Military operations in Afghanistan 1979 1989. Afghan war

When Soviet troops entered Afghanistan in December 1979 to support the friendly communist regime, no one could have imagined that the war would drag on for ten long years and eventually “drive” the last nail into the “coffin” of the USSR. Today, some are trying to present this war as the villainy of the “Kremlin elders” or the result of a worldwide conspiracy. However, we will try to rely only on the facts.

According to modern data, the losses of the Soviet Army in the Afghan war amounted to 14,427 people dead and missing. In addition, 180 advisers and 584 specialists from other departments were killed. More than 53 thousand people were shell-shocked, wounded or injured.

Cargo "200"

The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. The most common figure is 1 million dead; available estimates range from 670,000 civilians to 2 million in total. According to Harvard professor M. Kramer, an American researcher of the Afghan war: “During the nine years of the war, more than 2.7 million Afghans (mostly civilians) were killed or maimed, several million more became refugees, many of whom left the country” . Apparently, there is no clear division of victims into government army soldiers, Mujahideen and civilians.

The terrible consequences of the war

For courage and heroism shown during the war in Afghanistan, more than 200 thousand servicemen were awarded orders and medals (11 thousand were awarded posthumously), 86 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (28 posthumously). Among those awarded – 110 thousand soldiers and sergeants, about 20 thousand ensigns, more than 65 thousand officers and generals, more than 2.5 thousand employees of the SA, including – 1350 women.

A group of Soviet military personnel awarded government awards

During the entire period of hostilities, 417 servicemen were in Afghan captivity, 130 of whom were released during the war and were able to return to their homeland. As of January 1, 1999, 287 people remained among those who did not return from captivity and were not searched for.

Captured Soviet soldier

For nine years of war P loss of equipment and weapons amounted to: aircraftecomrade - 118 (in the Air Force– 107); helicopters - 333 (in the Air Force – 324); tanks - 147; BMP, BTR, BMD, BRDM - 1314; guns and mortars - 433; radio stations and KShM - 1138; engineering vehicles - 510; flatbed vehicles and tank trucks - 11,369.

Burnt out Soviet tank

The government in Kabul was dependent on the USSR throughout the war, which provided it with about $40 billion in military assistance between 1978 and the early 1990s. Saudi Arabia, China and a number of other states, which together provided the Mujahideen with weapons and other military equipment worth about $10 billion.

Afghan Mujahideen

On January 7, 1988, a fierce battle took place in Afghanistan at an altitude of 3234 m above the road to the city of Khost in the zone of the Afghan-Pakistani border. It was one of the most famous clashes between the units of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops in Afghanistan and the armed formations of the Afghan Mujahideen. On the basis of these events, in 2005, the film "The Ninth Company" was filmed in the Russian Federation. The height of 3234 m was defended by the 9th Airborne Company of the 345th Guards Separate Airborne Regiment with a total of 39 people, supported by regimental artillery. Soviet fighters were attacked by units of the Mujahideen numbering from 200 to 400 people who were trained in Pakistan. The battle lasted 12 hours. The Mujahideen never managed to capture the height. Having suffered heavy losses, they retreated. In the ninth company, six paratroopers were killed, 28 were injured, nine of them – heavy. All paratroopers for this battle were awarded the Orders of the Red Banner of War and the Red Star. Junior Sergeant V. A. Aleksandrov and Private A. A. Melnikov were posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Frame from the film "9th company"

The most famous battle of the Soviet border guards during the war in Afghanistan took place on November 22, 1985 near the village of Afrij in the Zardev Gorge of the Darai-Kalat mountain range in northeastern Afghanistan. The combat group of border guards of the Panfilov outpost of the motorized maneuver group (in the amount of 21 people) was ambushed as a result of an incorrect crossing of the river. During the battle, 19 border guards were killed. These were the most numerous losses of border guards in the Afghan war. According to some reports, the number of Mujahideen participating in the ambush was 150 people.

Border guards after the battle

There is a well-established opinion in the post-Soviet period that the USSR was defeated and expelled from Afghanistan. It is not true. When Soviet troops left Afghanistan in 1989, they did so in a well-planned operation. Moreover, the operation was carried out in several directions at once: diplomatic, economic and military. This allowed not only to save the lives of Soviet soldiers, but also to save the Afghan government. Communist Afghanistan held out even after the fall of the USSR in 1991, and only then, with the loss of support from the USSR and increasing attempts from the Mujahideen and Pakistan, did the DRA begin to slide to meet defeat in 1992.

Withdrawal of Soviet troops, February 1989

In November 1989, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR announced an amnesty for all crimes committed by Soviet military personnel in Afghanistan. According to the military prosecutor's office, from December 1979 to February 1989, 4,307 people were prosecuted as part of the 40th army in the DRA, at the time the USSR Armed Forces decree on amnesty came into force, more than 420 former soldiers were in prison -internationalists.

We have returned…

The war in Afghanistan is one of the main events cold war”, which provoked the crisis of the communist system, and after it the collapse of the USSR. The war led to the death of 15 thousand Soviet military personnel, the emergence of several tens of thousands of young military invalids, exacerbated the already severe socio-economic crisis in which Soviet Union in the second half of the 1970s, made the burden of military spending unbearable for the country, led to further international isolation of the USSR.

The real causes of the war were the inability of the Soviet leadership to timely and correctly assess the major dynamic changes in the Greater Middle East, the main content of which was the emergence and growth of Islamic fundamentalism, the systematic use of terrorism as a tool to achieve political goals, the emergence of adventurous regimes that relied on armed conflicts ( Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya), economic polarization, population growth at the expense of the younger generation, dissatisfied with their financial situation.

Since the second half of the 1960s, new centers of influence, alliances and lines of tension began to form in the region, huge financial resources were accumulated from the sale of oil and the arms trade, which began to spread in excess everywhere. The political rift in the region did not run along the “socialism-capitalism” axis, as Moscow erroneously imagined, but along religious lines.

The entry of troops and war could not be the answer to these changes and new problems. However, Moscow still viewed the Middle East region through the prism of its confrontation with the United States as the arena of some “big” zero-sum superpower game.

The Afghan crisis is an example of Moscow's misunderstanding of its national interests, incorrect assessment of the situation in the world, the region and in its own country, ideological narrow-mindedness, and political short-sightedness.

Afghanistan showed the inadequacy of the goals and methods of Soviet foreign policy to the real state of affairs in the world.

The middle and second half of the 1970s were marked by growing instability in the Middle East, which was the result of the anti-colonial revolutions of the 1950s and 60s, a series of Arab-Israeli conflicts, and the awakening of Islam. The year 1979 turned out to be especially turbulent: the leader of the Arab world, Egypt, concludes a separate peace treaty with Israel, which causes an uproar in the region; revolution in Iran brings ayatollahs to power; Saddam Hussein, who led Iraq, is looking for a pretext for an armed conflict and finds it in a war with Iran; Syria, led by Assad (senior), provokes a civil war in Lebanon, into which Iran is drawn; Libya under the leadership of Gaddafi sponsors various terrorist groups; Turkey's centre-left government resigns.

The situation is also radicalizing in peripheral Afghanistan. In April 1978, the "People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan" came to power here, declaring its desire to build socialism. In the political language of that time, this meant a statement of readiness to become a "client" of the USSR, counting on financial, economic and military assistance.

The Soviet Union has had good, even excellent, relations with Afghanistan since 1919, when Afghanistan gained independence from England and established friendly ties with Soviet Russia. For all the decades that have passed since then, not to be found in Soviet history references to Afghanistan in a negative context. There were mutually beneficial trade and economic ties. Afghanistan believed that it was in the informal sphere of influence of the USSR. The West has tacitly acknowledged this fact and has never been interested in Afghanistan. Even the change from a monarchy to a republic in 1973 resulted in palace coup did not change the nature of bilateral relations.

The April "revolution" of 1978 was unexpected for Moscow, but not accidental. In Moscow, the leaders (Taraki, Amin, Karmal) and many participants in the coup were well known - they often visited the USSR, representatives of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee and the First Main Directorate of the KGB (now the Foreign Intelligence Service) worked closely with them.

It seemed that Moscow had nothing to lose from regime change. However, the "socialists" repeated the sad Soviet experience of the 1920s in Central Asia, when the nationalization and redistribution of land, property, and repressive measures provoked resistance from the population. Throughout 1978, the social base of the "socialists" was steadily shrinking. Neighboring Iran and Pakistan took advantage of the situation and began to send groups of their servicemen in civilian clothes to Afghanistan, as well as to support the opposition with weapons. China has been active. In parallel, historically existing and earlier contradictions between the leaders of the "socialists" intensified.

As a result, a year later, in the spring of 1979, the situation in Afghanistan became critical for the new government - it was on the verge of collapse. Only the capital and 2 more out of 34 provinces remained under its control.

