Biography of Gorbachev Mikhail Sergeevich: policy of the board of the USSR, life after perestroika. Gorbachev - an epochal nonentity (12 photos) Early years and the beginning of political activity
On October 21, 1980, a significant event for that era took place. A new member was introduced into the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, who was strikingly different from the “Kremlin elders”. He was younger, purposeful and ready for positive changes. Who knows, maybe far-sighted politicians immediately saw great prospects in a 49-year-old man. He was the former First Secretary of the Stavropol Territory Committee of the CPSU, Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev. It is worth noting that today, he is the only living member of the Politburo of that convocation.
Early years and early political activity
The future first and last president of the USSR was born on March 2, 1931 in the Stavropol Territory of Russia, in the village of Privolnoye. Parents are peasants, as they would say now, from an international family (father is Russian, mother is Ukrainian). It so happened that the fathers of both parents were repressed by the Soviet authorities in the 1930s.
Gorbachev in childhood and youth
Already at the age of 13, Misha learns what collective farm labor is. After 2 years, he works as an assistant to the MTS combine operator. At the age of 18, he receives a very high award for such an age - the Order of the Red Banner of Labor. A year later, he becomes a candidate member of the CPSU, and since 1952 - a member of the party. The move turned out to be a milestone for the 21-year-old student. Faculty of Law Moscow State University.
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A year later, he created a family with a student of the philological faculty R. M. Titarenko. After graduation, he was sent to work in the Stavropol Regional Prosecutor's Office. But, the desire to move along the “party line” took over and very soon the young lawyer switched to Komsomol, and, then, to party work.
Although the young Gorbachev was a delegate to the XXII Congress of the CPSU in October 1961, he continued to remain, although in leading, but Komsomol posts. The opportunity to take the first party post presented itself after the transfer of the 1st secretary of the Stavropol regional committee to Moscow. It was he, already from the heights of the capital, who recommended to move forward Mikhail Sergeevich, in whom he saw the potential of a party worker. And he was not wrong. Recommendations from above were always perceived as orders, and in September 1966, M. S. Gorbachev was elected First Secretary of the Stavropol Regional Party Committee.
From party functionary to general secretary
After that, the promising party worker had the opportunity to start a scientific career and become a prominent KGB officer (in 1969, Yu. Andropov almost appointed him his deputy).
Gorbachev during his political career
However, Gorbachev moved further up the party career ladder and in 1973 became a candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. Immediately after that, he could become the head of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, but, on the advice of Suslov, he refused. He could also become the Prosecutor General of the USSR, but his candidacy was not approved. The prevailing circumstances slowly but surely led him to the pinnacle of political power in the country.
On November 27, at the next Plenum, he was elected Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The following month, the Gorbachev family moves to live in the capital.
Having survived two more general secretaries, who ruled for only about 3 years in total, MS Gorbachev waited for his finest hour. At a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on March 11, 1985, he was elected to the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Gorbachev, 54, became the country's youngest first leader in last years. Many, tired of weak old people in power, wanted something new and decisive changes. The Soviet people received all this in full. Even more than many would like.
Reforms of the new general secretary
Just a month after being appointed to the highest post of the state, new head party and the people made efforts to raise industry and the standard of living of the people.
Soviet President Gorbachev
The new policy was called "acceleration", but, for the most part, only contributed to the speedy development of production capacity and wear and tear of equipment. On the positive side, one can note the “green” street given to the cooperative movement in the USSR. Now enterprising people could legally engage in various types of economic and commercial activities without fear of being prosecuted. All this paved the way for the coming restructuring.
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In the same year, another important change began in the minds of the Soviet people, which had ambiguous, more negative, consequences. May 17 was the beginning of the fight against alcohol abuse at the state level. Among the positive results of the campaign can be considered an increased average life expectancy among the population and a decrease in the level of crimes while intoxicated. At the household level, this meant that it was already much less common to meet drunk people on the street, and for lovers of soft drinks, even in small villages, there was a sale of “citro” on tap. There were, of course, more negative consequences.
This is the thoughtless cutting down of rare and valuable grapes used for the production of vintage wine, and the shortage of sugar in stores, due to its use for home brewing, and the death of alcohol-addicted people from the use of technical and other alcohols. The campaign ended in nothing, the country missed 62 billion rubles in it (despite the fact that alcohol prices were significantly increased). 30 years later, the former general secretary himself said that the methods used in the fight for sobriety were wrong.
Chernobyl nuclear power plant
On April 26, 1986, the most terrible tragedy of our time occurred - the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. The reasons for what happened are still unclear, perhaps the human factor, a technical moment and a combination of circumstances are intertwined here, but its consequences are still being felt.
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Konstantin Pavlovich Vetrov
Assistant and adviser to the Minister of State Control of the USSR, Hero of Socialist Labor, historian, doctor of historical sciences. Author of many scientific works about the history of the Soviet Union.
Especially in Ukraine and neighboring Belarus, which took the brunt. In all the former republics of the USSR, there are people who have the status of victims of the Chernobyl accident (these are liquidators, residents, and plant workers), many of them have already died prematurely from radiation exposure. The fact that, on the instructions of the first leader of the country, in order to avoid panic among the population, May Day demonstrations were held in the Ukrainian and Belarusian capitals and other cities close to the epicenter of the accident also made its evil contribution. So mercantile interests were put higher human lives and health.
Two weeks after that, the country launched a fight against unearned income. Six months later, it ended in nothing, because the law on individual labor activity came out and the illegal suddenly became completely legal.
Improvements are also taking place in the field of human rights. At the end of the same year, Nobel Prize winner AD Sakharov returned from political exile. Gradually, the fight against dissent is curtailed, the persecution of various religious groups banned in the USSR is becoming much less. People begin to feel freer, which is also expressed in everyday conversations, when Soviet citizens are no longer afraid to openly criticize the Soviet leadership for miscalculations in governing the country. All this has prepared fertile ground for further changes.
B. Yeltsin and M. Gorbachev
Since 1987, attempts have been made in the Soviet Union to carry out perestroika on the principles of democratic socialism. Glasnost is announced, which allows open discussion of the topics of Stalinist repressions, sex, domestic violence, drug addiction and others in our country.
It is proposed to reform the political institutions in the country and democratize all aspects of the life of Soviet society. It is allowed to publish a lot of previously banned books and to watch banned films. Suddenly, the depressive beginning of the 80s turns into the sunny end of the 80s, when people begin to hope for the best and make bright plans. But, as it turned out, not everyone was capable of the correct use of the suddenly fallen freedom. Due to the gradually deteriorating economic situation and seeming impunity, the number of serious crimes is increasing and separatist aspirations are growing in all the union republics.
Foreign policy of M. S. Gorbachev
Even before coming to the heights of power, Gorbachev had the opportunity to visit abroad several times, including capitalist countries. Communicating with the politicians of those countries, he made a much more favorable impression on them than the orthodox representatives of the old formation, who saw capitalists only as ideological enemies. The young politician was more open, amiable and democratic. The Canadian Prime Minister was the first to appreciate it. Probably, many in the West dreamed that we would quickly agree with such a first leader of the USSR! Now their dream has come true.
USSR President Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Anatoly Lukyanov, 1990
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Konstantin Pavlovich Vetrov
Assistant and adviser to the Minister of State Control of the USSR, Hero of Socialist Labor, historian, doctor of historical sciences. Author of many scientific works on the history of the Soviet Union.
However, despite all this, relations between the US and the USSR in the early years of Gorbachev's rule remained habitually coldly strained. The first meeting of the leaders of the two countries in the fall of 1985 ended, by and large, with nothing. But the meeting in Reykjavik a year later marked a new bilateral relationship. The Secretary General has clearly shown the whole world that the Soviet Union is ready to pursue a new, milder and more peaceful foreign policy. The reasons for this were not only political, but also economic.
In order to continue the arms race with the United States, the USSR was forced to spend up to a quarter of the country's budget on military needs. In conditions when the country's economy was going through a clear crisis, it was both unreasonable and impossible. In confirmation of this course, the Warsaw Pact countries presented a new military doctrine, which implied a unilateral reduction in armaments to the necessary defensive minimum. An unexpected help in moving in this direction was the change of the Minister of Defense of the USSR. After the scandalous landing of a plane of a German citizen on Red Square, instead of S. L. Sokolov, this post was taken by a more flexible D. T. Yazov. The next milestones were the moratorium in the USSR on nuclear tests and the treaty on the elimination of short and medium-range missiles. Beginning in 1987, the tension in relations between the two leading countries of the world decreased and by the time of the collapse of the USSR it had completely disappeared.
The leaders of the country began to prepare the ground for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, which was carried out in 1989. The pressure and influence on the European countries of the socialist camp also began to decrease. Military contingents from these countries were gradually withdrawn, and they all changed the political system. The Cold War came to an end.
