Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the USSR. Chapter Eleven

The Headquarters of the High Command was established on June 23, 1941. Its composition was somewhat different from the project proposed by the People's Commissariat of Defense. It included: People's Commissar of Defense S. K. Timoshenko (Chairman), Chief of the General Staff G. K. Zhukov, I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, K. E. Voroshilov, S. M. Budyonny, N G. Kuznetsov.

We should have adopted our draft, which provided for the appointment of JV Stalin as Commander-in-Chief. Indeed, under the then existing order, one way or another, without I.V. Stalin, People's Commissar S.K. Timoshenko could not independently make fundamental decisions. It turned out two commanders-in-chief: People's Commissar S. K. Timoshenko - legal, in accordance with the decree, and I. V. Stalin - actual. This complicated the work of troop command and control and inevitably led to unnecessary waste of time in developing decisions and issuing orders.

We also proposed to include N. F. Vatutin, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, in the Headquarters. But IV Stalin did not agree.

At the Headquarters, a group of advisers was formed on various issues. In practice, the group played a nominal role, since all the advisers soon received other appointments, and their replacement did not take place.

Throughout the war, the Headquarters was in Moscow. This was of great moral importance. Due to the threat of enemy air strikes, in early July, she was transferred from the Kremlin to the Kirov Gates area to a small mansion with a reliable working space and communications, and a month later, nearby, on the platform of the Kirovskaya metro station, the operators of the General Staff - a worker organ of the Stavka.

On June 30, 1941, on the model of the Leninist Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense during the period of foreign military intervention and civil war, by decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, an emergency body was created - the State Defense Committee, headed by I. V. Stalin.

The State Defense Committee became an authoritative body for the leadership of the country's defense, concentrating all power in its hands. Civil, party, Soviet organizations were obliged to comply with all his decisions and orders. To control their implementation in the territories and regions, the military-industrial people's commissariats, at the main enterprises and construction sites, the State Defense Committee had its own representatives.

At meetings of the GKO, which took place at any time of the day, as a rule, in the Kremlin or at the dacha of I.V. Stalin, the most important issues were discussed and resolved. Plans for military action were considered by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party and the State Defense Committee. People's commissars were invited to the meetings, who were to take part in the provision of operations. This made it possible, when the opportunity arose, to concentrate enormous material forces in the most important areas, to pursue a single line in the field of strategic leadership and, backing it up with an organized rear, to link the combat activity of the troops with the efforts of the whole country.

Very often at the meetings of the State Committee of Defense sharp disputes broke out, while opinions were expressed definitely and sharply. If a consensus was not reached, a commission was immediately created from representatives of the extreme parties, which was instructed to report the agreed proposals at the next meeting.

In total, during the war, the State Defense Committee adopted about ten thousand decisions and resolutions of a military and economic nature. These resolutions and orders were strictly and energetically implemented, around them work began to boil, ensuring the implementation of a single party line in the leadership of the country at that difficult and difficult time.

On July 10, 1941, in order to improve the leadership of the armed forces, by the decision of the State Defense Committee, the Headquarters of the High Command was transformed into the Headquarters of the High Command, and on August 8 it was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ( Throughout the war, the Headquarters successively included B. M. Shaposhnikov, A. M. Vasilevsky, and A. I. Antonov, who held the post of Chief of the General Staff. The last change occurred on February 17, 1945, when, by a decree of the State Defense Committee, the Stavka was determined as part of I. V. Stalin, G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevsky, A. I. Antonov, N. A. Bulganin, N. G. Kuznetsova. - Approx. author). From then until the end of the war, I. V. Stalin was the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. With the formation of the State Defense Committee and the creation of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, headed by the same person - the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, the creation of the structure of state and military leadership of the war was completed. The Central Committee of the Party ensured the unity of action of all Party, state, military and economic bodies.

Now I began to work directly with JV Stalin. I had never had such close contact with him before, and at first I felt a certain stiffness in his presence. In addition, my insufficient experience in strategic matters affected, and I was not sure of the accuracy of my forecasts.

At first, I. V. Stalin spoke to me little. It was felt that he was carefully looking at me and he had not yet formed a firm opinion about me, as the chief of the General Staff.

But as experience accumulated, I became bolder and more confident in expressing my opinions and noticed that JV Stalin began to listen to them more and more.

On July 19, 1941, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, I. V. Stalin was also appointed People's Commissar of Defense.

It must be said that with the appointment of I. V. Stalin as Chairman of the State Defense Committee, Supreme Commander-in-Chief and People's Commissar of Defense in the General Staff, the central departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the State Planning Committee of the USSR and in other government and national economy bodies, his firm hand was immediately felt.