March 18, 1979 Taraki in extended telephone conversation with the head of the Soviet government A. Kosygin, he explains the current situation and insistently asks to send troops - now only this can save the situation, i.e. pro-Soviet government. Despair, the consciousness of hopelessness, comes through in every word of Taraki. He returns each question of the Soviet leader to the same urgent request - send troops.

For Kosygin, this conversation becomes a revelation. Despite the large number of advisers working in Afghanistan through various departments, incl. The KGB and the Ministry of Defense, the Soviet leadership are not aware of what is happening in this country. Kosygin wonders why, they say, you cannot defend yourself. Taraki admits that the regime has no support among the population. In response to Kosygin's naive, ideologically motivated proposals to rely on "workers", Taraki says that there are only 1-2 thousand of them. The Soviet Prime Minister proposes, as it seems to him, rational decision: we will not give troops, but we will supply equipment and weapons in the required quantity. Taraki explains to him that there is no one to control the tanks and planes, there are no trained personnel. When Kosygin recalls several hundred Afghan officers who were trained in the USSR, Taraki reports that almost all of them went over to the side of the opposition, and mainly for religious reasons.

Shortly before Taraki, Amin called Moscow and told the Minister of Defense of the USSR D. Ustinov almost the same thing.

On the same day, Kosygin informs his colleagues in the Politburo about the conversation that took place at a meeting specially convened for this purpose. Members of the Politburo express seemingly sensible considerations: they underestimated the religious factor, the regime has a narrow social base, there is interference from Iran and Pakistan (and not the United States), the introduction of troops will mean war on the population. There seems to be a reason to revise or at least correct the policy in Afghanistan: start contacts with the opposition, with Iran and Pakistan, find a common basis for reconciliation, form a coalition government, and so on. Instead, the Politburo decides to follow the more than strange line that Kosygin suggested to Taraki - they are ready to supply weapons and equipment (which there is no one to control), but we will not send troops. Then it was necessary to answer the question: what to do in the event of an inevitable fall of the regime, about which the regime itself warns? But this question remains unanswered, and the entire line of Soviet actions is transferred to the plane of waiting and situational decisions. There is no strategy.

In the Politburo, 3 groups are gradually distinguished: 1) Andropov and Ustinov, who, in the end, insist on the entry of troops, 2) Kosygin, who opposes this decision to the end, 3) Gromyko, Suslov, Chernenko, Kirilenko, who silently or inactively support the entry troops. The ailing Leonid Brezhnev rarely participates in Politburo meetings and has difficulty focusing on problems that need to be addressed. These people are members of the Politburo commission on Afghanistan and actually act on behalf of the entire Politburo, making appropriate decisions.

During the spring-summer of 1979, Taraki and Amin increase pressure on the Soviet leadership with requests to help the troops. The situation is becoming so dramatic that their requests, despite the position of the Politburo, are already supported by all Soviet representatives in Afghanistan - the ambassador, representatives from the KGB and the Ministry of Defense.

By September, the conflict and struggle for power between the Afghan leaders themselves, Taraki and Amin, are heating up. On September 13-16, an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Amin takes place in Kabul, as a result of which he seizes power, removes Taraki, who is later killed. Apparently, this unsuccessful operation to eliminate Amin was carried out with the knowledge, if not without the participation of Moscow.

Since that time, Moscow has set itself the goal of achieving the removal of Amin, whom it does not trust, to bring to power "its" man - Karmal, and to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan. Amin gives reasons: realizing that his survival now depends only on himself, he enters into a dialogue with some opposition forces, and also tries to establish contact with the Americans. In Moscow, these actions, in themselves reasonable, but committed without coordination and secretly from the Soviet side, are considered as a blow to Soviet interests, an attempt to withdraw Afghanistan from the Soviet sphere of influence.

Around October-November, the issues of a special operation by the Soviet forces against Amin are being worked out, which should be covered by the second, parallel and subordinate to the first operation of introducing a “limited” contingent of Soviet troops, the task of which should be to ensure order in case of another miscalculation with the support of Amin among the Afghan military. At the same time, in Kabul, all the main Soviet representatives were replaced with new ones, whose activities caused growing displeasure in the Kremlin.

By December 1, the study of issues is completed, and Andropov gives Brezhnev a note on this matter. On December 8, Brezhnev holds an interim meeting, and on December 12, the final decision of the Politburo on the special operation and the introduction of troops is made.

Before the final decision was made, he was actively resisted by the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal N. Ogarkov. It came to his open clashes and squabbles in raised tones with Ustinov and Andropov, but to no avail. Ogarkov pointed out that the army would have to go to war with the population without knowledge of traditions, without knowledge of the terrain, that all this would lead to guerrilla warfare and heavy losses, that these actions would weaken the position of the USSR in the world. Ogarkov warned about everything that eventually happened.

The operation began on December 25, 1979. On that day alone, 215 transport aircraft (An-12, An-22, Il-76) landed at Kabul airport, delivering the forces of about one division and a large amount of equipment, weapons and ammunition. There was no movement of ground troops concentrated on the Soviet-Afghan border, there was no border crossing either on December 25 or in the following days. On December 27, Amin was eliminated and Babrak Karmal was brought to power. The troops gradually began to enter - more and more.

For more than 30 years after the Second World War, the Soviet Union was at peace, not taking part in any major military conflicts. So, Soviet military advisers and soldiers participated in wars and conflicts, but they did not take place on the territory of the USSR and, in terms of the scope of participation of Soviet citizens in them, they were essentially insignificant. Thus, the Afghan war became the largest armed conflict since 1945, in which Soviet soldiers and officers took part.

Historical background

Since the 19th century, a peaceful struggle has been going on between the Russian and British empires, aimed at expanding the sphere of influence in the Central Asian region. At the same time, Russia's efforts were aimed at annexing the lands that lay along its southern outskirts (Turkestan, Khiva, Bukhara), and Great Britain - at the colonization of India. It was here that already in 1885 the interests of both powers clashed for the first time. However, things did not come to a war, and the parties continued to colonize the lands that were in their spheres of influence. At the same time, Afghanistan was the cornerstone in relations between Russia and Britain, a very advantageous position that would allow for decisive control over the region. At the same time, the country remained neutral, extracting its own benefits from this situation.

Afghan war

The first attempt by the British crown to subjugate Afghanistan was made back in 1838-1842. Then the British expeditionary forces stumbled upon the stubborn resistance of the troops of the Afghan emirate, as well as guerrilla warfare. The result was the victory of Afghanistan, the preservation of its independence and the withdrawal of British troops from the country. Nevertheless, the presence of Britain in the Central Asian region has increased.

The next attempt by the British to take control of Afghanistan was a war that lasted from 1878 to 1880. During this war, the British troops again suffered a series of defeats from the Afghan army, however, the Afghan army, in turn, was defeated. As a result, Afghanistan became a British protectorate, and the southern part of the country was annexed to British India.

However, this state of affairs was temporary. The freedom-loving Afghans did not want to remain under the control of the British, and discontent quickly and massively matured in the country. However, Afghanistan had a real chance to free itself from the British protectorate only after the First World War. In February 1919, Amanullah Khan ascended the throne in Afghanistan. He was supported by representatives of the "Young Afghans" and the army, who wanted to finally get rid of the oppression of the British. Already upon accession to the throne, Amanullah Khan announced the independence of the country from Britain, which caused the invasion of British troops. The 50,000-strong Afghan army was quickly defeated, but a powerful national movement practically nullified the military victories of the British. Already in August 1919, a peace treaty was concluded between Afghanistan and Great Britain, according to which Afghanistan became a completely independent state, and its border ran along the Durand line (the modern Afghan-Pakistani border).

In foreign policy, the focus on the young Soviet state became the most obvious. So, Soviet military instructors arrived here, which made it possible to create a fairly combat-ready Air Force, and also participated in hostilities against Afghan rebels.

However, the north of Afghanistan became a refuge for the mass migration of residents of Soviet Central Asia who did not want to accept the new government. Basmachi detachments were also formed here, which then carried out partisan attacks on the territory of the USSR. At the same time, the financing of the armed groups was carried out by Great Britain. In this regard, the Soviet government sent a note of protest to Amanullah Khan, after which the channels of British assistance to the Basmachi were significantly suppressed.

However, in Afghanistan itself, things were far from calm. Already in the autumn of 1928, an uprising broke out in the east of the country by a new pretender to the throne, Khabibullah, who also received support from Great Britain. As a result, Amanullah Khan was forced to flee to Kandahar, and Khabibullah seized power. The result of this was the complete immersion of Afghanistan into the abyss of anarchy, when absolutely everything was subjected to pogroms: schools, hospitals, villages.