Last days of the USSR
All the good undertakings of Gorbachev and his associates faded against the background of the chaos that was established in the country on the threshold of the 1990s. Having lost all its European allies, having lost its former weight on the world stage, torn apart by internal conflicts and economic problems, the country was approaching its end.
This development could only be prevented by emergency measures. This is exactly what the GKChP, created in August 1991, became. But, after Yeltsin, gaining more and more supporters, took over, it became clear that the Union, in its current form, did not have long to live. Gorbachev, who formally remained the president of the USSR, no longer had real power in the country, remaining a “wedding general”, waiting for this wedding to end and his services would no longer be needed.
Today, there is no doubt that Gorbachev and his entourage played a decisive role in preparing the collapse of the Union of the Indestructible, one part of which actively implemented the disastrous decisions of the Secretary General, and the other silently watched how betrayal corrodes the foundations and unity of the country.
And none of the so-called comrades-in-arms dared to tell Gorbachev that he was not "a giant, but just a cockroach." But in the post-Soviet period, some of the Secretary General's associates hastened to publish memoirs in which they cursed the former patron in every way, talking about how they "opposed" the destructive perestroika course.
In this regard, I will try to show how the personnel environment for more than six years created conditions for Mikhail Sergeevich to work on the collapse of the country. I wouldn't want something like this to happen again.
THE DARKER THE NIGHT, THE BRIGHTER THE STARS
Narcissistic amateurs like Gorbachev, having broken into power, care only about their image. They surround themselves not with personalities, but with convenient people in order to look like “geniuses” against their background. This feature of Mikhail Sergeevich was noticed by the US Ambassador to the USSR J. Matlock, saying: “He felt comfortable only next to the silent or gray ...”
Mikhail Sergeevich formulated the essence of his personnel policy while still working in Stavropol. Once, in response to friendly criticism of his personnel approaches, Gorbachev uttered a mysterious phrase: "The darker the night, the brighter the stars." There is no doubt that he saw himself in the sky as a star of the first magnitude. Therefore, he always tirelessly shuffled the deck, picking up convenient and helpful ones.
"Architect" of perestroika Alexander Yakovlev (to the left of M. Gorbachev)
By the time Gorbachev was elected General Secretary, Yegor Ligachev, then head of the Department of Organizational and Party Work of the Central Committee of the CPSU, managed to replace 70% of the secretaries of the regional and regional committees of the party, placing "his proven" people, ready to follow any instructions and ensure the majority at the Plenums of the Central Committee.
With the advent of Gorbachev, personnel replacements acquired a wider scope. During the first three years, the composition of the Central Committee was updated by 85%, which was much higher than in 1934-1939. Then they amounted to about 77%. In 1988, Gorbachev began the "rejuvenation" of the apparatus of the Central Committee. All key positions were given to Gorbachevs.
In the same way, the Council of Ministers of the USSR was renewed. Only ten out of 115 pre-Gorbachev ministers remained there. Nevertheless, despite the endless personnel reshuffling, Gorbachev still believes that HIS perestroika was torpedoed by the conservative apparatus.
In his memoirs “Life and Reforms,” he writes: “... After the XXVII Congress (1986), the composition of district committees and city committees changed three times, the Soviet bodies were almost completely renewed. After the January Plenum of the Central Committee in 1987, there was a change of first secretaries in alternative elections, many "old-timers" retired. The second, third or even fourth “team” became at the helm, and things went on the old fashioned way. So strong was the leaven. The dogmas of Marxism in the simplified Stalinist interpretation were so firmly driven into the heads.
It is difficult to imagine a greater misunderstanding of the situation. It is absolutely clear that in 1988-1989, people came to the leadership of most party organizations in the CPSU, not only "poisoned" by the dogmas of Marxism, but very far from both Marxism and socialism. As a result, the restructuring of socialism turned into a departure from it. For the same reason, in September 1991, the CPSU quietly died.
STAFF LINKS. ARCHITECT OF PERESTRUCTION
The main credo of Gorbachev's personnel policy was the placement of trusted and controlled supporters in key positions, which created personnel links. Pushing through the appointment of such people, Mikhail Sergeevich demonstrated truly "teeth of steel", which Politburo Patriarch Andrei Gromyko once said.
Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and US Secretary of State George Shultz
Clear evidence of this is the situation with the appointment on July 1, 1985, of the tongue-tied and poorly spoken Russian Eduard Shevardnadze as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. However, in his memoirs Life and Reforms, Gorbachev states without a shadow of embarrassment: "Eduard Shevardnadze is an uncommon personality, an accomplished politician, educated, erudite."
The damage that the Gorbachev-Shevardnadze connection inflicted on the Soviet Union and, accordingly, Russia, is best evidenced by a quote from the memoirs former president US George Bush Sr.:
“We ourselves did not understand such a policy of the Soviet leadership. We were ready to give guarantees that the countries of Eastern Europe would never join NATO and forgive many billions of dollars of debt, but Shevardnadze did not even bargain and agreed to everything without preconditions. The same on the border with Alaska (we are talking about the delimitation of maritime spaces in the Bering and Chukchi Seas), where we did not count on anything. It was a gift from God."
Yegor Ligachev, who became famous for the phrase in relation to Yeltsin: “Boris, you are wrong!”
No less scandalous is the situation with the appointment of Gennady Yanayev to the post of vice president. Gorbachev, together with Lukyanov, actually raped the IV Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (December 1990), pushing through this candidacy. In the end, from the second run, the deputies voted for "a mature politician who is able to participate in the discussion and adoption of important decisions on a national scale." This is how Gorbachev described his candidate Gennady Yanaev for the post of vice-president of the USSR.
I knew Yanaev quite well, I visited him in the Kremlin office more than once. He was a decent and kind person, completely devoid of the Kremlin bureaucratic fanaticism, but not the vice president, which was confirmed by the events of August 1991. Apparently, for this reason, Mikhail Sergeevich needed Yanaev so much.
In addition, Gorbachev was aware of Yanaev's delicate problem: his hands were constantly shaking. Even during my first meeting with Gennady Ivanovich, I noticed how he took cigarettes with trembling hands and lit up. We were one on one in the office, so Yanaev had no reason to worry.
So trembling hands, allegedly from fear, at a press conference on August 19, 1991, are a myth of journalists. Apparently, this personal aspect also determined Gorbachev's stubborn desire to see Yanaev as vice president. As a result, Mikhail Sergeevich managed to create a much-needed personnel link between Gorbachev and Yanaev.
In addition to the above, Mikhail Sergeevich managed to create the following personnel links: Gorbachev - Yakovlev, Gorbachev - Ryzhkov, Gorbachev - Lukyanov, Gorbachev - Yazov, Gorbachev - Kryuchkov, Gorbachev - Razumovsky, Gorbachev - Bakatin.
The central link was Gorbachev - Yakovlev. True, Yakovlev created it, and not Gorbachev, during his stay on an official visit to Canada in 1983. Let's talk about it in more detail.
Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Vladimir Kryuchkov
It is known that the most important ideas of disastrous perestroika were inspired by Mikhail Sergeevich precisely by Yakovlev. It is no coincidence that he was called “the architect of perestroika” behind his back.
Yakovlev managed to convince Gorbachev that socialism had no prospects. He also threw in the idea of the priority of universal human values. And he also helped Mikhail Sergeevich to furnish himself with "the right people."
It is no secret that Yakovlev was the one who insisted on the appointment of Dmitry Yazov as Minister of Defense of the USSR, and Vladimir Kryuchkov as Chairman of the KGB.
Being a good psychologist, Yakovlev felt that with all the positive characteristics, the diligence of these two would always prevail over initiative and independence. This subsequently played a fatal role in the fate of the USSR.
Jeanne Kirkpatrick, former adviser to R. Reagan on defense and foreign intelligence, let slip about Yakovlev's real contribution to the collapse of the USSR in an interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta (October 10, 1998). When asked about the role of individuals in the politics of the 20th century, along with such figures as Churchill, Mussolini, Hitler, Mao Zedong, Truman, Stalin, she named Yakovlev.
The surprised journalist asked: “Why Yakovlev? Have you met him?" An ambiguous answer followed: “A couple of times. I think he is a very interesting person and has played a huge and important role. I hope he knows that I think so."
Comments are superfluous, especially if we recall the statement of Yuri Drozdov, the former head of the KGB Department C (illegal intelligence), made by him to the Rossiyskaya Gazeta correspondent (August 31, 2007): “Several years ago, a former American intelligence officer whom I knew well, Arriving in Moscow, at dinner in a restaurant on Ostozhenka, he threw the following phrase: “You are good guys. We know that you have had successes that you can be proud of. But time will pass, and you will gasp if it is declassified what kind of agents the CIA and the State Department had at the top.”
PERSONNEL LINKS-2
Special mention should be made of the Gorbachev-Ryzhkov connection. Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov is an excellent specialist and a person with a heightened sense of decency and responsibility, which did not allow him to properly confront Gorbachev.