Each member of the State Defense Committee received a specific task and was strictly responsible for the implementation of national economic plans. One of them was responsible for the release of tanks, the other - artillery weapons, the third - aircraft, the fourth - the supply of ammunition, food and uniforms, etc. The commanders of the armed forces I.V. to help them in their work on the implementation of the program for the production of certain military products exactly at the appointed time and of the required quality.

Under the influence of party political work, the improvement of the art of command and control, and the accumulated experience of armed struggle, the rebuff to the enemy intensified. Warriors of all kinds and types of weapons acted heroically and selflessly in battles. Military discipline has risen noticeably in the troops.

However, despite the vigorous measures taken by the Headquarters and the command of the fronts, the situation on the fronts continued to worsen. Under pressure from superior enemy forces, our troops retreated deep into the country. I have already said above that the most difficult situation developed in the first months of the war in the western and northwestern directions. In the conditions of the unfavorable development of military events for us, the strategic defense of the Soviet Armed Forces was also taking shape. It was distinguished by very active forms and stubbornness of the struggle.

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the State Defense Committee showed serious concern about the state of the country's air defense, since the fascist German aviation was very active. The enemy had high hopes for the Luftwaffe. He counted on hitting a mass of aircraft to disrupt the mobilization in the western regions of our country, to disorganize the work of the nearest rear, transport and state apparatus, to undermine the will of the people to resist. Hitler showered the air robbers and their leader Goering with favors and rewards.

Analyzing the situation and taking into account the unfavorable forecasts regarding air defense of the state's main facilities, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, with his characteristic energy, set about strengthening the combat capability of air defense. He invited a group of senior air defense workers to his place and strictly demanded that, within two days, fundamental considerations be presented on strengthening the anti-aircraft forces and means, improving their organizational structure and management. General N. N. Voronov, Chief of Artillery of the Red Army, Generals M. S. Gromadin, D. A. Zhuravlev, P. F. Zhigarev, N. D. Yakovlev and others provided him with great and useful advice.

The main task of the air defense at that time was to cover Moscow, Leningrad and other large industrial centers, where tanks, aircraft, artillery weapons were produced, oil was extracted and the most important railway communications, energy and communications facilities were located.

The most powerful grouping of forces and means of air defense was created for the defense of Moscow. In July, it already had 585 fighter aircraft, 964 anti-aircraft guns, 166 heavy anti-aircraft machine guns, up to 1,000 searchlights and a large number of barrage balloons. This organizational structure of air defense has fully justified itself. Fascist aviation, taking massive actions, suffered huge losses, but still could not break through with large forces to Moscow. In total, many thousands of bombers took part in the raids, but only a few of them (two or three percent) managed to penetrate the city, and even those were forced to drop their deadly cargo anywhere.

During enemy air raids on Moscow, the Supreme Commander repeatedly appeared in the underground premises of the capital's air defense command post and personally observed the work of repelling enemy air forces. Here, General D. A. Zhuravlev was calmly and clearly in charge. After the raid, I. V. Stalin usually lingered and talked with the officer-operators. He asked them about what, in their opinion, the Headquarters still needs to do in order for the air defense to be able to fulfill its tasks, primarily for the defense of Moscow.

In subsequent years of the war, air defense continued to improve and made a worthy contribution to the common cause of defeating the Nazi aggressors.

I still remember with great respect and gratitude the air defense personnel of Leningrad and the Baltic Fleet: the fighters and officers of these troops heroically, with genuine skill, repelled massive, almost daily enemy air raids on the city and fleet.

Of course, the process of creating bodies of Soviet strategic leadership took some time and underwent a number of fundamental changes dictated by the course of the war and the nature of the military-strategic situation. But gradually Soviet military science, guided by the experience of armed struggle accumulated even before the Great Patriotic War achieved significant success in command and control issues.

People - the command and political staff and the staff personnel of the operational-strategic level - were mostly well-chosen, moreover, from among young, energetic and capable officers and generals. They ardently set to work, daily improving their knowledge in the field of strategy and operational art. The General Staff, the Main Headquarters of the Naval Forces, the bodies of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the commanders of the fronts, navies, districts and their headquarters did a lot to ensure the greatest combat effectiveness of the armed forces and win victory.

However, the absence of our supreme body of military leadership, which the Headquarters should have been at the time of the attack by fascist Germany, naturally, could not but affect the command and control of troops, the results of the first operations and the general operational-strategic situation. Moreover, the enemy has already gained considerable experience in Europe in organizing war and sudden invasions by strike forces. It must be admitted that both the commanders-in-chief of the directions and the command of the fronts at the beginning of the war made significant shortcomings in command and control. It also had a negative impact on the results of the armed struggle.