Thus, by April 1929, a difficult situation had developed: the legitimate ruler of Afghanistan, Amanullah Khan, was in Kandahar, forming an army of people loyal to him. Khabibullah was in Kabul, who continued to impose the cruel laws of Islamic fundamentalism. In this situation, the Soviet leadership decided to help the legitimate leader of Afghanistan regain power in the country. On April 15, Soviet troops under the command of the Soviet military attache V. Primakov crossed the border of Afghanistan and began active fighting against the supporters of Khabibullah. Events from the very first days developed unequivocally in favor of the Red Army, and the number of losses correlated approximately 1:200 in its favor. However, the successes of the operation, achieved in a month and a half, were nullified by the flight of Amanullah Khan to India and the cessation of his struggle for power. After that, the Soviet contingent was withdrawn from the country.

In 1930, the Red Army again undertook a campaign on the territory of Afghanistan in order to defeat the Basmachi gangs based there and destroy their economic bases and supply bases. However, the Basmachi did not accept the battle and retreated to the central regions of the country, which made the continued presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan not only inexpedient, but also diplomatically dangerous. In this regard, the Red Army left the country.

In Afghanistan itself, the civil war subsided only at the end of 1929, when Khabibullah was overthrown by Nadir Shah (the latter became the king of Afghanistan). After that, the country continued to develop, albeit extremely slowly. Relations with the Soviet Union were quite close, thanks to which the country had many benefits from this, mainly of an economic nature.

At the turn of the 1950s and 1960s, popular democratic movements began to emerge in Afghanistan, including the Marxist one. So, the ideological inspirer and leader of the Marxist movement was Nur Mohammed Taraki, a magazine poet. It was he who, on January 1, 1965, announced the creation of the PDPA - the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. However, the composition of the party was heterogeneous - it included both people from the lower strata of society, and from the middle and even upper ones. This inevitably led to a conflict within the party and led to its split already in 1967, when two branches were formed at once: Khalq (People, the most radical faction) and Parcham (Banner, a moderate faction represented mainly by intellectuals).

Afghanistan remained a monarchy until 1973, when cousin King Mohammed Daoud led an anti-monarchist coup and did not come to power as prime minister as a result. The change in the form of government had practically no effect on Soviet-Afghan relations, since Mohammed Daoud continued to maintain close relations with the USSR. The name of the country changed to the Republic of Afghanistan.

Over the next five years, Mohammed Daoud took steps to modernize the Afghan industry and the state as a whole, but his steps did not actually have any results. By 1978, the situation in the country was such that almost all segments of the population were opposed to the vain prime minister. The severity of the political situation can be indicated by the fact that already in 1976 both factions of the PDPA - Khalq and Parcham - agreed on cooperation against the dictatorship of Daoud.

The revolution and the assassination of Mohammed Daoud, which took place on April 28, 1978 under the leadership of the PDPA and the army, became a milestone in the history of the country. Now a regime has been established in Afghanistan that is very similar and akin to the Soviet one, which could not but cause further rapprochement between the two countries. As in the USSR, the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the PDPA Nur Mohammed Taraki, who was the leader of the Khalq faction, became the head of state. The name of the state changed to "Democratic Republic of Afghanistan".

Beginning of the civil war

However, Afghanistan was still not calm. First of all, after the April (or Saur) revolution, the struggle between the factions of the PDPA intensified. Since it was the “Khalk” wing that received the leading position in the government, the gradual removal of the “Parchamists” from the levers of power began. Another process was the departure from Islamic traditions in the country, the opening of schools, hospitals and factories. Also, an important decree was the gratuitous allocation of land to peasants.

However, all these measures, which were aimed at improving life and thus gaining the support of the people, led in the main to diametrically opposite results. The formation of armed opposition groups began, consisting mainly of peasants, which, in principle, is not surprising. People who had been living Islamic traditions for hundreds of years and suddenly lost them simply could not accept it. Also dissatisfied with the actions of the Afghan government army, which often, in the fight against the rebels, attacked peaceful villages whose inhabitants were not connected with the opposition.

In 1978, a civil war began, which, in fact, continues in Afghanistan to this day. At its early stage, this war was fought between the Afghan government and armed rebels - the so-called "dushmans". However, in 1978, the actions of the rebels were still insufficiently coordinated and consisted mainly of attacks on Afghan military units and shelling of columns. There were also strikes on party functionaries, but this mainly concerned lower-level party representatives.

However, the main signal that the armed opposition was ripe and ready for decisive action was the uprising in the large city of Herat, which broke out in March 1979. At the same time, there was a real danger of capturing the city, since the Afghan government army was very reluctant to fight against its compatriots, and there were frequent cases of government soldiers going over to the side of the rebels.

It was in this connection that real panic began among the Afghan leadership. It became clear that with the loss of such a large administrative center as Herat, the position of the government would be seriously shaken. A long series of negotiations began between the Afghan and Soviet leadership. In these negotiations, the Afghan government asked to send Soviet troops to help suppress the rebellion. However, the Soviet leadership clearly understood that the intervention of the Soviet Armed Forces in the conflict would only lead to a worsening of the situation, including the international one.

Ultimately, the Afghan government army managed to cope with the Herat rebellion, but the situation in the country continued to deteriorate. It became clear that a civil war was already in full swing in the country. Thus, the Afghan government army was drawn into battles with rebel gangs that controlled mainly rural and mountainous areas. The "people's" Afghan authorities managed to control only a number of large cities (and even then not always completely).

In the same vein, Nur Mohammad Taraki's popularity in Afghanistan began to decline, while his prime minister, Hafizullah Amin, was rapidly gaining political weight. Amin was a rather tough politician who believed that only by military means could order be restored to the country.

Undercover intrigues in the Afghan government led to the fact that in mid-September 1979, Nur Mohammad Taraki was removed from all his posts and expelled from the PDPA. The reason for this was an unsuccessful attempt on the life of Prime Minister Amin, when he arrived at the residence of Taraki for negotiations. This attempt (or a provocation, because there is still no sufficient evidence that Mohammad Taraki himself was involved in the attempt) made him a clear enemy of Amin, which sentenced the first to death. Taraki was killed in October 1979, and his family and friends were taken to the Puli-Charkhi prison.

Having become the ruler of Afghanistan, Hafizullah Amin began to purge both the ranks of the clergy and the rival faction - Parcham.

The decision to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan and the liquidation of Amin

At the same time, Amin realized that he could no longer cope with the rebels on his own. Increasingly, there were cases of transition of soldiers and officers from the Afghan government army to the ranks of the Mujahideen. The only deterrent in the Afghan units were Soviet military advisers, who sometimes prevented such incidents by the force of their authority and character. In the course of numerous negotiations between the Soviet and Afghan leaderships, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, having weighed all the pros and cons, at its meeting on December 12, 1979, decided to send a limited contingent of troops to Afghanistan.

Soviet troops have been in Afghanistan since July 1979, when a battalion of the 111th Guards Airborne Regiment of the 105th Airborne Division was deployed to Bagram (a city about 60 km from Kabul, also a major air base in the country). The duties of the battalion were to control and protect the Bagram airfield, where they landed and from which Soviet aircraft took off with supplies for the Afghan leadership. On December 14, 1979, a battalion from the 345th separate airborne regiment arrived here as reinforcements. Also on December 20, the Soviet “Muslim Battalion” was transferred to Kabul, which received this name because of the configuration exclusively by Soviet military personnel from the Central Asian republics. This battalion was included in the security brigade of Amin's palace, allegedly to strengthen the security of the Afghan leader. But few people knew that the Soviet party leadership decided to "remove" the too impulsive and obstinate leader of Afghanistan.

There are many versions of why it was decided to remove Hafizulu Amin and put Babrak Karmal in his place, but there is no consensus on this matter. It is likely that after restoring order in Afghanistan with the help of Soviet troops, Amin would become too independent, which, with his close contacts with the United States, threatened the Soviet presence in the country. In the event that the United States of America received an ally in the person of Amin, the threat to the southern borders of the USSR would become clear. Also, do not forget that Amin, with his extensive repressions and the murder of Nur Mohammad Taraki, managed in a very short time to set against himself not only the lower strata of Afghan society (which, however, were already in their majority in opposition to the regime), but and the Afghan elite. Having concentrated great power in his hands, he was not going to share it with anyone. It would be unreasonable for the Soviet leadership to rely on such a leader, to put it mildly.

By December 25, 1979, two motorized rifle and one airborne divisions, two motorized rifle regiments, 2 aviation regiments of fighter-bombers, 2 helicopter regiments, one aviation fighter regiment, airborne -assault brigade and logistics units. Additionally, as a reserve, three more divisions were formed and manned according to the states of wartime. All these troops were part of the 40th Combined Arms Army, which was to enter Afghanistan.

The staffing of the troops was carried out mainly by reservists - residents of the Central Asian republics, called up for military training. So, for example, in the 201st motorized rifle division, whose task was to march and take up positions in the area of the city of Kunduz, about half of the personnel were represented by reservists. All this, of course, had a negative impact on the combat training of the units, but given that the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities was not planned, then such a “demonstration of force” made its own sense.