They started talking about him as a leader in July 1989, when Ryzhkov said at a meeting of party workers in the Kremlin: "The party is in danger!" Therefore, when at the Extraordinary Third Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (March 1990) the question of electing the president arose, a number of deputies asked him to nominate his candidacy.
Here is how the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR Vitaly Vorotnikov describes this situation: “The situation developed in such a way that if the prime minister had not withdrawn his candidacy, Gorbachev would undoubtedly have been defeated in a normal vote. However, as you know, Nikolai Ivanovich never found the courage to cross the invisible line that separates the most senior of the officials from the real party leader. Thus, he gave Gorbachev the presidency of the USSR.
I want to clarify. In my opinion, and I talked a lot with Nikolai Ivanovich, the main role in Ryzhkov's refusal to run for president was played not by lack of courage, but by the decency that I mentioned above. Ryzhkov considered it dishonorable to put the foot on a colleague. Gorbachev was counting on this.
But not only the position of Ryzhkov gave Gorbachev the presidency. A decisive role here was played by a bunch of Gorbachev - Lukyanov. Anatoly Ivanovich chaired a meeting of the III Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, which approved an addition to the Constitution on the establishment of the post of President of the USSR. The head of state was to be elected by the citizens by direct and secret ballot. But at that time it was already clear that Gorbachev's chances of becoming "popularly elected" were extremely small.
Lukyanov managed to push through with a negligible majority of 46 votes the decision that the first elections, as an exception, be held by the Congress of People's Deputies. M. Gorbachev, N. Ryzhkov and V. Bakatin were nominated as candidates. However, the last two candidates recused themselves. As a result, Gorbachev was elected President of the USSR. This is what it means to put the right person in the right position. Gorbachev could not take away this skill.
A few words about the Gorbachev-Razumovsky connection. Georgy Razumovsky in May 1985 headed the Department of Organizational and Party Work of the Central Committee, replacing Ligachev in this post. A year later, he acquired the status of secretary of the Central Committee.
Regulation and showiness in the work of the party organizations of the country under Razumovsky increased significantly. It is he who is responsible for the separatist sentiments that appeared in the Communist Party of Lithuania in 1988.
The fact is that on the eve of the 19th Party Conference, Gorbachev called for the development of internal party democracy and glasnost. But at the same time, from the organizational department of the Central Committee, which was led by Razumovsky, went to the places, including the Communist Party of Lithuania, a tough order of which delegates should be elected. This caused a wave of indignation not only in the Communist Party of Lithuania, but also in the republic.
The protest moods of the Lithuanian communists largely contributed to the creation and development of "Sąjūdis" in Lithuania. In the future, the situation was aggravated by the complete disregard of the critical remarks made by the Lithuanian communists during the 1988 reporting and election campaign by the organizational department of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
As a result, on January 19, 1989, the plenum of the Vilnius City Party Committee was forced to re-apply to Razumovsky about the criticisms sent after the reporting and election campaign from the republic. However, this time there was no answer.
Then the topic of the independence of the Lithuanian Communist Party was put on the agenda in the Lithuanian media. As a result of this discussion, to which the Central Committee of the CPSU also did not respond, the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania (December 1989) announced the withdrawal of the party from the CPSU. Well, on March 11, 1990, Lithuania already announced its withdrawal from the USSR.
In this regard, let me remind you that Gorbachev constantly talked about the old party bureaucratic apparatus, which allegedly lay like a “dam” on the path of perestroika. It is clear that this was verbiage, because in fact such a "dam" was a bunch of Gorbachev - Razumovsky and their entourage.
Cover of the book by Vadim Bakatin with the characteristic title "Getting rid of the KGB"
I will add that, according to the Russian journalist Yevgenia Albats, the former candidate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, Razumovsky, at least until 2001, received a monthly salary from the structures of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Apparently, it was for what.
Serious damage to the country was caused by a bunch of Gorbachev - Bakatin.
In October 1988, Vadim Bakatin, the former first secretary of the Kemerovo Regional Party Committee, was appointed to the post of Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR. It seemed like a minor change. The former first secretary of the Rostov regional committee of the CPSU, Vlasov, was replaced by the first secretary of another regional committee, Bakatin. But this is only at first glance.
Bakatin's personality is usually associated with the defeat of the Committee. However, there his role was small. The KGB was already doomed in August 1991, and Bakatin was only following the instructions of the puppeteers to “finish him off”. Much more interesting is the role of Vadim Viktorovich in the collapse of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Offering Bakatin the post of interior minister, Gorbachev stressed: “I don't need police ministers. I need politicians." Bakatin "brilliantly" coped with the role of a politician from the police. For two years of work, he caused irreparable damage to the Soviet police.
The minister issued an order, according to which police officers received the right to work part-time in other organizations. As a result, this led not only to corruption and the merging of law enforcement agencies with the criminogenic contingent, but also to the departure of the main professional core of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to commercial structures. This was the beginning of the collapse of the Soviet law enforcement system.
Another order of Bakatin dealt a no less painful blow to this system - the liquidation of the undercover police apparatus. Policemen of the whole world considered and consider these agents as their eyes and ears in the criminal world. This is known even to amateurs.
Russia is still experiencing the consequences of the above orders of Bakatin. Towards the end of his reign, Vadim Viktorovich dealt another mortal blow to the Soviet law enforcement system. He prepared its actual division into fifteen national republican departments.
I'll give you an example. In 1990, after Lithuania declared independence, the Republican Ministry of Internal Affairs not only did not submit to the union ministry, but also took a hostile position in resolving controversial issues.
Nevertheless, Bakatin gave a personal instruction that the Ministry of Internal Affairs should finance the Ministry of Internal Affairs of independent Lithuania, supply it with modern equipment and help create a police academy in Vilnius, which, by the way, educated cadres in an anti-Soviet and anti-Russian spirit. Bakatin considered this a "constructive step" in relations between the USSR and independent Lithuania.
POLITBURO. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE SOVIET GENERALITY
Special mention should be made of the role of the Politburo of the Central Committee under Gorbachev. It was intended to ensure the collective leadership of the party and the country. However, it turned into a handy tool for blessing the disastrous decisions of the new General Secretary.
Solving this problem, Mikhail Sergeevich already in April 1985 began to change the balance of forces in the Politburo of the Central Committee. First of all, all opponents of Gorbachev were removed from the PB: Romanov, Tikhonov, Shcherbitsky, Grishin, Kunaev, Aliyev. Those who took an active part in the operation to elect him General Secretary were the first to take their place: E. Ligachev, N. Ryzhkov and V. Chebrikov.
Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Sokolov, dismissed after the "Rust case"
In total, during his reign, Gorbachev replaced three compositions of the Politburo of the Central Committee, and each of them was much weaker than the previous one. He immediately felt like a master. According to Valery Boldin, a former long-term assistant and in fact " right hand"Mikhail Sergeevich, he" became completely intolerant of any criticism addressed to him ... I remember at a meeting he said to one of the members of the Politburo: "If you continue to talk, I will immediately kick you out the door" ("Kommersant-Vlast", May 15, 2001 of the year).
That's how! However, members of the PB took this trick of the new General Secretary for granted. The old party apparatus was brought up in very rigid traditions.
Special mention should be made of the meeting at which Gorbachev dealt with the generals. The time for the "withdrawal" of candidate member of the PB, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Sokolov, came when Gorbachev realized that his unilateral "peacekeeping policy" was hindered by the military, led by the uncompromising Minister of Defense. It is known that Sokolov and his entourage opposed the signing of the Treaty on the Elimination of Medium and Short Range Missiles (INF).
Then a grandiose action was conceived to renew the Soviet generals. An incident that occurred in May 1941 was used as an example. Then the German military transport aircraft "Junkers-52", checking the Soviet air defense system, flying over 1200 kilometers without hindrance, landed at the Tushino airfield in Moscow. As a result, the Soviet military command and, above all, the air force, was covered by a wave of repressions, and almost everything was replaced.
On May 28, 1987, on the Day of the Border Guard, a Cessna-172 Skyhawk sports plane landed on Vasilevsky Spusk near Red Square, with German amateur pilot Matthias Rust at the controls. Gorbachev, having arrived that evening from Romania, held a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee right in the Vnukovo-2 government hall. On it, Marshal Sokolov was dismissed, and Yazov was immediately appointed minister, who happened to be at the airport very conveniently.
On May 30 of the same year, a meeting of the PB regarding Rust was already held in the Kremlin. The tone was set by Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Ryzhkov, who demanded the immediate removal of the Air Force Commander-in-Chief and the Minister of Defense. Well, then everything went according to knurled. Yakovlev, Ligachev, Gorbachev spoke: resign, remove, punish.
Matthias Rust on Vasilyevsky Spusk shortly after landing
Surprisingly, no one remembered that after the scandalous situation in September 1983 with the South Korean Boeing, the USSR signed an addendum to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, which categorically forbade shooting down civilian aircraft.