I am sometimes asked why, by the beginning of the war with fascist Germany, we were practically not fully prepared to lead the war and command the troops of the fronts.

First of all, I think it would be fair to say that many of the then leading officials of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff too canonized the experience of the First World War. Most of the commanders of the operational-strategic level, including the leadership of the General Staff, theoretically understood the changes that had taken place in the nature and methods of waging the Second World War. However, in reality, they were preparing to wage war according to the old scheme, mistakenly believing that a big war would begin, as before, with border battles, and then only the main enemy forces would enter into action. But the war, contrary to expectations, began immediately with the offensive operations of all the ground and air forces of Nazi Germany.

It must also be admitted that a certain share of responsibility for shortcomings in the preparation of the armed forces for the start of hostilities is borne by the people's commissar of defense and senior officials of the people's commissariat of defense. As the former chief of the General Staff and the closest assistant to the people's commissar, I cannot absolve myself of the blame for these shortcomings.

Finally, an important role was played by the fact that until the last moment, the beginning of the Hitlerite attack on the Soviet Union, I.V. Stalin did not leave the hope that the war could be delayed. This, to some extent, connected the people's commissar of defense, who did not dare to enter I.V. Stalin with the project to create the Headquarters until the spring of 1941.

At the end of spring, I had to once again, in an urgent form, ask the people's commissar to report to I.V. Stalin about the need to consider the draft plan for organizing the Headquarters of the High Command developed by the General Staff and allow it to be tested in practice at large command and staff exercises. This time the report took place, and I. V. Stalin agreed to conduct such an exercise, but away from the border, somewhere at the turn of Valdai - Orsha - Gomel - r. Psyol, and then present to him a draft organization of the Headquarters, its functional duties and working bodies.

A reconnaissance of the line for the exercise was carried out in May 1941, but the exercise failed. Due to lack of time and other circumstances, measures for the practical preparation of the Headquarters of the High Command and its bodies were not considered.

In many chapters of my book, more will be said about the errors in command and control. This is especially true of the first period of the war, right up to the Stalingrad counter offensive operation. Of course, this most difficult period for us consisted of more than just mistakes. At that time, major operations were prepared and not without success carried out, the plan to capture Leningrad by the enemy was frustrated, and the fascist German troops near Moscow were routed. These and other battles and battles taught the command staff a lot. Our army matured, the leadership of the troops improved. When the difficulties of the first period were over, the leadership of the armed struggle on the part of the Headquarters and the command of the fronts improved significantly.

Upstairs, at the Headquarters, it was especially clear that in war there were differences between mistakes and mistakes: some of them can be corrected, others are difficult to correct. It all depends on the nature of the errors and their scale. Tactical mistakes, as experience showed, could be quickly eliminated by the higher command. Miscalculations on an operational scale are immeasurably more difficult to correct, especially if the command does not have the necessary forces, means or time at its disposal to bring these forces into action where and when it is needed.

To correct the operational-strategic mistakes made by the Headquarters and the command of some fronts in the summer of 1942 (which made it possible for the Nazi troops to reach the Stalingrad region and the North Caucasus), extraordinary efforts of the whole country were required.

Looking back, I will allow myself to say that no military-political leadership of any other country would have withstood such tests and would not have found a way out of this extremely unfavorable situation.

As you know, strategy is completely dependent on politics, and mistakes of a military-political nature on a nationwide scale are difficult to correct. Only a country that wages a just war and has the necessary military-material capabilities for this can cope with them. Conversely, when the goals of the war do not meet the vital interests of the people, mistakes of this kind, as a rule, lead to disastrous consequences.

But there are also incorrigible miscalculations. Such a miscalculation was made by the fascist leadership of Nazi Germany, risking an attack on the Soviet Union. This miscalculation stemmed from an incredible overestimation of its forces and means and an underestimation of the potential capabilities of the USSR - a country where a socialist system exists, where the armed forces, people, party and government are united.

Intoxicated by previous easy victories, Hitler and his political and military entourage believed that their troops would march victoriously through the Land of the Soviets just as they had in Western Europe. But this did not happen. Guided by the adventurist, nationalist ideology of fascism, the Nazis were unable to correctly understand the issues that decide the outcome of the war, which, in preparation for war, must be known and resolved without emotions, on the basis of the science of society and war.