Already on December 25, the entry of a limited contingent of Soviet troops (OKSV) into Afghanistan began. The units of the 108th motorized rifle division, as well as units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, were the first to enter the territory of Afghanistan, which were landed in Kabul by landing method. Also on that day, the 4th Airborne Assault Battalion of the 56th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade entered the country, tasked with guarding the strategically important tunnel at the Salang Pass.

In the period from December 25 to December 31, 1979, almost all units of the 40th Army, which were intended for this, entered the territory of Afghanistan.

As of March 1980, the deployment of units of the 40th Army had the following form:

Kabul - 103rd Guards Airborne Division and 108th Motorized Rifle Division.

Bagram - 345th separate airborne regiment.

Herat - 101st motorized rifle regiment of the 5th motorized rifle division.

Shindand - 5th motorized rifle division.

Kunduz - 201st motorized rifle division and 56th separate air assault brigade.

Kandahar - 70th separate motorized rifle brigade.

Jalalabad - 66th separate motorized rifle brigade.

Ghazni - 191st separate motorized rifle regiment.

Puli-Khumri - 395th motorized rifle regiment of the 201st motorized rifle division.

Khanabad - 122nd motorized rifle regiment of the 201st motorized rifle division.

Faizabad - 860th separate motorized rifle regiment.

Jabal-Ussaraj - 177th motorized rifle regiment of the 108th motorized rifle division.

Aviation units were based at the airfields: Bagram, Kunduz, Shindand, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Faizabad, Ghazni and Gardez.

On December 27, 1979, the forces of the Alpha group in the residence of Amin carried out an operation to eliminate the obstinate leader. As a result, Hafizula Amin was eliminated, and on the night of December 28, the new ruler of Afghanistan, Babrak Karmal, arrived in Kabul. On the same night (from December 27 to 28), Soviet troops, mainly with the forces of the 103rd Airborne Division, occupied a number of important buildings in the Afghan capital and established complete control over them.

Start of the war (1979-1982)

The first losses of the OKSV in Afghanistan began to bear back in December 1979. So, on December 25, when landing at the Kabul airfield, an Il-76 with paratroopers of the 103rd Airborne Division crashed into a mountain. Dozens of soldiers and officers died as a result.

Already from the very first days of the stay of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, our units began to be drawn into hostilities, which at first were of an exclusively episodic nature. So, on January 11, 1980, units of the 186th motorized rifle regiment of the 108th motorized rifle division stormed the village of Nakhrin not far from Baghlan, suppressing the rebellion of the Afghan artillery regiment. At the same time, the losses during the operation were extremely low (two wounded and two killed, with about 100 Afghans killed).

It is noteworthy that the nature of the first military operations of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan was rather the suppression of the uprisings of the Afghan units than the battles with the dushmans, whose detachments were still essentially being created and formed. Also, the tasks of the Soviet units at that time included maintaining control over a number of large settlements in the country, disarming deserters and arranging life.

The first clash of Soviet troops with dushmans was the Kunar operation, which was carried out from late February to mid-March 1980. During this operation, three Soviet battalions carried out a raid against bandit formations in the province of the same name. As a result, having inflicted significant losses on the enemy, our troops lost 52 people killed.

From the beginning of the spring of 1980, the war in Afghanistan unfolded in full. To ensure control over a number of areas, as well as to reduce the effectiveness of the rebels' actions, Soviet military units began to be regularly involved in military operations, often in cooperation with the Afghan army ("green") or Afghan units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs ("tsaranda"). The combat effectiveness of the Afghan government army (unlike the Mujahideen) was at a very low level, which was explained by the unwillingness of ordinary Afghans to fight for what they themselves did not really know.

Although the effectiveness of OKSVA's actions was quite high, losses also increased sharply with an increase in the intensity of hostilities. Naturally, this was hushed up in the official Soviet press, which stated that "Soviet troops are in Afghanistan for maneuvers, as well as to provide international assistance to the fraternal people, which consists in the construction of hospitals, houses and schools."

By the middle of 1980, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU decided to withdraw from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan a number of tank and anti-aircraft units, which were not needed in the conditions of guerrilla warfare. However, at the same time, the question of the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country was postponed. It became clear that the Soviet Army was "bogged down" in Afghanistan, and this fact simply could not go unnoticed by the CIA. It was 1980 that marked the beginning of cooperation between the American intelligence services and the Afghan Mujahideen.

1981 for OKSVA is characterized by further intensification of hostilities. During the first half of the year, Soviet troops fought the rebels mainly in the northern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan, but already in May the situation in the central region of the country, near Kabul, escalated. Here, actions were intensified by the group of Ahmad Shah Masud, whose fiefdom was the Panjshir Gorge, thanks to which he received the title of "Lion of Panjshir". The purpose of the actions of his grouping was to expand the area of control, as well as to pin down Soviet troops in order to prevent their penetration into Panjshir.

Nevertheless, by August 1981, four combined-arms operations had already been carried out by Soviet troops in the Panjshir Gorge. However, as in previous times, Soviet troops occupied the territory of the gorge, destroyed part of the enemy’s manpower and ammunition depots, but could not stay here for a long time - difficulties in supplying them far from the places of permanent deployment of units, as well as the fact that dushmans in such a "deaf" area they acted exceptionally boldly. The effectiveness of the Panjshir operations was seriously reduced by the fact that the rebels left the gorge ahead of time, leaving only barriers from small detachments and mining the paths.

By the end of 1981, it became clear that the Dushmans, having an inexhaustible stream of volunteers and supplies from Pakistan, could fight for as long as they wanted. It was for this purpose that the 56th separate airborne assault brigade was deployed from Kunduz to block the mountain paths in the southeast, to the city of Gardez, the capital of the province of Paktia. In addition, the actions of other Soviet units near the southern border of Afghanistan intensified. Indeed, already in the first months of 1982, it was possible to significantly reduce the flow of reinforcements and supplies for the Mujahideen from Pakistan. However, in the following months, due to the intensification of dushman activities in other parts of the country, the situation practically returned to its initial state. The most striking episode, testifying to the increased combat capabilities of the rebels, was the encirclement of an entire battalion (4th airborne assault) of the 56th airborne assault brigade in the Aliheil area. Only thanks to the energetic actions of the brigade leadership, as well as the competent interaction of the military branches (aviation, landing and artillery), the battalion was released with relatively small losses.

The war goes on (1982-1987)

1982 also marked major tragedy at the tunnel through the Salang pass, which is strategically important for the whole of Afghanistan. In November, there was a sabotage action dushman, which consisted in the fact that the exit from one side of the tunnel was blocked by their cars.

As a result of this action, 64 Soviet soldiers died, as well as more than 100 Afghans, including civilians. The rebels, in pursuit of momentary success, did not even stop at the murder of their compatriots, Afghan women and children.

At the end of the same 1982, a meeting was held in Moscow between the President of Pakistan, Zia ul-Haq, and the head of the USSR, Yuri Andropov. During the meeting, the conditions for terminating the provision of assistance by Pakistan to the Afghan rebels, as well as the conditions for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country, were discussed.

During 1983, Soviet troops in Afghanistan continued to carry out operations against armed opposition groups. However, this period is characterized by an increased intensity of hostilities in the area of the Soviet-Afghan border (Marmal operation), as well as the end of the fighting in the Panjshir Gorge by signing a truce with the armed forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud. The 177th Special Forces Detachment, which was located in the gorge, was withdrawn from it after 8 months of intense hostilities.

In April, in the province of Nimroz, a large fortified area of the militants Rabati-Jali was defeated. This fortified area also had the functions of a transshipment base for the transport of drugs. After its destruction, the rebels' economic base suffered significant damage, not to mention the fact that they lost a powerful base capable of letting through a large number of militants from Iran and Pakistan.

Another "hot" point in the far from calm Afghanistan in the summer of 1983 was the city of Khost, located in the southeast of the country, almost right next to the border of Pakistan. It was on him that the dushmans launched an offensive in July. Their plan was simple: to capture the city and make it the capital of the "rebellious" areas. Taking Khost would allow them to gain recognition in the world.

However, the stubborn defense of Khost made adjustments to the plans of the leadership of the Afghan opposition. Unable to take the city immediately, it was decided to take it into the blockade ring. But this plan also failed. Soviet troops, with massive support from aviation and artillery, managed to thwart an attempt to blockade the city.

The winter of 1983-1984 in the Afghan war is notable for the fact that during it the armed opposition groups did not leave the territory of Afghanistan for the first time, as was the case before. This became the reason for the aggravated situation in the area of Kabul and Jalalabad, where the Mujahideen began equipping bases and fortified areas for a long-term guerrilla war.