No one raised the question of why the plane, after crossing the border for 3 hours and 20 minutes, disappeared from the radar screens and landed with fairly full tanks. The chairman of the KGB, V. M. Chebrikov, did not say a word about the fact that, while waiting for Rust, trolleybus wires were allegedly cut on the Bolshoy Moskvoretsky Bridge, and professional television cameras were installed on Red Square.
According to the operational duty officer of the Moscow Air Defense District, Major General Vladimir Reznichenko, at the very moment when the Rust plane flew up to Moscow with a tailwind, an order was unexpectedly received from the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Forces to turn off the automated air defense control system for preventive maintenance.
The plane on which M. Rust flew, in the Berlin Technical Museum
One of the most vulnerable places of air defense is the border between location zones. According to General I. Maltsev: “the target was lost, because the continuous radar field was only in a narrow strip along the border, then there were dead zones, and for some reason Rust chose them for the flight.”
The question is, how could a German amateur pilot know about the boundaries of such "dead zones"? According to the statement of the chief of staff of the Tallinn Air Defense Division, Colonel V. Tishevsky, the following rule existed in the air defense system of that time: the boundaries of such zones were changed every 24 hours. However, on May 27 such a command was not received, so on May 28 the boundaries of the location zones established the day before continued to operate.
It turns out that Rust knew about the boundaries of the "dead" zones. Information could only be obtained from the USSR. The question is: through whom? Rust allegedly landed in the area of Staraya Russa (AiF, No. 31, July 2013).
M. Rust during the trial.
The newspaper quotes Andrey Karaulov, the author of the Moment of Truth TV program: “I ask Rust: “Do you want me to show you a photo of how your plane is refueled?” Rust did not answer, remained silent, he was not interested in looking at the photographs, only his eyes ran around ... "
By the way, this version appeared almost immediately, as soon as Rust was detained. Journalist M. Timm from the German magazine "Bunde" drew attention to two facts. First, Rust took off in a green shirt and jeans, and in Moscow he got off the plane in a red overall. Secondly, in Helsinki, only the sign of the Hamburg flying club appeared on board his plane, while in Moscow people could see an image of a crossed-out atomic bomb pasted on the tail stabilizer.
An intermediate landing was needed to mislead the radio engineering units of the air defense forces: to disappear from the locator screens, and then take off again, turning from a “border violator” into a domestic “flight violator”.
No one at the Politburo of the Central Committee raised the issue that Rust followed a surprisingly clear route, as if knowing how the air defense system of the northwestern direction of the USSR was built. It is known that in March 1987, Marshal Sokolov left the General Secretary maps of the country's air defense in this direction.
As the former commander-in-chief of the Russian Air Force, General of the Army Pyotr Deinekin, later stated, “there is no doubt that Rust’s flight was a carefully planned provocation by Western intelligence agencies. And, most importantly, it was carried out with the consent and knowledge of individuals from the then leadership of the Soviet Union.
“In the Rust case, one must carefully separate real facts from exaggerated sensations,” says Pavel Evdokimov, editor-in-chief of the Spetsnaz Rossii newspaper. - So, for example, at the suggestion of Andrey Karaulov, the version about trolleybus wires, which were previously removed in the area of the Cessna landing, received wide circulation.
However, everything was exactly the opposite: new ones appeared! After. When the investigator Oleg Dobrovolsky got acquainted with the photographs from the place of the emergency, he asked Rust with amazement: “Tell me, Matias, how could you even land the plane on the bridge? ..” He replied that there were only obstacles in three places: at the beginning, in middle and end. They began to find out ... And it turned out that in a day or two, at the direction of the leadership of the Moscow City Executive Committee, wires appeared every twenty meters.
Another thing - how Rust was able to overcome what was? In criminal case No. 136 of the Investigative Department of the KGB of the USSR, the answer of a witness, a traffic police officer S.A.
One of two things: either we are dealing with some kind of “secret operation” multiplied by favorable chances, or everything that happened is a really amazing combination of circumstances that allowed Rust to fly to Moscow.
The same Karaulov says that there is a photograph of the Cessna refueling near Staraya Russa. Good! So why hasn't it been published yet? It seems that Karaulov just took Rust "at gunpoint" to see his reaction.
Be that as it may, in May 1987 Gorbachev could present the matter in such a way that the Soviet Armed Forces were, they say, an intruder along the entire route of his movement, from the border, and did not shoot down solely because of humanism and goodwill - in the spirit of Perestroika, Glasnost and Democratization. And the international resonance from such a noble position would be enormous! However, Gorbachev acted in a completely different way, ”concludes Pavel Evdokimov.
The analysis of the scandalous passage of Rust at the Politburo of the Central Committee ended with the displacement of almost the entire top of the Armed Forces of the USSR. “One afternoon, in the early days of June,” Ligachev’s assistant V. Legostaev recalled, “Yakovlev appeared unexpectedly in my office, as usual. By that time, he had already managed to become a member of the Politburo, close to the General Secretary. A. N.'s broad, roughly drawn face shone with a triumphant smile. He was in an openly upbeat, almost celebratory frame of mind. Right from the threshold, victoriously putting out his palms in front of him, he blurted out: “In! All hands in blood! Elbows!”
From the excited explanations that followed, it turned out that my guest was returning from the next meeting of the Politburo, at which personnel clashes were held in connection with the Rust case. A decision was made to remove a number of senior Soviet military leaders from their posts. The results of this meeting led Yakovlev to such an enthusiastic victorious state. His hands were "in the blood" of the defeated adversaries.
On December 8, 1987, M. Gorbachev and R. Reagan freely signed the INF Treaty, which today is considered the de facto surrender of the USSR to the United States.
ANTI-ALCOHOLIC POLITBURO
The next Politburo of the Central Committee that deserves attention concerns the results of the well-known anti-alcohol campaign initiated by Gorbachev in May 1985. The discussion of these results took place on December 24, 1987. The note of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR Vorotnikov “On the consequences of the anti-alcohol campaign in the RSFSR” was discussed. The facts were damning. But Gorbachev stood his ground: “The decision was right. We will not change our principled position." And everyone once again agreed with the General Secretary.
But Gorbachev turned out to be crafty. In 1995, he published the book "Life and Reforms", in which he titled one chapter "The Anti-Alcohol Campaign: a noble idea, a deplorable result." In it, he transferred the arrows of responsibility for the failure to the Secretary of the Central Committee, Yegor Ligachev, and the Chairman of the Party Control Committee, Mikhail Solomentsev. Allegedly, it was they who “brought everything to the point of absurdity. They demanded that local party leaders, ministers, business executives "overfulfill" the plan to reduce the production of alcohol and replace it with lemonade.
However former minister Finance of the USSR, and later Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Valentin Pavlov, revealed the exact calculation and intent that Gorbachev and Yakovlev put on the anti-alcohol campaign: structures and their enrichment. The results of the campaign in the USSR were not long in coming, in exact accordance with world experience. Gorbachev and Yakovlev could not have been unaware of this experience, but they were solving a different problem and, apparently, they were ready to pay any price for its successful solution.
There is no doubt that the "fathers" of perestroika were in a hurry to create a social base in the USSR for the restoration of capitalism. And they found it in the face of the shadow mafia-criminal business. According to various estimates, the state lost up to 200 billion rubles in the fight against alcoholism. The lion's share of this amount "shadow companies" put in their pockets. And Mikhail Sergeevich was friends with the “shadow business” since the Stavropol times.
The second part of the social base of the capitalist restoration was the party, Soviet and especially economic nomenklatura. Favorable conditions were also created for its successful growth into capitalism. This was facilitated by the adopted laws on state-owned enterprises, cooperation and foreign economic activity.
As a result, the majority of Soviet directors got the opportunity to lay the foundation for personal well-being on the ruins of their enterprises with the help of cooperatives, which they generously shared with the party and Soviet nomenklatura. This is how the class of owners of democratic Russia was formed. And his fathers should be considered not only Gaidar and Chubais, but above all Gorbachev and Yakovlev.
Let's finish the story about the strange August GKChP. Today, when everyone has witnessed the coup d'état that took place in Kyiv, where power passed to the Maidan militants, it became clear that not only the blatant corruption of Ukrainian officials, but, above all, the weakness of power, provoked the militants to lawlessness.
The events in Kyiv again reminded the Moscow events of August 1991. The indecisiveness and uncertainty of the position of the GKChP, headed by the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Vladimir Kryuchkov, led to the defeat of the GKChP.
By the way, the Gekachepies could count on the support of the majority of the population of the USSR. I want to remind you that in March 1991, 70% of the population of the "Union of the Indestructible" spoke in favor of maintaining a single state.
ARREST YELTSIN. "WAIT FOR THE COMMAND!"