Having soberly assessed the reasons for our unsuccessful operations in 1942, the Communist Party and the Soviet government, relying on the indisputable advantages of the socialist social and state system, were able to mobilize all the forces of the country for new efforts to repulse the enemy. Thanks to the selfless support of the people, the Soviet Supreme High Command found the most acceptable methods and forms of struggle in the given situation, finally wrested the initiative from the enemy, and then turned the course of the war in its favor. After the Stalingrad operation, the leadership of military operations in all command units of the Soviet Armed Forces, up to and including the Supreme High Command, reached a high level of perfection. Most of the commanders of the fronts and armies showed themselves well. Having lost the initiative, the Hitlerite command did not cope with the difficulties that arose both in terms of organizing operations and in their practical implementation, which significantly brought the hour of their catastrophic defeat closer. This was the beginning of the general defeat of Nazi Germany.

During the war, the Central Committee Communist Party The Soviet Union and the Soviet government paid great attention to the leadership of the armed forces. During the war years, more than 200 meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Organizing Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Party took place. Decisions made on issues of foreign policy, economics and strategy were put into effect, respectively, through the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars, the GKO or the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

The work of the Headquarters was based on the Leninist principles of centralized command and control of troops. The headquarters directed all military operations of the armed forces on land, at sea and in the air, and built up strategic efforts in the course of the struggle at the expense of reserves and the use of the forces of the partisan movement. Its working body, as already mentioned, was the General Staff.

New forms and methods of warfare naturally required an organizational restructuring of command and control. As a result of the measures taken, the General Staff was relieved of a number of functions that were transferred to other departments. With its activities, the General Staff covered all types of armed forces and branches of service - land, navy, aviation, etc. Its main attention was focused on operational-strategic issues, a comprehensive and in-depth study of the situation, on the analysis and support of decisions of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in organizational terms.

As a result of the reorganization, the General Staff became a more efficient, operational body and was able to carry out the tasks assigned to it much more efficiently throughout the war. Of course, there were shortcomings even after the reorganization, but only in individual cases and on some complex issues.

To improve the management of the fronts, on July 10, 1941, the State Defense Committee formed three Main Commands of the troops of the directions: - North-Western (commander-in-chief - Marshal K. E. Voroshilov, member of the Military Council - A. A. Zhdanov, chief of staff - General M. V. Zakharov); - Western (commander-in-chief - Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, member of the Military Council - N.A. Bulganin, chief of staff - General G.K. Malandin); - South-Western (commander-in-chief - Marshal S. M. Budyonny, member of the Military Council - N. S. Khrushchev [since August 5, 1941, chief of staff - A. P. Pokrovsky).

By creating the High Commands of Directional Troops, the State Defense Committee hoped to help the Headquarters provide the possibility of better command and control of troops, to organize the interaction of fronts, air and naval forces. It was assumed that the Military Councils of the directions, to a greater extent than the commands of the fronts, would be able to use Local forces and means in the interests of the armed struggle.

However, already the first months of the existence of the Main Commands of the Directional Troops showed that they did not justify the hopes. The Headquarters continued to direct the fronts directly. According to the practice then existing, the commanders-in-chief of the directions did not have at their disposal reserves of troops and materiel to influence the course of hostilities. They could not, without the consent of the Supreme High Command, put into practice any fundamental decisions and, thus, turned into mere relaying authorities. As a result, in 1942, the main commands of the troops of the directions were liquidated.

The headquarters had to again direct the actions of a large number of fronts deployed over a vast area. This was inevitably associated with significant difficulties, especially in the field of coordinating the efforts of the troops of several fronts operating side by side. The search for new management methods began, which ultimately led to the emergence of an effective form of direct influence of strategic leadership on the activities of the fronts. Thus, a very peculiar institution of strategic leadership appeared - representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, who were sent to the most important sectors.

Military history has known such examples dating back to the time of the First World War, when representatives of the high command, sent directly to the place of military operations, exerted a very important influence on the course of operations. In the first months of the Great Patriotic War, some Soviet generals, due to the prevailing circumstances, under the authority of the Stavka, also had to work in the active troops and, using the power given to them, seek a more favorable development of the situation. But now, after a year of experience in the war, the activity of the Stavka representatives in certain sectors of the armed struggle has taken on a purposeful character. From now on, its representatives were sent only to those fronts or groups of fronts where the main tasks that determined the course of the most important operation or campaign were being solved at the given moment.

Representatives of the Headquarters were appointed from among the most trained military leaders. They knew the situation in every detail and, as a rule, were participants in the development of the concept and plan for future operations. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command steadily demanded leadership and full responsibility for solving the operation from its representatives and endowed them with full power for this purpose. In this regard, let me quote one of the telegrams of I.V. Stalin to the representative of the Stavka on the Crimean Front, L. Z. Mekhlis, in May 1942.

