the war and the nature of the military-strategic situation. But gradually, Soviet military science, guided by the experience of armed struggle accumulated even before the Great Patriotic War, achieved significant success in command and control of troops.

However, the absence of the supreme body of military leadership in the USSR, which the Headquarters should have been at the time of the attack by fascist Germany, naturally, could not but affect the command and control of troops, the results of the first operations and the overall operational-strategic situation. Moreover, the enemy has already gained considerable experience in Europe in organizing war and sudden invasions by strike forces. It must be admitted that both the commanders-in-chief of the directions and the command of the fronts at the beginning of the war made significant shortcomings in command and control. It also had a negative impact on the results of the armed struggle.

It must also be admitted that a certain share of responsibility for shortcomings in the preparation of the armed forces for the start of hostilities is borne by the people's commissar of defense and senior officials of the people's commissariat of defense. As a former chief of the General Staff and the closest assistant to the people's commissar, I cannot absolve myself of guilt for these shortcomings.

Finally, an important role was played by the fact that until the last moment, the beginning of the Hitlerite attack on the Soviet Union, I.V. Stalin did not leave the hope that the war could be delayed. This, to some extent, also connected the People's Commissar of Defense, who did not dare to enter I.V. Stalin with the project to create Headquarters until the spring of 1941.

At the end of spring, G.K. Zhukov had to once again, in an urgent form, ask the people's commissar to report to I.V. Stalin about the need to consider the draft plan for organizing the Headquarters of the High Command developed by the General Staff and allow it to be tested in practice at large command and staff exercises. This time the report took place and I. V. Stalin agreed to conduct such an exercise, but away from the border, somewhere at the turn of Valdai-Orsha-Gomel-r. Psyol, and then present to him a draft organization of the Headquarters, its functional duties and working bodies.

A reconnaissance of the line for the exercise was carried out in May 1941, but the exercise failed. Due to lack of time and other circumstances, measures for the practical preparation of the Headquarters of the High Command and its bodies were not considered.

Upstairs, at Headquarters, it was especially clear that in war mistakes are different from mistakes: some of them are correctable, others are difficult to correct. It all depends on the nature of the errors and their scale. Tactical mistakes, as experience showed, could be quickly eliminated by the higher command. Miscalculations on an operational scale are immeasurably more difficult to correct, especially if the command does not have the necessary forces, means or time at its disposal to bring these forces into action where and when it is needed.

To correct the operational-strategic mistakes made by the Headquarters and the command of some fronts in the summer of 1942 (which made it possible for the Nazi troops to reach the Stalingrad region and the North Caucasus), extraordinary efforts of the whole country were required.

As you know, strategy is completely dependent on politics, and mistakes of a military-political nature on a nationwide scale are difficult to correct. Only a country that wages a just war and has the necessary military-material capabilities for this can cope with them. Conversely, when the goals of the war do not meet the vital interests of the people, mistakes of this kind tend to lead to disastrous consequences.

But there are also incorrigible miscalculations. Such a miscalculation was made by the fascist leadership of Nazi Germany, risking an attack on the Soviet Union. This miscalculation stemmed from an incredible overestimation of their forces and means and underestimation potential The USSR is a country where a socialist system exists, where the armed forces, people, party and government are united.

Intoxicated by previous easy victories, Hitler and his political and military entourage believed that their troops would march victoriously through the Land of the Soviets just as they had in Western Europe. It turned out the other way around. Guided by the adventurist, nationalist ideology of fascism, the Nazis proved unable to properly understand the issues that decide the outcome of the war, which, in preparation for war, must be known and resolved without emotion on the basis of the science of society and war.

Having soberly summed up the causes of our unsuccessful operations in 1942, communist party. The Soviet government, relying on the indisputable advantages of the socialist social and state system, managed to mobilize all the forces of the country for new efforts to repulse the enemy. Thanks to the selfless support of the people, the Soviet Supreme High Command found the most acceptable methods and forms of struggle in the given situation, finally wrested the initiative from the enemy, and then turned the course of the war in its favor.

During the course of the war, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government paid great attention to the leadership of the armed forces. During the war years, more than 200 meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Organizing Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Party took place. Decisions made on issues of foreign policy, economics and strategy were carried out, respectively, through the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars, the State Defense Committee or the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

The work of the Headquarters was based on the Leninist principles of centralized command and control of troops. The headquarters directed all military operations of the armed forces on land, at sea and in the air, and built up strategic efforts in the course of the struggle at the expense of reserves and the use of the forces of the partisan movement. Its working body, as already mentioned, was the General Staff.

As a result of the reorganization, the General Staff became a more efficient, operational body and was able to carry out the tasks assigned to it much more effectively throughout the war. Of course, there were shortcomings even after the reorganization, but only in individual cases and on some complex issues.