As you know, the special group "A" of the KGB of the USSR, headed by the Hero of the Soviet Union V.F. Karpukhin, was in the Arkhangelsk region from the night of August 18 to August 19, 1991. But the order to isolate Yeltsin, despite repeated telephone inquiries from the commander of Group A, never followed.
In this regard, I will quote a direct participant in those events - the president of the International Association of Veterans of the Alpha anti-terror unit, a deputy of the Moscow City Duma, Sergei Goncharov:
“Karpukhin informed the headquarters that we were in place and ready to fulfill the order. The command followed, and I distinctly heard it: "Wait for instructions!" Beginning to light up. I tell Karpukhin: “Fedorych! You report to headquarters - dawn is coming soon. Again the team: “Wait! Contact me later." Our commander took responsibility: “What to expect!” And we relocated to a village located next to Arkhangelsk.
Mushroom pickers went ... People, seeing the fighters in an unusual form - in "spheres" and with them in their hands, were frightened and began to shy away from us, to return home.
As I understand it, the information reached Korzhakov. I say: “Fedorych, call again! Everyone understands that we have already been deciphered!” Karpukhin comes to the leadership. They formulate a new order for him: “Advance to the position of option No. 2” - this is for capturing at the moment of promotion. We remove the guys, get back into the cars and move forward for two kilometers, we begin to disguise ourselves. But how can so many armed people do this? The villagers looked at us with obvious apprehension, they didn’t even go out for water ...
Hero of the Soviet Union Viktor Fyodorovich Karpukhin (1947-2003). It was he, as the commander of Group A of the KGB of the USSR, who was waiting for the order to arrest Boris Yeltsin. And didn't get it.
OK. We worked out the operation, how to block the advance, and Karpukhin reported on readiness. It was 6 o'clock - it's light, you can see everything, there is a stream of cars going to Moscow. From headquarters again: “Wait for instructions, there will be an order!”
By 7 o'clock, service cars with guards began to arrive at Arkhangelskoye. We see some big ranks. Okay, sent our intelligence. It turns out that Khasbulatov, Poltoranin and someone else arrived. We report. We again: "Wait for instructions!" All! We do not understand what they want from us and how to carry out the operation!
Somewhere around 8 in the morning, the scouts report: “The column - two armored ZILs, two Volga with the protection of Yeltsin and the persons who arrived there is moving out onto the highway. Get ready for the operation! Karpukhin calls the headquarters again and hears: “Wait for the command!” - “What to expect, the column will pass in five minutes!” - "Wait for the command!" When we have already seen them, Fedorych again pulls off the receiver. Him again: “Wait for the command!”
The commands never arrived. Why? The figures of the State Emergency Committee, including Kryuchkov, did not give a clear answer to this question. Obviously, none of its organizers dared to take responsibility. There was no man of the caliber of Valentin Ivanovich Varennikov, but he was in Kyiv and could not influence the course of events.
Or, perhaps, there was some kind of complex double or triple game. I don't know, it's hard for me to judge... Last chapter The Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Anatoly Lukyanov, in an interview with the Russian press, reported that the State Emergency Committee was created at a meeting with Gorbachev on March 28, 1991. And Gennady Yanaev said that the documents of the State Emergency Committee were developed on behalf of the same Gorbachev.
After Yeltsin's motorcade passed us at high speed, Karpukhin answered the phone: "What to do now?" - "Wait, we'll call back!" Literally in five minutes: “Take some of your officers under the protection of Arkhangelskoye. - "Why?!" “Do what you are told! The rest - in the unit!
The time when the GKChP could win was mediocrely missed. Yeltsin was given precious time to mobilize his supporters and take action. At 10 or 11 we returned to N-sky lane, to the place of permanent deployment. And on the Central Television, instead of the programs announced in the broadcasting schedule, they showed "Swan Lake". The tragedy of the state turned into a farce.”
... Further, the whole situation fell down like a house of cards. Yeltsin, having climbed onto a tank near the White House, declared the actions of the GKChP unconstitutional. In the evening, a news broadcast went on television, in which information was announced that put an end to the State Emergency Committee. The failed press conference, which was held by the Gekachepsy, also played its role.
In a word, it turned out not to be the State Emergency Committee, but almost a madhouse. In fact, there was a repetition of the January situation in Vilnius in 1991. Meanwhile, it is known that the KGB always carefully prepared its operations. Let us recall at least the first phase of the entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, for which the Chekists were responsible. Everything was calculated to the minute.
However, much becomes clear when it turns out that the two "irreconcilable enemies", Gorbachev and Yeltsin, actually worked together. This was stated to Komsomolskaya Pravda (August 18, 2011) by the former Minister of Press and Information of Russia Mikhail Poltoranin. Apparently, the head of the KGB knew or guessed about this bunch, which determined the strange duality of his behavior. Moreover, V. Kryuchkov, judging by his conversation with the head of the PGU (intelligence) of the KGB, Leonid Vladimirovich Shebarshin, back in June 1990 decided to bet on Yeltsin.
At the same time, Vladimir Alexandrovich could not get rid of a sense of personal obligation to Gorbachev. As a result, his behavior was a vivid example of following the principle of "ours and yours." But in politics, such a duality of position is, as a rule, punished. What happened.
TESTIMONY OF PRINCE SHCHERBATOV
Boris Yeltsin, who played a subordinate role in the "bundle", realized that the "putsch" gave him a rare opportunity to put an end to Gorbachev. Unfortunately, Boris Nikolaevich, trying to throw Mikhail Sergeevich out of big politics, at the same time, without regret, said goodbye to the Union.
And again, one should recall the treacherous behavior of Gorbachev in a situation when Yeltsin, Kravchuk and Shushkevich, having gathered in Viskuli, announced the termination of the activities of the USSR as an international entity.
This is now talking about the legitimacy of the statement adopted by the Troika. And then the conspirators knew perfectly well that they were committing a crime and they met precisely in Belovezhskaya Pushcha in order, in extreme cases, to leave on foot for Poland.
It is known that after Viskuly, Yeltsin was afraid to come to the Kremlin to Gorbachev. He was sure that he would give the command to arrest him, but ... Mikhail Sergeevich preferred to let the situation take its course. He was satisfied with the situation of the collapse of the USSR, since in this case the likelihood of bringing him to justice for the crimes committed disappeared.
Sworn enemies Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, however, played a common role in the collapse of the Soviet Union
Earlier I already wrote that during this period Gorbachev was thinking not about how to save the Union, but about how to provide himself with a deficit for the future: food, drinks and housing. It is no coincidence that Mikhail Sergeevich’s long-term head of security, KGB General Vladimir Timofeevich Medvedev, aptly emphasized that Gorbachev’s main ideology was the ideology of self-survival.
Unfortunately, at that time many of the Soviet political and military leaders tried to secure a material reserve for the future. In this regard, we should talk about how in 1991 the Americans bought up the Soviet elite in the bud, helping Yeltsin to come to power. I will cite the testimony of Prince Alexei Pavlovich Shcherbatov (1910-2003) from the Rurik family, president of the Union of Russian Nobles of North and South America.
On the day of the putsch, Shcherbatov flew to Moscow from the United States to take part in the congress of compatriots. The prince outlined his impressions of this trip
in a memoir entitled “A Very Recent History. First trip to Russia.
By the will of fate, Shcherbatov found himself in the midst of the events of August 1991. He, as an influential American citizen, had direct access to the US Ambassador to the USSR, Robert Strauss, who was a very well-informed person. The prince, who remained a Russian patriot in his soul, was acutely worried about the events of August 1991. Therefore, he was interested in everything connected with them.
In an article published by the popular Orthodox newspaper Vera - Eskom (No. 520), Prince Shcherbatov said: “... I tried to find out as many details as possible about the preparations for the coup. And in a few days I clarified something for myself: the Americans, the CIA spent money through their ambassador to Russia, Robert Strauss, using his connections to bribe the military: the Taman and Dzerzhinsk airborne divisions, which were supposed to go over to Yeltsin's side. The son of Marshal Shaposhnikov, the Minister of War Grachev, received a lot of money.
Shaposhnikov now has an estate in the south of France, a house in Switzerland. I heard from George Bailey, my old friend who worked for the CIA for many years, that the amount allocated to the USSR was more than one billion dollars. Few knew that in 1991, special planes under the guise of diplomatic cargo delivered money to Sheremetyevo Airport, they were distributed in packages of 10, 20, 50 banknotes to government leaders and the military. These people were later able to participate in privatization. Today this is a known fact.
Former delegates of the Shatagua conference participated in the coup: General Chervov helped distribute money among the military, one of the directors of the Banks Trust Company, John Crystal, as I learned, spent the amounts received from the CIA through his bank. It turned out that if good bribes were given to Soviet officials, then it would not be difficult to destroy the Soviet Union.
It remains to be added that the journalist’s conversation with Prince Shcherbatov, who was called “the man-legend of Russian history,” took place in New York, in a house in Manhattan, in the summer of 2003.