Having caught in the telegram L. 3. Mekhlis an attempt to evade responsibility for the serious failures of the Soviet troops on the Kerch Peninsula, I. V. Stalin writes to him:

“You hold on to the strange position of an outside observer who is not responsible for the affairs of the Crimean Front. This position is very convenient, but it is rotten through and through. On the Crimean front, you are not an outside observer, but a responsible representative of the Headquarters, responsible for all the successes and failures of the front and obliged to correct the mistakes of the command. You, together with the command, are responsible for the fact that the left flank of the front turned out to be extremely weak. If the whole “situation showed that the enemy would attack in the morning!”, And you did not take all measures to organize a rebuff, limiting yourself to passive criticism, then so much the worse for you. So, you have not yet understood that you were sent to the Crimean Front not as the State Control, but as a responsible representative of the Headquarters ... "( Archive of the USSR Ministry of Defense, f. 48-A, op. 1640, d. 177).

There is hardly any need for any comments on this very clear document defining the duties of the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

As the offensive operations of the Soviet Armed Forces expanded, so did the duties of the Stavka representatives. For example, in the summer campaign of 1944, the Bagration plan was implemented in the western strategic direction. According to this plan, developed by the collective efforts of the Headquarters, the General Staff and the Military Councils of the fronts, four Soviet fronts, long-range aviation, and partisans delivered simultaneous strikes. They were tasked with crushing the Army Group Center, the main grouping of troops of fascist Germany.

The conditions of the situation then demanded the expansion of the powers of the representatives of the Headquarters. In the course of the Byelorussian operation, representatives of the Stavka were given the right to directly supervise the operations of the fronts. I personally was then entrusted with the 2nd, 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky, with whom we interacted directly, led the offensive of the 2nd, 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts.

In my opinion, this measure of the Headquarters, which at that time provided a broad initiative to its representatives, contributed to the mobile, operational command and control of troops. The task assigned to the troops was successfully completed, and the Red Army then liberated Soviet Belarus, a significant part of the Lithuanian SSR and the Latvian SSR, the western regions of Ukraine and the southeastern part of Poland.

Who did the Stavka send as its main representatives to the army in the field?

First of all, members of the Headquarters, including K. E. Voroshilov, G. K. Zhukov, S. K. Timoshenko. The permanent representative of the Headquarters in the troops was the chief of the General Staff, A. M. Vasilevsky.

In addition to the main representatives of the Headquarters, generals N. N. Voronov, A. I. Antonov, S. M. Shtemenko, L. Z. Mekhlis and others were sent to the troops.

In addition to the plenipotentiaries, who directly implemented the decisions of the Headquarters on this or that operation directly on the ground, special commissioners were also sent. They went to the troops in order to help the command of the troops and the main representatives of the Headquarters in organizing the use various kinds armed forces and military branches.

Personally, during the war years, I had to go to the active army as a representative of the Headquarters at least 15 times.

Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky also visited the fronts a lot. More than once we had to travel together to the area of ​​military operations and participate in the development and conduct of such major operations as Stalingrad, the Battle of Kursk, the offensive in the Right-Bank Ukraine and the liberation of Belarus. All those who had to work with Alexander Mikhailovich note his deep knowledge, clarity and clarity of thinking. A. M. Vasilevsky did not tolerate shortcomings and guesses on the "maybe", but always demanded from the persons preparing the operation, solid, accurate data and reasonable forecasts. With great satisfaction, I always remember our friendly work in organizing and conducting operations.

Representatives of the Headquarters did not command the fronts. This function remained in the hands of the commanders. But endowed with great powers, they could influence the course of the battles in the area in which they were located, correct the mistakes of the front or army command in time, and specifically help them in obtaining material and technical means from the center. I do not remember a case of non-compliance with the recommendations of the Stavka representative.

Of course, it should be said that not all of them fully possessed the same capabilities. Many representatives of the Headquarters did not have the power that, for example, A. M. Vasilevsky and I had: they did not have direct communication with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, did not have the necessary headquarters apparatus and means of communication, etc. This forced them to use workers and the means of communication of the front or the army, which were already overloaded.

From representatives of the Headquarters, the Supreme Commander demanded daily reports or reports on the preparation and conduct of operations. Particularly important assessments of the situation and proposals for new operations, at the direction of I.V. Stalin, were written by hand in one copy and delivered to him through A.N. Poskrebyshev. If for some reason there were no reports from representatives of the Stavka during the day, the Supreme Commander himself called them on the HF and asked: “Do you have anything to report today?”