To improve the management of the fronts on July 10, 1941, the State Defense Committee formed three Main Commands in the following areas:

Northwestern (commander-in-chief - Marshal K. E. Voroshilov, member of the Military Council - A. A. Zhdanov, chief of staff - General M. V. Zakharov);

Western (commander-in-chief - Marshal S. K. Timoshenko, member of the Military Council - N. A. Bulganin, chief of staff - General G. K. Malandin);

South-Western (commander-in-chief - Marshal S. M. Budyonny, member of the Military Council - N. S. Khrushchev (since August 5, 1941), chief of staff - A. P. Pokrovsky.

By creating the High Commands of the Directions, the State Defense Committee hoped to help the Headquarters to ensure the possibility of better command and control of troops, to organize the interaction of fronts, air and naval forces. It was assumed that the Military Councils of the directions, to a greater extent than the commands of the fronts, would be able to use local forces and means in the interests of the armed struggle.

However, already the first months of the existence of the High Commands showed that they did not justify hopes. The Headquarters continued to direct the fronts directly. According to the practice then existing, the commanders-in-chief of the directions did not have at their disposal reserves of troops and materiel to influence the course of hostilities. They could not, without the consent of the Supreme High Command, put into practice any fundamental decisions and, thus, turned into mere relaying authorities. As a result, in 1942, the High Commands of the directions were liquidated.

The Stavka had to lead the action again a large number fronts deployed over a vast area. This was inevitably associated with significant difficulties, especially in the field of coordinating the efforts of the troops of several fronts operating side by side. The search for new management methods began, which ultimately led to the emergence of an effective form of direct influence of strategic leadership on the activities of the fronts. Thus, a very peculiar institution of strategic leadership appeared - representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, who were sent to the most important sectors.

The role of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander in WWII

From the very first days of the Great Patriotic War, the Communist Party launched a gigantic work of organizing a nationwide struggle against the fascist invaders, of restructuring the entire life of the string on a military footing. The Central Committee of the Communist Party worked out measures to mobilize all the forces of the country to fight the enemy. They were set out in a directive letter from the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to party and Soviet organizations in the front-line regions dated June 29, 1941. The letter emphasized that our country had entered into a deadly battle with a dangerous and insidious enemy, German fascism. “In the war against fascist Germany imposed on us, the question of life and death of the Soviet state is being decided, of whether the peoples of the Soviet Union should be free or fall into enslavement.”

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR pointed out that in order to eliminate the greatest danger hanging over the country, it is necessary to mobilize all the forces of the people, reorganize all work on a war footing, organize all-round assistance to the front, increase in every way the production of weapons, ammunition, tanks, aircraft, etc. e. It was necessary to abandon the moods of peacetime and direct all forces to repulse the enemy, to defeat him. The Red Army and the Red Navy had to fight to the last drop of blood for our cities and villages. The party called on Soviet patriots to launch a partisan struggle behind enemy lines. To lead the struggle of the people behind enemy lines, underground party organizations were created.

In order to quickly mobilize the material, spiritual and human forces of the Soviet state, on June 30, 1941, the State Defense Committee was created, in whose hands all power in the state was concentrated. I. V. Stalin was the chairman of the GKO. As soon as the war began, prominent party and state figures were sent to military work - N. A. Bulganin, A. A. Zhdanov, N. S. Khrushchev, A. S. Shcherbakov and other members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, many secretaries Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics, Regional Committees and Regional Committees. In addition, tens of thousands of responsible party workers went to the front, who played a big role in strengthening discipline and morale in the army. During the war, important areas of work in the rear and at the front were taken over by members of the Central Committee, as well as Soviet military leaders, who, through their organizational, political, economic and military work, together with local party and Soviet organizations, ensured the victory of the Soviet people in the war. In total, more than one and a half million communists joined the ranks of the Soviet Army.

With a fiery word and personal example, the communists instilled courage and courage in the hearts of soldiers. The Komsomol youth bravely fought side by side with the communists.

On July 3, 1941, the head of the Soviet government, I. V. Stalin, spoke on the radio. He emphasized the deeply just, liberating nature of the Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, outlined to the people the program developed by the Central Committee of the Party and the Council of People's Commissars for restructuring the life of the country on a military footing and mobilizing forces to fight the enemy. JV Stalin, recalling the formidable danger hanging over the Soviet country, appealed to the entire Soviet people with an appeal to show courage and selflessness in defending the Motherland, “Our forces are innumerable,” he said. “The arrogant enemy will soon have to be convinced of this. Together with the Red Army, many thousands of workers, collective farmers, intellectuals are rising to the war against the attacked enemy.