BETRAYAL OF SHEVARDNADZE
Treason has long settled in the Kremlin. On February 14, 2014, the TV channel "Russia 1" showed a film by journalist Andrei Kondrashov "Afghan". In it, one of the relatives of the famous leader of the Mujahideen, Ahmad Shah Massoud, said that most of the military operations of the Soviet troops against the Mujahideen ended in nothing, since Massoud received timely information from Moscow about the timing of these operations.
NATO has always received Eduard Shevardnadze, M. Gorbachev's closest associate, as a dear guest. Until released into circulation
In the film, another fact of the obvious betrayal of the Soviet leaders was voiced. It is known that before the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan with the same Ahmad Shah Massoud, an agreement was reached on a mutual ceasefire. However, at the insistence of Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and at the direction of Supreme Commander Gorbachev, on January 23-26, 1989, Soviet troops launched a series of massive missile and air strikes on areas under the control of Ahmad Shah Massoud. It was not only a treacherous decision by the Kremlin, but also a war crime.
In this regard, the Republic of Afghanistan has every legal basis for declaring M. Gorbachev and E. Shevardnadze war criminals, and may also demand their extradition for a criminal trial to be held against them.
Shevardnadze proved himself not only in Afghanistan. It is known that in April 1989, Shevardnadze spoke at the Politburo of the Central Committee for the immediate restoration of order in the protesting Tbilisi and bringing to justice the leader of the Georgian opposition, Zviad Gamsakhurdia. However, having appeared in Tbilisi on April 9, 1990, after the well-known tragic events, it was Shevardnadze who began to voice the version of the inadequacy of the actions of the military during the dispersal of the protesters, while emphasizing the use of sapper shovels by the paratroopers - which, as the film shot by the KGB operators testified, only covered their faces from flying stones and bottles.
I remember that in March 1990, at the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, dedicated to the withdrawal of Lithuania from the USSR, it was Shevardnadze who was one of those who demanded the most decisive measures against the Lithuanian separatists and the return of constitutional order in the republic. But in fact, he and A. Yakovlev constantly supplied Landsbergis with information.
On June 1, 1990, Shevardnadze committed an act of treason. He, being on a visit to Washington, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, together with the US Secretary of State J. Baker, signed an agreement according to which the States "acquired" more than 47 thousand square kilometers of the Bering Sea, rich in fish and hydrocarbons, free of charge.
There is no doubt that Gorbachev was informed about this deal. Otherwise, Shevardnadze would have been in trouble in Moscow. How else to understand that Gorbachev blocked any actions to recognize this "deal" as illegal. The Americans, knowing in advance about such a reaction of the head of the USSR, quickly took control of this area. It must be assumed that the remuneration of Shevardnadze and Gorbachev for this "service" was expressed in an extremely substantial amount.
Undoubtedly, Kryuchkov knew about this dubious deal, but he did not dare to publicly declare the betrayal of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. Well, these two got the money, but why was he silent? By the way, in modern Russia there is also a “conspiracy of silence” around this event.
In recent years, the United States has been using the practice of bribing the national elites of "independent" states very intensively and effectively. Iraq, Afghanistan, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt... The last example is Ukraine.
Russian political scientist Marat Musin said that Yanukovych's vague stance on the rampaging Maidan was due to the Ukrainian president's desire to keep the billion "greens" he kept in the United States. Vain hopes. In the United States, the money of the Shah of Iran M. Reza Pahlavi, President of the Philippines F. Marcos, President of Iraq S. Hussein, President of Egypt H. Mubarek and other former "friends" of America have sunk into oblivion.
The entourage of the Ukrainian president also managed to make good money. Most of them have already left Kyiv with their families for their "alternate airfields", similar to those that our "Russian jingo-patriot" Yuri Luzhkov had previously created for himself in Austria and London.
There is no doubt that a significant part of the Russian ruling elite, in the event of an aggravation of the situation in the country, will also follow the example of their Ukrainian “colleagues”. Fortunately, their "alternate airfields" have long been ready.
THIRTY SILVER GORBACHEV
Mikhail Sergeevich also hit a good jackpot for his betrayal. Paul Craig Roberts, an American economist and publicist, former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in the government of R. Reagan, told the Izvestia newspaper in 2007 about how this was done.
He recalled the time when his supervisor was appointed assistant secretary of defense for international affairs (Melvin Laird was then secretary of defense). Taking the opportunity, Roberts asked him how the United States makes other countries dance to its tune. The answer was simple: “We give their leaders money. We buy their leaders."
Roberts cited former British Prime Minister Tony Blair as an example. As soon as he left his post, he was appointed as an adviser to financial corporations with a salary of 5 million pounds. In addition, the United States gave him a series of speeches - for each Blair received from 100 to 250 thousand dollars. It is known that the US State Department organized a similar program for former President Gorbachev.
Nevertheless, Mikhail Sergeevich, explaining his participation in promotions, refers to the lack of funds, which he then allegedly directs to finance the Gorbachev Foundation. Maybe, maybe ... However, it is known what a considerable compensation Gorbachev received from Yeltsin for the "non-conflict" leaving the Kremlin.
It is also known that in September 2008 Mikhail Sergeevich received the Medal of Freedom from the United States for "ending the Cold War." 100 thousand US dollars were attached to the medal. To this should be added the Nobel Peace Prize, which R. Reagan “procured” for Gorbachev in 1990. However, without a doubt, this is only a known part of the material well-being that the States provided to the former president of the USSR.
It is known that in 2007 Gorbachev acquired an impressive castle in Bavaria, where he lives with his household. "Castle Hubertus", where a Bavarian orphanage used to be in two large buildings, is registered in the name of a daughter, Irina Virganskaya.
In addition, Mikhail Sergeevich owns or uses two villas abroad. One is in San Francisco, the other is in Spain (next to the villa of the singer V. Leontiev). He also has real estate in Russia - a dacha in the Moscow region ("Moscow River 5") with a plot of 68 hectares.
The “modest” wedding of his granddaughter Xenia, which took place in May 2003, testifies to the financial possibilities of the former president of the USSR. It took place in Moscow's fashionable Gostiny Dvor restaurant, which was cordoned off by police. The treat at the wedding was, as the media wrote, "no frills."
Cold dishes were served with medallions of goose liver (foie gras) and figs, black caviar on an ice base with warm pancakes, chicken with mushrooms in a thin puff pastry. In addition, the guests indulged in fried hazel grouse and elk lips. The highlight of the gastronomic program was a three-tier snow-white cake one and a half meters high.
There is no doubt that in the foreseeable future Gorbachev will be able to organize more than one such celebration for his granddaughters. Unfortunately, lifetime retribution, apparently, passes him by. But besides the human court, there is another Court, which sooner or later will pay tribute to this greatest of the traitors - Herostratus of the 20th century. And the US State Department will no longer help there.
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On December 25, 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev announced the termination of his activities as president of the USSR and signed a decree on the transfer of control of strategic nuclear weapons to Russian President Boris Yeltsin.
The signing of the document was preceded by the events that took place since the mid-1980s in the territory of the former Soviet Union. Changes in the country's economic and political life led to deepening contradictions between the center and the union republics, which were striving for independence.
In 1990, all the union republics adopted, establishing the priority of their laws over the laws of the Union.
To stop the collapse of the USSR, on March 17, 1991, a referendum was held on the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 76.4% of those who took part in the voting were in favor of preserving the Union.
Based on the results of the all-Union referendum authorized by the central and republican authorities working group in the framework of the so-called Novo-Ogarevsky process in the spring-summer of 1991, a project was developed to conclude a federation treaty "On the Union of Sovereign Republics", the signing of which was scheduled for August 20.
But it never took place due to an attempted coup d'état undertaken by the conservative wing of the top leadership of the USSR on August 19-21, 1991.
The failed coup d'état initiated the process of spontaneous destruction of the union statehood.
From August 20 to October 27, 1991, eleven union republics decided on independence (withdrawal from the USSR).
The Communist Party of the USSR ceased to exist. The activities of almost all state authorities of the Soviet Union also ceased.
On the same day, the leaders of 11 states also signed the Alma-Ata Declaration, which confirmed the main goals and principles of the CIS.
On December 25, at about 19:00, Mikhail Gorbachev signed a decree "On the resignation by the President of the USSR of the powers of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the abolition of the Defense Council under the President of the USSR."
At 19.00, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev made a live broadcast of the central television with a statement of resignation.
“Due to the current situation with the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, I am terminating my activities as President of the USSR. I am making this decision for reasons of principle. I firmly stood for the independence, independence of peoples, for the sovereignty of the republics. But at the same time, for the preservation of the union state, the integrity of the country. Events took a different path. The line on the dismemberment of the country and the separation of the state prevailed, with which I cannot agree," the statement said.