It was in this connection that already at the beginning of 1984 it was decided that the Soviet troops would conduct Operation Veil. Its essence was to create a barrier line along the Afghan-Pakistani and partially Afghan-Iranian borders in order to prevent the supply of Mujahideen detachments and intercept caravans going to the territory of Afghanistan. For these purposes, rather large forces were allocated with a total strength of 6 to 10 thousand people and a large number of aircraft and artillery.

But the operation ultimately did not achieve its goal, since it was almost impossible to completely close the border with Pakistan, especially with such limited, albeit mobile, forces. Only 15-20% of the total number of caravans coming from Pakistan were intercepted.

The year 1984 is mainly characterized by hostilities against the newly created staging posts and fortified areas of dushmans in order to deprive them of long-term bases and ultimately reduce the intensity of their operations. At the same time, the Mujahideen were not only fighting, but also carried out a number of terrorist acts in the cities of the country, such as the explosion of a bus with passengers in Kabul in June of the same year.

In the second half of the 84th year, the rebels intensified in the area of the city of Khost, in connection with which a large army operation was carried out here in November-December to escort columns and break through the orders of dushmans who were trying to take the city. As a result, the Mujahideen suffered heavy losses. It is worth noting, however, that the losses of the Soviet troops were very noticeable. Constant explosions on mines, which by 1984 on Afghan roads had become almost 10 times more than in the initial period of the war, unexpected shelling of columns and Soviet units already exceeded in terms of losses ordinary fire contacts with dushmans.

However, the situation as of January 1985 remained stable. The Afghan government, with the strong support of the Soviet Army, held Kabul and a number of provincial centers. The Mujahideen, on the other hand, "dominated" with might and main in rural and mountainous areas, having serious support among dehkans - Afghan peasants and receiving supplies from Pakistan.

Precisely with the aim of increasing the number of intercepted caravans coming from Pakistan and Iran, in the spring of 1985, the 15th and 22nd separate GRU special-purpose brigades were introduced into the territory of Afghanistan. Being divided into several detachments, they were dispersed throughout the country, from Kandahar to Jalalabad. Due to their mobility and exceptional combat capability, the special forces of the GRU General Staff were able to significantly reduce the number of caravans conducted from Pakistan, and also, as a result, seriously hit the supply of dushman in a number of areas.

Nevertheless, 1985 was marked primarily by large and bloody operations in the Panjshir Gorge, as well as in the Khost region and in the so-called "green zone" of a number of provinces. These operations ensured the defeat of a number of gangs, as well as the capture a large number weapons and ammunition. For example, in the province of Baghlan, serious losses were inflicted on the detachments of the field commander Said Mansur (he himself survived).

The year 1985 is also notable for the fact that the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU took a course towards a political solution to the Afghan problem. New trends, caused by the young General Secretary M. Gorbachev, came in handy in the Afghan issue, and already in February of the following year, 1986, the development of a plan for the phased withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began.

In 1986, there was an increased effectiveness of the actions of the Soviet troops against the bases and fortified areas of the Mujahideen, as a result of which the following points were defeated: Karera (March, Kunar province), Javara (April, Khost province), Kokari-Sharshari ( August, Herat province). At the same time, a number of major operations were carried out (for example, in the north of the country, in the provinces of Kunduz and Balkh).

On May 4, 1986, at the XVIII Plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA, M. Najibullah, the former head of the Afghan security service (KHAD), was elected to the post of Secretary General instead of Babrak Karmal. New head The state announced a new - exclusively political - course towards solving intra-Afghan problems.

At the same time, M. Gorbachev announced the imminent withdrawal from Afghanistan of a number of military units numbering up to 7 thousand people. However, the withdrawal of six regiments from Afghanistan took place only 4 months later, in October. This move was rather psychological, aimed at showing the Western powers the readiness of the Soviet Union to resolve the Afghan issue by peaceful means. The fact that a number of withdrawn units practically did not participate in hostilities, and the personnel of a number of newly formed regiments consisted exclusively of soldiers who had served 2 years and were being demobilized, did not bother anyone. That is why this step of the Soviet leadership was a very serious victory with minimal casualties.

Also an important event that opened the page for a new, final period of the Soviet war in Afghanistan was the proclamation by the Afghan government of a course towards national reconciliation. Since January 15, 1987, this course provided for a unilateral ceasefire. However, the plans of the new Afghan leadership remained just plans. The Afghan armed opposition regarded this policy as a cause of weakness and stepped up efforts to fight against government troops throughout the country.

Final stage of the war (1987-1989)

The year 1987 is characterized by the complete failure of the policy of national reconciliation put forward by M. Najibullah. The rebels were not going to follow the example of government troops, and the fighting continued throughout the country. However, it was precisely from 1987 that the Soviet troops operated mainly through large-scale army operations, which were successful thanks to the competent interaction of all branches of the military. The largest operations during this period were: “Strike” (Kunduz province), “Thunderstorm” (Ghazni province), “Circle” (Logar and Kabul provinces), “South-87” (Kandahar province).

Separately, it is also worth mentioning the operation "Magistral" to release the city of Khost. It was this city that for more than 5 years was stubbornly defended by both Afghan and Soviet forces and, as a result, was still surrounded. However, the supply of the Khost garrison was carried out by air. The result of the operation "Magistral" was the complete release of the Gardez-Khost highway in January 1988 and the defeat of a number of rebel gangs.

April 14, 1988 in Geneva, the ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed an agreement on a political settlement of the Afghan conflict. The guarantors of these agreements were the USSR and the USA. In addition, the USSR pledged to withdraw troops from Afghanistan within 9 months. The United States and Pakistan pledged to stop supporting the Mujahideen.

The first period of withdrawal of the OKSV from Afghanistan began on May 15, 1988. During it, Soviet units were withdrawn from the Panjshir Gorge, Kunduz, Kandahar, Gardez and other points of the country. As a result, a kind of "vacuum" was initially formed, which was quickly filled by the rebels. Already in August-October, dushmans occupied a number of large settlements in Afghanistan, including Kunduz and Khanabad. The number of the limited contingent of Soviet troops was about half of what it was as of January 1, 1988 - 50 thousand people.

By November, the Afghan government army, with the support of Soviet troops, controlled only about 30% of the country's territory, while after the departure of the Soviet units, entire provinces came under the control of the rebels.

November 15 began the second and final stage of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country. This period characterized by a significantly reduced intensity of hostilities. The last operation for the Soviet Army in Afghanistan was Operation Typhoon in the provinces of Baghlan, Parvan and Kapisa. It was carried out at the request of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA M. Najibullah, who thus wanted to seriously weaken the forces of the rebels in the end before facing them one on one. Nevertheless, although the losses of dushmans were quite large, they were not critical, but this operation somewhat complicated the withdrawal of the last Soviet units from Afghanistan.

On February 15, 1989, the commander of the 40th Army, General B. Gromov, was the last to cross the bridge over the Pyanj border river, thereby completing the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Republic of Afghanistan. The Soviet war in Afghanistan ended.

Side tactics

During the Afghan War, both sides widely used tactics that originated during the Second World War in Yugoslavia, and also developed in the wars for the freedom of Algeria and Vietnam. At the same time, the USSR, which previously supported the rebels who fought against the armies of the capitalist countries, now faced a serious guerrilla struggle itself.

At the beginning of the war, the Soviet army had practically no experience in fighting modern partisan movements, which caused a number of command errors and serious losses in the first operations. Nevertheless, the Soviet troops had good combat skills and seriously outnumbered the Afghan rebels technically, materially and morally.

A striking example of the initial period of hostilities of the Soviet army in Afghanistan was the capture of a bridge across the Kokcha River. This bridge was captured in late 1979 - early 1980 and was held by large forces of dushman (up to 1500 people). The Soviet forces consisted of up to 70 people (the 1st parachute company of the 1st airborne assault brigade of the 56th airborne assault brigade, reinforced with AGS-17 crews).

As a result of the battle, the Soviet troops drove the rebels from their positions and occupied the bridge, with losses of 7 dead and 10 wounded. Dushman losses were much greater. This operation was recognized as successful, and the company commander, Senior Lieutenant S.P. Kozlov, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In the future, Soviet tactics were significantly developed and became more flexible. To defeat the bases of the Mujahideen, the Soviet units (usually, at first, no more than a battalion, divided into combat groups for ease of control, went out on a military operation) walked through the mountains or were delivered by helicopters. The firepower of combat groups almost always made it possible to suppress the firing points of dushmans, as well as to destroy their ambushes. In addition to small arms, combat groups were often reinforced by mortar and AGS crews. In rare cases, battle groups were even given SPTG calculations (easel anti-tank grenade launchers), who practically did not usually participate in combat operations.

In cases where the enemy was hiding in villages or green zones, the Soviet units themselves or interacting with the “greens” (the Afghan government army) carried out a “search” (search for dushmans on the territory) of a given area.

Parts of the GRU special forces, used to intercept caravans, interacted more closely with aviation. Helicopters delivered them to ambush sites, from where they were already operating, intercepting, inspecting caravans, or eliminating them if necessary.