The Soviet people, driven by a feeling of ardent love for the Motherland, expressed their determination and readiness to defend every inch of their native land, to fight the enemy until he was completely defeated. Hundreds of thousands of volunteers joined the ranks of the army and the people's militia. 100 thousand people immediately joined the people's militia in Moscow, about 160 thousand in Leningrad, 32 thousand girls and women in Leningrad voluntarily went to the front as sanitary troopers and nurses. Often whole families joined the people's militia.

During the first five months of the war, 100,000 communists and 260,000 Komsomol members left the Moscow party and Komsomol organizations for the front.

Those who remained in the rear strove to make their contribution to the defeat of the enemy by their labor deeds. Women-housewives, students went to work in production. Many old workers who were retired returned to the enterprises at their own request.

Raising the Soviet people to the Patriotic War, the Communist Party put forward fighting slogans: “Everything for the front. All to defeat the enemy!

The Soviet government in the very first days of the war determined areas for the evacuation of industrial enterprises and the population; measures were outlined for the distribution of the country's material resources, as well as budgetary appropriations for better meeting the needs of the front and the military industry.

On August 16, 1941, the military economic plan for the fourth quarter of 1941 and 1942 was approved; in the regions of the Volga region, the Urals, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. This plan provided for the wide deployment of industrial construction in the East, the relocation of enterprises from the front line and their commissioning in new places, an increase in the production of weapons, ammunition, metal, coal, gasoline, etc. In order to create trained reserves for the Soviet Army and Navy, the State Defense Committee on July 16, 1941 adopted a special decision "On the training of reserves in the system of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the Navy." In addition, from October 1, 1941, the State Defense Committee introduced compulsory military training for male citizens aged 16 to 50 years.

Across the country, the general training of Soviet citizens in military affairs unfolded on a broad front. Communists and Komsomol members were in the forefront of the universal education. The voluntary society of working people, OSOAVIAKHIM, played an important role in organizing the military training of the population.

By a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), an emergency body of the highest military administration was formed - the Headquarters of the High Command Armed Forces USSR. It was headed by People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko. The Headquarters included members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, Marshal of the Soviet Union K. E. Voroshilov, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny, People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov and Chief of the General Staff General of the Army G. K. Zhukov.

By the same resolution, an institute of permanent advisers was formed at the Headquarters, which included Marshals of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov and G. I. Kulik, generals K. A. Meretskov, P. F. Zhigarev, N. F. Vatutin, N. N. Voronov, as well as A. I. Mikoyan, L. M. Kaganovich, L. P. Beria, N. A. Voznesensky, A. A. Zhdanov, G. M. Malenkov, L. Z. Mekhlis.

Throughout the war, the Headquarters was in Moscow, but with the start of the bombing, it was transferred from the Kremlin to a small mansion in the Kirov Gate area. A month later, an underground center for the strategic control of the armed forces was prepared on the platform of the Kirovskaya metro station. The offices of I. V. Stalin and B. M. Shaposhnikov were equipped there, as well as the operational group of the General Staff and the departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense.

On July 10, 1941, in order to ensure centralized and more efficient control of the armed struggle, by the decision of the USSR State Defense Committee No. 10, the Headquarters of the High Command was transformed into the Headquarters of the High Command. It was headed by the chairman of the State Defense Committee (GKO) I. V. Stalin. By the same decree, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov was introduced to the Headquarters.

August 8, 1941 Stalin was appointed Supreme Commander. Since that time, the Headquarters became known as the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SVGK).

At the final stage of the Great Patriotic War, by a decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR of February 17, 1945, the composition of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was last changed and defined as follows: Marshals of the Soviet Union I. V. Stalin (Chairman - Supreme Commander), G. K. Zhukov (Deputy People's Commissar Defense) and A. M. Vasilevsky (Deputy People's Commissar of Defense), Army Generals N. A. Bulganin (member of the State Defense Committee and Deputy People's Commissar of Defense) and A. I. Antonov (Chief of the General Staff), Fleet Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov (People's Commissar of Defense) Navy of the USSR).

The activities of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command were large-scale and multifaceted. The headquarters made changes and clarifications to the structure and organization of the Armed Forces; carried out planning of campaigns and strategic operations; assigned tasks to the fronts and fleets and directed their combat activities; organized interaction between strategic groupings and operational formations various kinds Armed Forces and partisans; distributed between the fronts the reserve formations and materiel at its disposal; exercised control over the progress of the tasks; led the study and generalization of the experience of the war.

The main working body of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and personally of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was the General Staff of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, which closely interacted with the departments of the people's commissariats of defense and the Navy.

Lit .: Danilov V.D. Headquarters of the Supreme High Command: Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, 1941-1945. M., 1991; Pavlenko I.D. Headquarters of the Supreme High Command // Great Soviet Encyclopedia. T. 24. Book. 1. M., 1976; Headquarters of the Supreme High Command // Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. M., 2002. T. 1. Ch. eleven; The same [Electronic resource]. URL : http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/zhukov1/11.html .