I recall one case in this connection. Somehow, at the end of September 1942, the Supreme Commander summoned G. M. Malenkov and me from the Stalingrad region to Headquarters. After I reported the situation, I. V. Stalin sternly asked G. M. Malenkov:

And why didn't you, Comrade Malenkov, inform us about the affairs in the Stalingrad area for three weeks?

Comrade Stalin, every day I signed the reports that Zhukov sent you, - answered G. M. Malenkov.

We sent you not as a commissar to Zhukov, but as a member of the State Defense Committee, and you had to inform us, - JV Stalin said sternly.

The institution of Headquarters representatives lasted almost until the end of the war. The need for it disappeared only during the final campaign. This alone convincingly indicates that the presence of such a management link in the strategic management system was extremely necessary and, of course, useful. The need for representatives of the Stavka ceased only when the strategic front of struggle was more than halved and the number of front-line formations decreased. By this time, the front commanders had grown into great commanders, and the staffs had gained experience in organizing and directing large-scale operations.

Therefore, the operations of the final campaign of 1945 were already being prepared and carried out without the participation of representatives of the Headquarters. The direction of the actions of the fronts in these operations - East Prussian, Vistula-Oder and in some others - was carried out directly by the Headquarters directly from Moscow. So it was in the final battle of the war - the Berlin operation, when the control of the fronts was personally taken over by the Supreme Commander. Only Marshal S.K. Timoshenko remained with the 2nd and 4th Ukrainian fronts until the end of the war in Europe.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was the collective body for directing the military operations of the armed forces. Its work was based on a reasonable combination of collegiality with unity of command. In all cases, the right to make the final decision remained with the Supreme Commander.

The ideas and plans for strategic operations and campaigns were developed in the working apparatus of the Headquarters - in the General Staff with the participation of some members of the Headquarters. This was preceded by a lot of work in the Politburo and the State Defense Committee. The international situation for a given period of time was discussed, and the potential political and military capabilities of the belligerent states were studied. Only after research and discussion of all general issues political and military forecasts were made. As a result of all this complex work, the political and military strategy was determined, which guided the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

When developing the next operation, I. V. Stalin usually called the Chief of the General Staff and his deputy and painstakingly examined the operational-strategic situation on the entire Soviet-German front together with them: the state of the troops of the fronts, data from all types of intelligence and the progress in the preparation of reserves of all types of troops.

Then the head of the rear of the Red Army, the commanders of various branches of the armed forces and the heads of the main departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense were called to the Headquarters, who had to practically ensure this operation.

Then the Supreme Commander, the Deputy Supreme Commander and the Chief of the General Staff discussed the operational and strategic capabilities of our troops. The Chief of the General Staff and the Deputy Supreme Commander were given the task of thinking over and calculating our capabilities for one or those operations that were planned to be carried out. Usually the Supreme Commander gave us 4-5 days for this work. At the end of the term, a preliminary decision was made. After that, the Supreme Commander instructed the Chief of the General Staff to request the opinion of the Military Councils of the fronts on the upcoming operation.

While the command and headquarters of the front were working, the General Staff was doing a lot of creative work on planning the operation and interaction between the fronts. Tasks were outlined for reconnaissance agencies, long-range aviation, partisan forces located behind enemy lines, military communications agencies for the transfer of replenishments and reserves of the Supreme High Command, material reserves.

Finally, a day was appointed when the commanders of the fronts were to arrive at Headquarters to report on the plan of the front's operation. Usually the Supreme Commander listened to them in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff, the Deputy Supreme Commander and some members of the GKO.

After careful consideration of the reports, I. V. Stalin approved the plans and terms of the operation, indicating what exactly should be paid special attention to. It was determined who was personally sent by the representative of the Headquarters to coordinate the actions of the fronts and to whom to exercise control over the material and technical support of the troops, the timely regrouping of troops and reserves of the Supreme High Command.

Of course, all these issues that the Stavka had to solve in the preparation of operations or military campaigns, its activities were far from being limited. Its volume and degree of complexity largely depended on where, when and against which enemy, and by what forces and means the operations were carried out.

The decisions of the Headquarters were communicated to the executors in the form of directives signed by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of the General Staff. Sometimes directives were given signed by IV Stalin and his deputy. Since 1943, the directives of the Headquarters, together with I. V. Stalin, were signed by A. I. Antonov, since the Deputy Supreme Commander and the Chief of the General Staff were often in the troops. When developing smaller operations, the commanders of the fronts were usually not called to the Headquarters, but, at its request, presented their views on the conduct of the operation in writing.

General plans for logistics, as a rule, were previously developed at the General Staff with the participation of the head of the logistics of the Red Army A. V. Khrulev, the head of the Main Artillery Directorate N. D. Yakovlev and other heads of the main and central departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense, after which they reported to the Stavka or the State Defense Committee. Those fronts that were to carry out the operation, simultaneously with the operational directive, received instructions on matters of material and technical supply.