The supply of Soviet troops was carried out by means of columns marching along the Afghan roads with everything necessary. These columns are without fail, in addition to trucks, they were also equipped with military equipment (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, tanks and ZSU). However, with all precautions, dushman attacks on columns were a very frequent occurrence, and more and more broken and burned equipment became. Notorious throughout Afghanistan was the road near the village of Mukhamed-Aga in the province of Logar (the so-called "mukhamedka") - almost every column was fired upon here. It is noteworthy that the drivers of the cars in the columns had instructions - during the shelling, by increasing the speed, try to get out of the fire as soon as possible.

The Soviet army also massively used aircraft and artillery. If Vietnam became the “star” hour for American helicopters, then for the Soviet army aviation, it was the Afghan war that became such a time. Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters were not only mobile and reliable means of delivering personnel to the required areas, but also excellent means of supporting ground troops, as well as suppressing enemy firing points. In total, during the years of the Afghan war, the USSR lost 333 helicopters.

Dushman tactics consisted mainly in inflicting as much damage as possible on Soviet troops and actions on their communications, as well as (for example, near Khost in 1983-1988 or in general at the final stage of the war) in capturing settlements. Ambushes, attacks on columns, mining of mountain paths and even terrorist attacks in Kabul and other large cities - these measures had their results, albeit sometimes very doubtful. There were also frequent cases of the destruction of families by the Mujahideen, and even entire villages, in any way collaborating with the "infidels".

In the event that a group of dushmans was in danger, it easily dissolved in the mountains, which were native to the Afghans. However, the retreat was not always successful for the dushmans, and in such cases the group died or was captured.

At the beginning of the war (1979-1983), the Mujahideen, as a rule, went to spend the winter in Pakistan, where they had equipped field camps and bases. However, starting from 1983, they began to equip similar bases on the territory of Afghanistan, and often these bases were discovered and destroyed by Soviet troops. Replenishment in the ranks of the Mujahideen came mainly from the defeated villages or from deserted soldiers of the Afghan government army.

The results of the Afghan war and its significance

The result of the Afghan war was that the pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan, with the support of Soviet troops, was able to hold out much longer than it would have held out without it (the regime finally fell in 1992). However, at the same time, the confidence of the Afghan people in the PDPA was completely undermined, and therefore no political solution to intra-Afghan problems could be found.

The USSR, which was created near the southern border, somewhat fettered the Soviet forces, preventing them from effectively solving other foreign policy problems in the 1980s, such as, for example, the crisis in Poland. Ultimately, this circumstance seriously affected the balance of power in Eastern Europe and, as a consequence, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact.

The American leadership, barely recovering from the Vietnam War, was interested in tying the USSR in Afghanistan, and therefore provided serious support to the Afghan rebels. However, in reality, the Afghan insurgency was little controlled, as a result of which, already in the mid-90s, it was completely discredited in the eyes of almost the whole world.

In military terms, the Soviet Army gained a very extensive experience in fighting partisans in mountainous areas, which, however, was little taken into account after 6 years - during the war in Chechnya. Nevertheless, OKSVA honorably fulfilled all the military tasks assigned to it, in the words of General B. Gromov, "returned to the Motherland in an organized manner."

Afghan war 1979-1989: the entire chronicle of events from beginning to end

Historical background

However, this state of affairs was temporary. The freedom-loving Afghans did not want to remain under the control of the British, and discontent quickly and massively matured in the country. However, Afghanistan did not have a real chance to free itself from the British protectorate until after the First World War. In February 1919, Amanullah Khan ascended the throne in Afghanistan. He was supported by representatives of the "Young Afghans" and the army, who wanted to finally get rid of the oppression of the British. Already upon accession to the throne, Amanullah Khan announced the independence of the country from Britain, which caused the invasion of British troops. The 50,000-strong Afghan army was quickly defeated, but a powerful national movement practically nullified the military victories of the British. Already in August 1919, a peace treaty was concluded between Afghanistan and Great Britain, according to which Afghanistan became a completely independent state, and its border ran along the Durand line (the modern Afghan-Pakistani border).

In foreign policy, the focus on the young Soviet state became the most obvious. So, Soviet military instructors arrived here, which made it possible to create a fairly combat-ready Air Force, and also participated in hostilities against Afghan rebels.

Thus, by April 1929, a difficult situation had developed: the legitimate ruler of Afghanistan, Amanullah Khan, was in Kandahar, forming an army of people loyal to him. Khabibullah was in Kabul, who continued to impose the cruel laws of Islamic fundamentalism. In this situation, the Soviet leadership decided to help the legitimate leader of Afghanistan regain power in the country. On April 15, Soviet troops under the command of the Soviet military attache V. Primakov crossed the border of Afghanistan and began active hostilities against the supporters of Khabibullah. Events from the very first days developed unequivocally in favor of the Red Army, and the number of losses correlated approximately 1:200 in its favor. However, the successes of the operation, achieved in a month and a half, were nullified by the flight of Amanullah Khan to India and the cessation of his struggle for power. After that, the Soviet contingent was withdrawn from the country.

Afghanistan remained a monarchy until 1973, when the king's cousin Mohammed Daoud led an anti-monarchist coup and did not come to power as prime minister as a result. The change in the form of government had practically no effect on Soviet-Afghan relations, since Mohammed Daoud continued to maintain close relations with the USSR. The name of the country changed to the Republic of Afghanistan.

Over the next five years, Mohammed Daoud took steps to modernize the Afghan industry and the state as a whole, but his steps did not actually have any results. By 1978, the situation in the country was such that almost all segments of the population were opposed to the vain prime minister. The severity of the political situation can be indicated by the fact that already in 1976 both factions of the PDPA - Khalq and Parcham - agreed on cooperation against the dictatorship of Daoud.

Beginning of the civil war

In 1978, a civil war began, which, in fact, continues in Afghanistan to this day. At its early stage, this war was fought between the Afghan government and armed rebels - the so-called "dushmans". However, in 1978, the actions of the rebels were still insufficiently coordinated and consisted mainly of attacks on Afghan military units and shelling of columns. There were also strikes on party functionaries, but this mainly concerned lower-level party representatives.

In the same vein, Nur Mohammad Taraki's popularity in Afghanistan began to decline, while his prime minister, Hafizullah Amin, was rapidly gaining political weight. Amin was a rather tough politician who believed that only by military means could order be restored to the country.

After becoming the ruler of Afghanistan, Hafizullah Amin began to purge both the ranks of the clergy and the rival faction, Parcham.

At the same time, Amin realized that he could no longer cope with the rebels on his own. Increasingly, there were cases of transition of soldiers and officers from the government Afghan army to the ranks of the Mujahideen. The only deterrent in the Afghan units were Soviet military advisers, who sometimes prevented such incidents by the force of their authority and character. In the course of numerous negotiations between the Soviet and Afghan leaderships, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, having weighed all the pros and cons, at its meeting on December 12, 1979, decided to send a limited contingent of troops to Afghanistan.

In the period from December 25 to December 31, 1979, almost all units of the 40th Army, which were intended for this, entered the territory of Afghanistan.

As of March 1980, the deployment of units of the 40th Army had the following form:

Kabul - 103rd Guards Airborne Division and 108th Motorized Rifle Division.
Bagram - 345th separate airborne regiment.
Herat - 101st motorized rifle regiment of the 5th motorized rifle division.
Shindand - 5th motorized rifle division.
Kunduz - 201st motorized rifle division and 56th separate air assault brigade.
Kandahar - 70th separate motorized rifle brigade.
Jalalabad - 66th separate motorized rifle brigade.
Ghazni - 191st separate motorized rifle regiment.
Puli-Khumri - 395th motorized rifle regiment of the 201st motorized rifle division.
Khanabad - 122nd motorized rifle regiment of the 201st motorized rifle division.
Faizabad - 860th separate motorized rifle regiment.
Jabal-Ussaraj - 177th motorized rifle regiment of the 108th motorized rifle division.
Aviation units were based at the airfields: Bagram, Kunduz, Shindand, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Faizabad, Ghazni and Gardez.

Start of the war (1979-1982)

It is noteworthy that the nature of the first military operations of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan was rather the suppression of the uprisings of the Afghan units than the battles with the dushmans, whose detachments were still essentially being created and formed. Also, the tasks of the Soviet units at that time included maintaining control over a number of large settlements in the country, disarming deserters and arranging life.

The war goes on (1982-1987)

The year 1982 was also marked by a major tragedy at the strategically important for the whole of Afghanistan tunnel through the Salang pass. In November, there was a sabotage action dushman, which consisted in the fact that the exit from one side of the tunnel was blocked by their cars.

At the end of the same 1982, a meeting was held in Moscow between the President of Pakistan, Zia ul-Haq, and the head of the USSR, Yuri Andropov. During the meeting, the conditions for terminating the provision of assistance by Pakistan to the Afghan rebels, as well as the conditions for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country, were discussed.