Further, Mikhail Gorbachev gave his assessment of the path traveled as first General Secretary of the Central Committee Communist Party, and then President of the USSR since 1985 and thanked all the citizens who supported his policy of renewal and democratic reforms.
At 19.38, the state flag of the USSR was lowered from the flagpole of the Kremlin and the state flag was raised Russian Federation.
After the televised speech, Mikhail Gorbachev gave a short interview and returned to his office in the Kremlin to hand over the nuclear ciphers to President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin. The farewell meeting between them did not take place. Gorbachev was met by USSR Minister of Defense Yevgeny Shaposhnikov. Yeltsin, dissatisfied with the content of Gorbachev's last speech, refused to accept nuclear ciphers in the former president's office and offered to carry out this procedure in another room in the Kremlin, on "neutral territory." But Mikhail Gorbachev did not agree with this proposal and, without any TV cameras, handed over to Shaposhnikov two colonels, who accompanied the head of state everywhere and constantly, being responsible for the "nuclear briefcase".
There were no other procedures for seeing off the president of the USSR.
The last farewell dinner was held in the Walnut Drawing Room, surrounded by five people from Mikhail Gorbachev's close circle.
On December 26, Mikhail Gorbachev met with journalists at the Oktyabrskaya Hotel. The conversation went on for two hours.
The material was prepared on the basis of information from RIA Novosti and open sources
On Mikhail Gorbachev's 80th birthday, he is deservedly praised for glasnost, perestroika, and the end of the Cold War. All this has long since taken its rightful place in the history books. But the question arises: why, on a March evening in 1985, was Gorbachev elected as the new Soviet leader, and not someone else?
This is a key point, but it still remains largely misunderstood.
This was largely due to Gorbachev as a person, as well as to the miserable state in which the Soviet leadership and the whole country were then.
Gorbachev was not a radical in his early years. As a child, he witnessed the horrors of World War II; later saw the shortcomings of the Soviet state, from the persecution of his grandfathers during the Stalin years to economic stagnation under Leonid Brezhnev. Gorbachev also understood that the huge military-industrial complex was draining the vital juices from the system, forcing ordinary people to live in poverty. Nevertheless, Gorbachev kept many of his observations to himself as he climbed the steps to the pinnacle of power.
Gorbachev received a powerful boost from former KGB chief Yuri Andropov, who became Soviet leader after Brezhnev in 1982. Andropov's own attempts to change the inert system turned out to be too sluggish and were doomed to failure. But he did an important thing, seeing in Gorbachev a promising man. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Gorbachev experimented with timid innovations in agriculture and the economy, giving peasant groups more autonomy and attracting like-minded scientists who wanted change. When Andropov died in early 1984, Gorbachev thought he had a chance to succeed him. However, the old guard extinguished his hopes at the last moment, choosing decrepit Konstantin Chernenko instead of Gorbachev.
This time Gorbachev was ready.
That evening, a meeting of the Politburo was held in the Kremlin. As I wrote in my book The Dead Hand, about 20 minutes before the meeting began, Gorbachev met with the patriarch of the old guard, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, in the walnut hall, where Politburo members, who had every right to vote. Gromyko was the key figure in deciding who would be the next general secretary. Earlier, Gromyko sent a secret emissary to Gorbachev with the message that he would support him in the struggle for power if, in return, Gorbachev would give him the opportunity to step down as foreign minister and take the easy but honorable position of chairman of the Supreme Council.
Gorbachev recalls how he told Gromyko: "Andrei Andreyevich, the moment is critical, we need to join forces."
“I think everything is clear,” Gromyko replied.
When everyone gathered, Gorbachev informed the members of the Politburo about Chernenko's death. Usually, the person who was chosen to head the funeral organization became the new general secretary. There was a question about this commission. Gorbachev headed it, and the next day became the new Soviet leader.
Gorbachev was not elected because of the United States, not because of Ronald Reagan or his Strategic Defense Initiative, as many assumed. The Cold War was an important reason for all that caused suffering and pain to the Soviet Union, but it was not the main reason for Gorbachev's election.
No, rather Gorbachev was chosen for the reason that he was like a bright light in a gloomy hall. Five of the ten members of the Politburo were at that time over seventy, three over sixty, and only two over fifty. At 54, Gorbachev was not only the youngest member of the Politburo. He was 13 years younger than the average age of voting members of the Politburo.
The next day, during the meeting, Gromyko presented a strong case in favor of Gorbachev, speaking in an unusual manner for such cases, without a piece of paper and without hesitation. “I will speak directly,” Gromyko said. - Gorbachev is absolutely right choice. He has an indomitable creative energy, strives to do more and do better.
Georgy Shakhnazarov, who worked for Andropov and later became Gorbachev's adviser, recalled that Gorbachev's rise to power was by no means preordained. Gorbachev did not have an irreproachable and full-fledged biography that made him a natural choice. And the Politburo could well have chosen another old-timer to continue to slowly move forward. But according to Shakhnazarov, there was one unofficial factor that, nevertheless, could not be ignored. “People are terribly tired of participating in a shameful farce ... They are tired of seeing leaders with shaking heads and faded eyes, knowing that the fate of the country and half of the world is in the hands of these miserable semi-paralytics.”
After agonizing years of stagnation, deaths of leaders, and disappointments, Gorbachev was elected primarily because there were high hopes for him as the man to set the country in motion. We usually forget about it, but Gorbachev's achievement in ending the Cold War was not his first goal. They grew out of his desire to bring about radical change in the country, out of his powerful impressions of what had gone wrong. Gorbachev did not seek to change the world, he wanted to save his country. As a result, he did not save the country, but the world is quite possible.
As the date of the putsch of the State Emergency Committee approaches, or, more simply, the final collapse of the USSR, materials for the future court on the fact of high treason by citizen Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev.
The iconic Judas Kiss between Gorbachev and East German leader Erich Honecker on October 7, 1989. Eleven days later, Honecker was removed from the presidency. The Berlin Wall fell, marking the end of the GDR
In continuation of the foregoing, let me remind you of the assessment of Gorbachev's activities, which Putin gave in the book "From the First Person" (2000). In it, Vladimir Vladimirovich, referring to a conversation with former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, quoted the latter's words about Gorbachev's policy: “I believed that the Soviet Union should not leave Eastern Europe so quickly. We were changing the balance of the world very quickly, and this could lead to undesirable consequences. And now they blame me for this ... To be honest, I still don’t understand why Gorbachev did this?
Summing up this conversation, Putin wrote: “I told him (Kissinger) and now I say: “Kissinger was right. We would have avoided so many problems if there had not been such a hasty flight.
It can be added that this was not just a flight, it was the actual surrender of the USSR, expressed in the destruction of the "security belt" created along the western borders of the Union after the Great Patriotic War and the rejection of the Potsdam agreements.
As a result, today Russia has NATO on its borders, and the United States is intensively forming its own security belt, but already on a global scale.
BETRAYAL… AS A MODEL OF BEHAVIOR
The beginning of the track record of betrayals was laid in his tenure as the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU for agriculture. Thanks to the support of Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, he positioned himself as the second person in the party. However, after the death of Andropov, the star of Mikhail Sergeevich began to rapidly fade in the political horizon of the USSR.
In December 1984, Gorbachev had a chance to demonstrate his importance at the international level. He was sent to Great Britain by the head of an insignificant delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Nevertheless, Mikhail Sergeevich decided to impress British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.
During one of the meetings with the Iron Lady, as Thatcher was then called, Gorbachev “pulled out on the table a map of the General Staff with all the secrecy stamps indicating that the map was genuine. It depicted the directions of rocket attacks on the UK. So this episode was described by Alexander Yakovlev in his memoirs "The Pool of Memory". Andrey Grachev, Gorbachev's press secretary, also wrote about him in his book Gorbachev. A man who wanted the best ... "Yes, and Mikhail Sergeevich himself confirmed this fact in his memoirs" Life and Reforms ".
In London, or rather in the special residence Checkers, Gorbachev, not having the authority from the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to make a statement on behalf of the USSR and show a top-secret map, suggested Thatcher to put an end to this situation. The prime minister was so impressed by the desire of the Soviet politician to please Western partners that she immediately flew to US President Ronald Reagan to say that this man could be dealt with. Unfortunately, this fact of Gorbachev's obvious betrayal remained unnoticed.
No less scandalous is the situation with two USSR air defense maps of the western and northwestern directions of the General Staff of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which in February 1987 the USSR Minister of Defense Sergei Leonidovich Sokolov was forced to leave to Secretary General Gorbachev at his request. This information is known from the words of Colonel-General Leonid Grigoryevich Ivashov, who in 1987 was responsible for the secrecy regime at the General Staff.
The issue of transferring top-secret maps to Gorbachev becomes especially acute if we recall that three months later, in May 1987, a mysterious flight of Matthias Rust over the USSR took place. Moreover, Rust flew as if he knew the location of the Soviet radar tracking stations in the northwestern direction. The situation with the Rust flyby and maps is still unclear.