We have already said that the Headquarters and the General Staff were in Moscow throughout the war. When the German troops came close to the capital, the General Staff was divided into two parts. One unit, led by First Deputy Chief of the General Staff A. M. Vasilevsky, remained in Moscow at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the other, led by B. M. Shaposhnikov, temporarily moved to the area where a reserve command post was prepared. However, she soon returned to Moscow. JV Stalin during the war years performed five duties. In addition to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, he remained in the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, was Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and Chairman of the State Defense Committee, and was People's Commissar of Defense. He worked hard, 15-16 hours a day. JV Stalin highly valued the work of the General Staff and fully trusted it. As a rule, he did not make important decisions without first listening to the General Staff's analysis of the situation and considering its proposals.

Usually the analysis began with data about the enemy. As the experience of the war showed, the ability of the command to skillfully conduct reconnaissance of the enemy, quickly process the received data and draw the right conclusions is of paramount importance. It must be said that throughout the war, with the exception of some moments in its first period, the Stavka correctly directed all types of intelligence, which timely and efficiently carried out the tasks assigned to it, and learned to analyze the situation well.

The headquarters was well aware of the situation on the fronts and responded in a timely manner to changes in the situation. Through the General Staff, she closely followed the course of operations, made the necessary adjustments to the actions of the troops, clarified them or set new tasks arising from the current situation. If necessary, it regrouped forces and means to achieve the goals of the operations and the tasks assigned to the troops, and in special cases stopped the operation.

A firm order was established by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, according to which the General Staff twice a day reported to him a map of the situation on the fronts with all the changes since that time. A brief explanatory note from the Chief of the General Staff was attached to the map.

An important link in the system of organs of the General Staff was a special corps of officers of the General Staff. Along with senior officers of operational management, the so-called dispatch officers, they did a great deal of work directly in the troops, including in combat areas. The size of the corps of officers of the General Staff made it possible to provide permanent representatives of the General Staff to all the headquarters of the fronts, armies, corps and divisions.

The selfless and useful work of these officers of the General Staff has not yet received a proper description in our military history literature. These were combat officers who knew their business. Many of them gave their lives in the name of Victory. Modest war workers, they deserved our greatest gratitude and kind memory.

The officers of the General Staff who worked in the troops, the dispatch officers who were in the apparatus of the General Staff, were worthy and tireless assistants to the Supreme High Command.

We have already said above that the work of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff in commanding troops was distinguished by advance planning of military campaigns and strategic operations. In this regard, I will allow myself to express my thoughts on the effectiveness of the plans and decisions of our Headquarters. It is known that any planning is groundless if it is not based on scientific foresight of the possible course of operations, forms and methods of armed struggle, with the help of which the goals set for the troops are achieved. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command saw further and better than the Hitlerite strategic leadership. It was armed, first, with a knowledge of the general laws of struggle based on the solid foundation of Marxism-Leninism. Secondly, it understood better than the enemy the specific situation that determined the course of events on the fronts. Therefore, as a rule, our Headquarters clearly imagined the likely actions of the Nazi command, took measures to destroy its intentions and achieve its goal. All this, taken together, ensured the high effectiveness of our military planning.

Of course, the activities of the Headquarters could not be limited to directing only the main operations of the armed forces. The war required the firm hand of the Supreme High Command on the entire strategic front - on land, on water and in the air, and the forces operating in the main operations needed the support of the troops interacting with them in secondary directions. For example, at the end of the Stalingrad counter-offensive operation, a number of offensive operations were prepared and carried out on other fronts. Their goal was to pin down or defeat the forces and means that the Nazi command could transfer to the site of the decisive operation, where the enemy suffered one defeat after another and was in dire need of reserves. So it was in the south of our country, on the Western and Kalinin fronts in late 1942 - early 1943. So it was with the breaking of the blockade of Leningrad in January 1943.

Usually, operations in secondary directions were carried out not according to previously developed plans for a military campaign, but in the course of the general situation in the administrative order at the direction of the Supreme High Command. They were prepared in a limited time and were distinguished by a relatively small scale. In aggregate and overall results, together with the main operation, they constituted the content of the military campaign.

The planning and preparation of planned operations is a very complex, multifaceted matter, requiring not only sufficient time, but also great creative effort and organizational efforts of a huge team of people, primarily the Headquarters itself, the General Staff and the command of the fronts. Great is the burden of responsibility to the people, which rests on the shoulders of those who are entrusted with this work.