However, the stubborn defense of Khost made adjustments to the plans of the leadership of the Afghan opposition. Unable to take the city immediately, it was decided to take it into the blockade ring. But this plan also failed. Soviet troops, with massive support from aviation and artillery, managed to thwart an attempt to blockade the city.

However, the situation as of January 1985 remained stable. The Afghan government, with the strong support of the Soviet Army, held Kabul and a number of provincial centers. The Mujahideen, on the other hand, "dominated" with might and main in rural and mountainous areas, having serious support among dehkans - Afghan peasants and receiving supplies from Pakistan.

It was with the aim of increasing the number of intercepted caravans coming from Pakistan and Iran that in the spring of 1985, the 15th and 22nd separate GRU special forces brigades were introduced into the territory of Afghanistan. Being divided into several detachments, they were dispersed throughout the country, from Kandahar to Jalalabad. Due to their mobility and exceptional combat capability, the special forces of the GRU General Staff were able to significantly reduce the number of caravans conducted from Pakistan, and also, as a result, seriously hit the supply of dushman in a number of areas.

Nevertheless, 1985 was marked primarily by large and bloody operations in the Panjshir Gorge, as well as in the Khost region and in the so-called "green zone" of a number of provinces. These operations ensured the defeat of a number of gangs, as well as the capture of a large number of weapons and ammunition. For example, in the province of Baghlan, serious losses were inflicted on the detachments of the field commander Said Mansur (he himself survived).

On May 4, 1986, at the XVIII Plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA, M. Najibullah, the former head of the Afghan security service (KHAD), was elected to the post of Secretary General instead of Babrak Karmal. The new head of state announced a new - exclusively political - course towards solving intra-Afghan problems.

Final stage of the war (1987-1989)

Separately, it is also worth mentioning the operation "Magistral" to release the city of Khost. It was this city that for more than 5 years was stubbornly defended by both Afghan and Soviet forces and, as a result, was still surrounded. However, the supply of the Khost garrison was carried out by air. The result of the operation "Magistral" was the complete release of the Gardez-Khost highway in January 1988 and the defeat of a number of rebel gangs.

November 15 began the second and final stage of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country. This period is characterized by a significantly reduced intensity of hostilities. The last operation for the Soviet Army in Afghanistan was Operation Typhoon in the provinces of Baghlan, Parvan and Kapisa. It was carried out at the request of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA M. Najibullah, who thus wanted to seriously weaken the forces of the rebels in the end before facing them one on one. Nevertheless, although the losses of dushmans were quite large, they were not critical, but this operation somewhat complicated the withdrawal of the last Soviet units from Afghanistan.

Side tactics

As a result of the battle, the Soviet troops drove the rebels from their positions and occupied the bridge, with losses of 7 dead and 10 wounded. Dushman losses were much greater. This operation was considered successful, and the company commander, Senior Lieutenant S.P. Kozlov, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In the future, Soviet tactics were significantly developed and became more flexible. To defeat the bases of the Mujahideen, the Soviet units (usually, at first, no more than a battalion, divided into combat groups for ease of control, went out on a military operation) walked through the mountains or were delivered by helicopters. The firepower of combat groups almost always made it possible to suppress the firing points of dushmans, as well as to destroy their ambushes. In addition to small arms, combat groups were often reinforced by mortar and AGS crews. In rare cases, battle groups were even given SPTG calculations (mounted anti-tank grenade launchers), which usually practically did not participate in combat operations.
In cases where the enemy was hiding in villages or green zones, the Soviet units themselves or interacting with the “greens” (the Afghan government army) carried out a “search” (search for dushmans on the territory) of a given area.

The supply of Soviet troops was carried out by means of columns marching along the Afghan roads with everything necessary. These columns without fail, in addition to trucks, were equipped with military equipment (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, tanks and ZSU). However, with all precautions, dushman attacks on columns were a very frequent occurrence, and more and more broken and burned equipment became. Notorious throughout Afghanistan was the road near the village of Mukhamed-Aga in the province of Logar (the so-called "mukhamedka") - almost every column was fired upon here. It is noteworthy that the drivers of the cars in the columns had instructions - during the shelling, by increasing the speed, try to get out of the fire as soon as possible.

The results of the Afghan war and its significance

The USSR, which was created near the southern border, somewhat fettered the Soviet forces, preventing them from effectively solving other foreign policy problems in the 1980s, such as, for example, the crisis in Poland. Ultimately, this circumstance seriously affected the balance of power in Eastern Europe and, as a result, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact.

The losses of Soviet troops in Afghanistan amounted, according to various sources, from 13,835 to 14,427 people. The losses of the KGB amounted to 576 people, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 people. 53,750 people were wounded and shell-shocked, 415,930 fell ill (mainly with diseases such as malaria, typhoid and hepatitis). 417 servicemen were taken prisoner, 130 of them were released.

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05.01.2010 12:18

Afghan war (1979-1989)

Afghan war (1979-1989) - the name of one of the stages of the civil war in Afghanistan, which has developed in the Soviet and Russian historiographic tradition, marked by the presence of a military contingent of Soviet troops on the territory of this country. The armed forces of the DRA government, on the one hand, and the armed opposition (mujahideen, or dushmans), on the other, took part in this conflict. The struggle was for complete political control over the territory of Afghanistan. The Soviet Army, introduced into the country by decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU to support the Kabul government, was directly involved in the military conflict. Dushmans during the conflict were supported by military specialists from the United States, a number of European countries - members of NATO, China, as well as Pakistani intelligence services.

The reasons

One of the reasons for the war was the desire to support the supporters of the concept of socialism in Afghanistan, who came to power as a result of the April Revolution, faced with powerful opposition to their social, economic and political strategy.

In part, the introduction of Soviet troops was aimed at preventing the possible strengthening of Islamic fundamentalism in the region, caused by the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979.

In itself, the fall of the pro-Soviet government would mean swipe according to the very theory of Marxism-Leninism, which asserted that social formations always change from simple to perfect and from feudalism to communism, and at the same time according to the foreign policy positions of the USSR, since if this happened, this would be the first case in post-war history of the overthrow of the pro-Soviet government . Theoretically, in addition to direct consequences, the spread of fundamentalism through the Afghan Tajiks could significantly destabilize Soviet Central Asia. At the international level, it was stated that the USSR was guided by the principles of "proletarian internationalism". As a formal basis, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU used the repeated requests of the leadership of Afghanistan and personally Hafizullah Amin to provide military assistance to the country to fight anti-government forces.

Solution

The final decision on the introduction of troops into Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and formalized by the secret resolution of the CPSU Central Committee No. 176/125 "To the position in" A "".

Course of the war - chronology

The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, December 1979

December 25 - Columns of the Soviet 40th Army cross the Afghan border on a pontoon bridge across the Amu Darya River. H. Amin expressed gratitude to the Soviet leadership and ordered General Staff Armed Forces DRA on rendering assistance to the introduced troops.

January 10-11 - an attempt at an anti-government rebellion by artillery regiments of the 20th Afghan division in Kabul. During the battle, about 100 rebels were killed; Soviet troops lost two killed and two more were wounded.

February 23 - tragedy in the tunnel at the Salang pass. During the movement of oncoming columns in the middle of the tunnel, a collision occurred, a traffic jam formed. As a result, 16 Soviet servicemen suffocated.

March is the first major offensive divisions of the OKSV against the Mujahideen - Kunar offensive.

April 20-24 - Massive anti-government demonstrations in Kabul are dispersed by low-flying jet aircraft.

April - The US Congress authorizes $15 million in "direct and open assistance" to the Afghan opposition.

- the first military operation in Panjshir.
June 19 - decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the withdrawal of some tank, missile and anti-aircraft missile units from Afghanistan.

September - fighting in the Lurkoh mountain range in the province of Farah; the death of Major General Khakhalov

October 29 - the introduction of the second "Muslim battalion" (177 Special Forces) under the command of Major Kerimbaev ("Kara Major").

December - the defeat of the base point of the opposition in the Darzab region (Dzauzjan province).

November 3 - Tragedy at the Salang pass. More than 176 people died as a result of the explosion of a fuel tanker. (Already during the years of the civil war between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban, Salang became a natural barrier and in 1997 the tunnel was blown up on the orders of Ahmad Shah Massoud to prevent the Taliban from moving north. In 2002, after the unification of the country, the tunnel was reopened).

November 15 - meeting of Y. Andropov and Zia ul-Haq in Moscow. The Secretary General had a private conversation with the Pakistani leader, during which he informed him about the "new flexible policy of the Soviet side and understanding of the need for a speedy resolution of the crisis." The meeting also discussed the expediency of the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the prospects for the participation of the Soviet Union in the war. In exchange for the withdrawal of troops from Pakistan, it was required to refuse assistance to the rebels.