Speaking about the treacherous behavior of Gorbachev, one should recall the situation with the destruction of the Soviet tactical missile system "Oka". The accuracy of this complex was incredible. It almost completely hit targets at a distance of up to 400 km. Americans "Oka" terribly unnerved. And it was from what.
According to Sergei Pavlovich Nepobedimy, the designer of the Oka, American experts estimated the preparation of an adequate response to neutralize the Oka at $150 billion. Gorbachev donated these funds to the Americans with one stroke of the pen, signing the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range Missiles (INF) in Washington in December 1987. According to its parameters, Oka did not fall under the scope of this Treaty. But she was there. Here's how it happened.
In April of the aforementioned year, US Secretary of State George Shultz arrived in Moscow to agree on the main positions of the Treaty (INF). As the former secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Anatoly Fedorovich Dobrynin writes in the book “Purely confidential ...”, on the eve of Schulz’s arrival, he and Chief of the General Staff Marshal of the USSR Sergei Fedorovich Akhromeev prepared a memorandum for Gorbachev. It was especially emphasized in it that in no way should one agree with Schulz's demands for the reduction of SS-23 missiles, that is, the Oka.
However, the next day, Gorbachev, at a meeting with Schultz, unexpectedly agreed with the latter's proposal to include the Oka complex in the agreement. In return, the USSR received nothing from the Americans. Asked by Akhromeev what caused such a decision, Gorbachev replied that he simply "forgot".
In this case, it remains only to believe in the version that Raisa Maksimovna once had a confidential conversation with Nancy Reagan. The wife of the American president said that if the SS-23 (Oka) missiles are included in the agreement, then "Roni (Ronald Reagan) will ensure that Gorbachev is awarded the Nobel Prize." They say that a diamond necklace for Raisa Maksimovna was added to this. But perhaps this is just a rumor. Although on October 15, 1990 Mikhail Sergeevich was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
GORBACHEV'S DEATH BLOW ON THE UNION
A vivid manifestation of Gorbachev's treacherous attitude to the fate of the USSR was his behavior on June 12, 1990. On this day, the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR adopted the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Russia. The example of Lithuania, which declared state sovereignty on May 18, 1989, and already on March 11, 1990, proclaimed its withdrawal from the USSR, clearly showed that this threatens the Union with a constitutional crisis.
According to the testimony of First Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Philip Bobkov, before voting for the draft Declaration, he and Colonel General Konstantin Kobets went to Gorbachev with this document. The President of the USSR, who was standing next to the chairman of the KGB V. Kryuchkov, read the draft and said that he saw "no reason for the Allied authorities to react to this." Bobkov and Kobets were amazed. The President could not fail to understand that the supremacy of Russian laws over those of the Union meant the collapse of the Union. Kryuchkov modestly kept silent in this situation.
This indicates that Gorbachev was interested in the collapse of the USSR.
In December of the same year, a formidable bell rang for Gorbachev at the IV Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. Deputy Sazhi Umalatova called for the issue of no confidence in the President of the USSR to be discussed at the congress. Gorbachev was saved by the presiding Anatoly Lukyanov, who effectively thwarted Umalatova's proposal.
Then followed the January events in Vilnius. They dealt a serious blow to Gorbachev's authority. After that, the prospects for the President of the USSR began to look very sad.
Another alarm bell rang for him at the April (1991) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. At it, two thirds of the speakers harshly criticized him. But the main holder of the facts about Gorbachev's treacherous activities, the head of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov, again, as at the Congress of People's Deputies, kept silent. As a result, the issue of resignation was removed from the agenda of the Plenum.
At the same time, former US President Richard Nixon visited Moscow on an "inspection trip" on behalf of the White House. The conclusion that Nixon reported to Washington was unequivocal: "The Soviet Union is tired of Gorbachev." Well, at the end of the summer of 1991, a strange August coup took place, the scenario of which was very reminiscent of Vilnius. Everything indicated that Gorbachev was behind the putsch.
A real salvation for the President of the USSR was the December meeting of Yeltsin, Shushkevich and Kravchuk in Belovezhskaya Pushcha, at which these "leaders" dealt a mortal blow to the USSR. They knew perfectly well that they had committed a crime and were waiting for arrest. The President of the USSR had more than weighty reasons for this: the Constitution of the USSR and the results of the March (1991) all-Union referendum on the preservation of the Union.
However, Gorbachev, in the name of saving his own skin, acted not as President, guarantor of the territorial integrity of the USSR, but as an outside observer. As a result, the second most powerful power in the world ceased to exist.
BETRAYAL UNDER SHASHLIK
Gorbachev's attitude towards the political allies of the USSR was most clearly manifested in the situation with the shameful surrender and subsequent liquidation of the German Democratic Republic.
On December 9, 1989, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Secretary General loudly declared: “We emphasize with all determination that the GDR will not be offended. It is our strategic ally and a member of the Warsaw Pact. It is necessary to proceed from the realities that have developed after the war - the existence of two sovereign German states, members of the UN ... "
But already in February 1990, under pressure from the United States, Gorbachev began to secretly change his position. The Kremlin entourage of Gorbachev was silent about this, and the unification of Germany on American terms was extremely disturbing to Great Britain and France. Margaret Thatcher twice sent Foreign Minister Douglas Heard to Moscow to stop the "capitulation" of the Russians, or rather Gorbachev. At that moment, Gorbachev was mesmerized by the approaching Nobel Prize that the Americans had promised him. For this, he was ready for anything.
At the end of May 1990, the President of the USSR, while on a visit to the United States, agreed with the American proposal that a united Germany should decide for itself whether to be in NATO or not. This was tantamount to recognizing Germany's right to remain in NATO.
Gorbachev's statement alarmed Thatcher so much that already on June 8, 1990, she flew to Moscow on purpose. Thatcher told Gorbachev that "no reasonable person can help but feel uneasy about the prospect of a huge united German power in the heart of Europe." Nevertheless, on August 30, 1989, the Unification Treaty on American terms was signed in Berlin, as a result of which the FRG absorbed the GDR.
Gorbachev betrayed not only the GDR, but also its leadership. It happened in July 1990 while Gorbachev and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl were eating Caucasian kebabs at the government dacha in Arkhyz (Northern Caucasus).
According to former secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Valentin Mikhailovich Falin, Kohl then asked Gorbachev what to do with the former members of the SED Politburo and other top functionaries of the former GDR. Gorbachev replied: “You are Germans. You know better what to do with them!” Thus, he gave the green light to the criminal prosecution of allies and friends of the USSR.
In Arkhyz, Gorbachev also made incomprehensible concessions to Kohl in terms of material compensation for the reunification of Germany and the withdrawal of Soviet troops, who had the right to remain there for another twenty years. In 1993, German Finance Minister Theodor Weigel told the Bundestag deputies that the unification of Germany had cost the German government only 15 billion marks.
The answer to the question whether Gorbachev acted in the interests of the United States is obvious. The Americans were amazed at how quickly the Soviet leader was losing position after position to the West. As Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott admitted, the Americans were looking for a way to reward Gorbachev "for his willingness to put up with keeping a united Germany in NATO." And since Gorbachev's visit to the United States was scheduled for June 1990, Robert Blackwell suggested: "The meeting should turn into a 'June Christmas' for Gorbachev."
"Gorbachev was literally reveling in his success when the crowd began to cheer and applaud him. Through an interpreter, he exclaimed: "I really feel at home here!" It was strange, but a lot speaking phrase: in his homeland, his own people would not arrange such a meeting for him.
Gorbachev was so eager to feel the favor of the public and to see evidence of his importance in the West that the next day he set aside four hours of his time and accepted five awards in turn from different organizations ...
Gorbachev, smiling broadly, greeted the representatives of each organization, who solemnly entered the magnificent reception hall of the Soviet embassy; they hung their emblem on the wall and praised Gorbachev to the skies in front of the cameras of Soviet and American television ... "
The next gift had to wait two years. In 1992, when Soviet Union was over, Reagan invited the former president of the USSR to his ranch and gave him a cowboy hat. Gorbachev writes about this in his memoirs. Commenting on this, political scientist Sergei Chernyakhovsky subtly noted that "the former" Caesar of the half world "is still proud of this. Russian courtyards were proud when the tsars gave them fur coats from their shoulders. Richard the Third York in a moment of danger promised to give half his kingdom for a horse. This " Nobel laureate"is proud of the fact that he profitably exchanged his half of the world for a hat from the former American president. Then Reagan's guests paid 5 thousand dollars each for a photograph of the former Secretary General in a Texas shepherds' hat. Gorbachev proudly writes about this. Not understanding what they paid - for his photo in jester's cap.
These are far from all the materials by which one can judge the betrayal of citizen Gorbachev. But even this is enough to understand that in world history there is simply no other such case of betrayal that could be compared in scale and consequences with this one.