January 2 - in Mazar-i-Sharif, dushmans abducted a group of Soviet civilian specialists numbering 16 people. They were released only a month later, while six of them died.

February 2 - The village of Vakhshak in northern Afghanistan was destroyed by bombs in retaliation for the hostage-taking in Mazar-i-Sharif.

March 28 - meeting of the UN delegation headed by Perez de Cuellar and D. Cordoves with Y. Andropov. He thanks the UN for "understanding the problem" and assures the mediators that he is ready to take "certain steps", but doubts that Pakistan and the US will support the UN proposal regarding their non-intervention in the conflict.

April - an operation to defeat opposition groups in the Nijrab Gorge, Kapisa province. Soviet units lost 14 people killed and 63 wounded.

May 19 - Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan V. Smirnov officially confirmed the desire of the USSR and Afghanistan "to set a date for the withdrawal of the contingent of Soviet troops."

July - Dushman offensive on Khost. An attempt to blockade the city was unsuccessful.

August - the hard work of the mission of D. Cordoves to prepare agreements on a peaceful settlement of the Afghan problem is almost completed: an 8-month program for the withdrawal of troops from the country has been developed, but after Andropov's illness, the issue of the conflict was removed from the agenda of the Politburo meetings. Now it was only about "dialogue with the UN".

Winter - hostilities intensified in the Sarobi region and the Jalalabad valley (the reports most often mention the province of Laghman). For the first time, armed opposition detachments remain on the territory of Afghanistan for the entire winter period. The creation of fortified areas and resistance bases directly in the country began.

January 16 - Dushmans shot down a Su-25 aircraft from the Strela-2M MANPADS. This is the first case of successful use of MANPADS in Afghanistan.

April 30 - During a major operation in the Panjshir Gorge, the 1st Battalion of the 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment was ambushed and suffered heavy losses.
October - over Kabul from the Strela MANPADS, dushmans shoot down an Il-76 transport aircraft.

1985

June - army operation in Panjshir.

Summer is a new course of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU for a political solution to the "Afghan problem".

Autumn - The functions of the 40th Army are reduced to covering the southern borders of the USSR, for which new motorized rifle units are involved. The creation of basic base areas in hard-to-reach places of the country has begun.

February - at the XXVII Congress of the CPSU, M. Gorbachev makes a statement about the beginning of the development of a plan for a phased withdrawal of troops.

March - the decision of the R. Reagan administration to start deliveries to Afghanistan to support the Mujahiddins with the Stinger ground-to-air MANPADS, which makes the combat aviation of the 40th Army vulnerable to ground attack.

April 4-20 - an operation to defeat the Javar base: a major defeat for the dushmans.
Unsuccessful attempts by Ismail Khan's detachments to break through the "security zone" around Herat.

May 4 - at the XVIII Plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA, instead of B. Karmal, M. Najibullah, who previously headed the Afghan counterintelligence service KhAD, was elected to the post of Secretary General. The plenum proclaimed the policy of solving the problems of Afghanistan by political means.

July 28 - M. Gorbachev defiantly announced the imminent withdrawal of six regiments of the 40th Army from Afghanistan (about 7 thousand people). The withdrawal date will be rescheduled at a later date. In Moscow, there are disputes about whether to withdraw troops completely.

August - Massoud defeated the base of government troops in Farkhar, Takhar province.
Autumn - Major Belov's reconnaissance group from the 173rd detachment of the 16th special forces brigade captures the first batch of three Stinger portable anti-aircraft missile systems in the Kandahar region.

October 15-31 - tank, motorized rifle, anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Shindand, motorized rifle and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kunduz, and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kabul.

November 13 - The Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU sets the task of withdrawing all troops from Afghanistan within two years.

December — an emergency plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA proclaims a course towards a policy of national reconciliation and advocates an early end to the fratricidal war.

January 2 - An operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense headed by First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces General of the Army V. I. Varennikov was sent to Kabul.

February - Operation "Strike" in the province of Kunduz.

February-March - Operation Flurry in Kandahar province.

March - Operation Thunderstorm in the province of Ghazni.
- Operation "Circle" in the provinces of Kabul and Logar.

May - operation "Volley" in the provinces of Logar, Paktia, Kabul.
- Operation "South-87" in the province of Kandahar.

Spring - Soviet troops begin to use the Barrier system to cover the eastern and southeastern sections of the border.

Soviet spetsnaz group preparing for operation in Afghanistan
January 8 - battle at height 3234.

April 14 - Through the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation around the situation in the DRA. The USSR and the USA became the guarantors of the agreements. The Soviet Union undertook to withdraw its contingent within 9 months, starting on May 15; The US and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.

February 15 - Soviet troops are completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the Limited Contingent, Lieutenant-General B.V. Gromov, who, allegedly, was the last to cross the border river Amu-Darya (the city of Termez).

The humanitarian aspect of hostilities The result of hostilities from 1978 to 1992 was the massive migration of refugees to Iran and Pakistan, a considerable percentage of which remain there to this day. The bitterness of the belligerents reached extreme limits. It is known that dushmans subjected prisoners to torture, among which the one called “red tulip” is widely known. There are known cases of the destruction of villages that gave shelter to the rebels to intimidate dushmans, mine fields and nodes of the water supply network, and destroy crops in territories controlled by dushmans [source?]. However, the rumors about the use of chemical weapons by the 40th Army were never confirmed.

results

After the withdrawal of the Soviet Army from the territory of Afghanistan, the pro-Soviet regime of Najibullah (1986-1992) existed for another three years and, having lost the support of Russia, was overthrown in April 1992 by a coalition of Mujahideen field commanders.

During the war years, the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda appeared in Afghanistan and the groups of Islamic radicals became stronger, who were active participants in the conflicts in Algeria, Egypt and Chechnya.

Colonel-General Gromov, the last commander of the 40th Army (led the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan), in his book “Limited Contingent” expressed this opinion regarding the victory or defeat of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan: “I am deeply convinced that there are no grounds for asserting that that the 40th Army was defeated, as well as the fact that we won a military victory in Afghanistan. At the end of 1979, Soviet troops entered the country without hindrance, completed their tasks, unlike the Americans in Vietnam, and returned to their homeland in an organized manner. If we consider armed opposition detachments as the main enemy of the Limited Contingent, then the difference between us lies in the fact that the 40th Army did what it considered necessary, and the dushmans only what they could.

The 40th Army had several main tasks. First of all, we had to assist the government of Afghanistan in resolving the internal political situation. Basically, this assistance consisted in the fight against armed opposition groups. In addition, the presence of a significant military contingent in Afghanistan was supposed to prevent aggression from outside. These tasks were fully completed by the personnel of the 40th Army.

Before the Limited Contingent, no one has ever set the task of winning a military victory in Afghanistan. All the combat operations that the 40th Army had to conduct from 1980 until almost the last days of our stay in the country were either preemptive or retaliatory. Together with government troops, we carried out military operations only to exclude attacks on our garrisons, airfields, motorcades and communications that were used to transport goods.

At the same time, more than 70% of the forces and means of the 40th Army were constantly involved in the transportation of humanitarian cargo through the territory of Afghanistan. This hard work did not stop until the last day of the stay of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops in Afghanistan. Thanks to Soviet supplies and the activities of our specialists, the country's economy has strengthened and, figuratively speaking, has risen to its feet.

One can agree with Gromov's opinion regarding the outcome of the war, since the Mujahideen have never managed to carry out a single major operation, not to mention measures of the caliber of the Tet offensive in Vietnam, and have not been able to occupy a single large city.

Afghanistan casualties

The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. The most common figure is 1 million dead; available estimates range from 670,000 civilians to 2 million in total. According to Harvard professor M. Cramer, an American researcher of the Afghan war: “During the nine years of the war, more than 2.5 million Afghans (mostly civilians) were killed or maimed, several million more were in the ranks of refugees, many of whom left the country” .

USSR losses

1979 - 86 people
1980 - 1,484 people
1981 - 1,298 people
1982 - 1,948 people
1983 - 1,446 people
1984 - 2,346 people
1985 - 1,868 people
1986 - 1,333 people
1987 - 1,215 people
1988 - 759 people
1989 - 53 people

Total - 13,836 people, on average - 1,537 people per year. According to updated data, in total in the war the Soviet Army lost 14,427, the KGB - 576, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 people dead and missing.

Losses in equipment, according to official figures, amounted to 147 tanks, 1314 armored vehicles, 433 artillery systems, 118 aircraft and 333 helicopters. At the same time, as in the case of human losses, these figures were not specified in any way - in particular, information was not published on the number of combat and non-combat losses of aviation, on the losses of aircraft and helicopters by type, etc.

Economic losses of the USSR

About 800 million US dollars were annually spent from the USSR budget to support the Kabul regime.
The maintenance of the 40th Army and the conduct of hostilities from the budget of the USSR annually spent about 3 billion US dollars.