The Battle of Kursk and its development were planned, for example, for three months in the spring of 1943. All subsequent campaigns - 2-3 months before the start of the offensive.

While preparing the campaign, the Headquarters, without disclosing its essence, made sure to acquaint the front commanders with their specific tasks arising from the general plan of the forthcoming actions. The commanders of the troops of the fronts, in accordance with the instructions received, developed and then submitted their views on the plan of the front's operation to the General Staff. Here they were carefully considered, analyzed, corrected, and then, together with the front command, they reported to the Headquarters.

In many cases, when considering the course of armed struggle in forthcoming operations, the Headquarters dealt with not only operational-strategic, but also fundamental tactical issues, for example, the formation of battle formations of formations, methods of using artillery, mortars, tanks, etc. It happened even to solve some specific tactical questions of the situation when they directly related to the course of hostilities in key points front, armies, corps and divisions, as was the case, for example, during the defense of Stalingrad and in the same place during the counteroffensive. Advance planning was based on complete and timely intelligence, which allowed the Stavka to have an accurate idea of ​​​​the intentions and state of the enemy.

Equally necessary was a correct analysis of the general military situation and of our own forces and capabilities. The active army, reserves of human resources and materiel have always been in the first place in the calculations of the top military leadership. In addition, the Soviet Union waged a coalition war, so the plans and actions of the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition were also taken into account.

An essential condition proper planning campaigns and strategic operations was a deeply scientific prediction of the course of the war by the Soviet military leadership. Based on it, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command correctly assigned precisely those forces and means that ensured the rapid defeat of the enemy in the operation and made it possible to create favorable conditions for further action.

The events of 1943 give an idea of ​​the well-prepared, pre-planned operations of the Soviet Armed Forces. Then, after the brilliant Battle of Stalingrad and the expulsion of enemy troops from the North Caucasus, successful operations near Ostrogozhsk and Voronezh followed with access to the Kursk Bulge. This made it possible to straighten the front in the Moscow direction, which was then very important.

As a result of the defeat of the shock grouping of the Nazi troops in the Battle of Kursk, on the success of which the Hitlerite High Command pinned great hopes, we created a favorable situation for ourselves on the entire Soviet-German front throughout all subsequent summer-autumn operations of 1943. In all these operations, the fascist German troops suffered the largest and irreparable losses in people, weapons and military equipment, and, most importantly, the morale of the fascist German troops dropped sharply.

Despite the absence of a second front in Europe, fascist Germany was placed by the Soviet troops in the face of a military catastrophe. For this catastrophe to become a fact, it was necessary to organize and carry out a series of new crushing blows. As you know, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command organized and conducted them brilliantly.

The actions of the Soviet troops had a huge impact on the military situation on other fronts of the Second World War. Thanks to the victories Soviet army our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition at that time successfully managed to carry out operations in Sicily and southern Italy.

The defeats suffered by the Wehrmacht in the summer-autumn campaign of 1943 finally undermined the confidence of the satellites of fascist Germany in the Nazi regime. The collapse of the fascist bloc began. An even more favorable strategic situation has been created for the Soviet Armed Forces. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command skillfully used it to prepare the operations of 1944.

At that time, none of the allies of fascist Germany and neutral countries believed that the Nazi regime would be able to avoid complete defeat. But the most important thing was that even those circles in Germany that brought Hitler to power and supported him in every possible way in subsequent years lost faith in the Hitlerite leadership. Intoxicated by the frenzy of easy victories in the first period of the war, many in Germany realized that all the years of fascist power they had been captivated by destructive delusions, that Germany could not resist the Soviet Armed Forces, the growing anti-Hitler coalition.

Returning from the Tehran Conference, the Supreme Commander said:

Roosevelt gave a firm word to open wide action in France in 1944. I think he will keep his word.

As always, in moments of good spirits, JV Stalin leisurely filled his pipe with tobacco cigarettes "Herzegovina Flor", smacking his lips, lit it and, releasing several puffs of smoke, slowly walked along the carpet path of the office.

Well, if it doesn’t hold back,” he continued, reasoning aloud, “we have enough of our own strength to finish off Nazi Germany.

This conversation in the office of I.V. Stalin preceded the joint meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the State Defense Committee and some members of the Headquarters, which took place in December 1943. Questions of the country's military-political situation were comprehensively considered here. In this regard, A. M. Vasilevsky and I were summoned from the fronts, where we were then as representatives of the Stavka. The Supreme Commander instructed Alexander Mikhailovich and his first deputy for the General Staff A.I. Antonov to report on the situation on the Fronts.

At this meeting, the main conclusion was drawn - the Soviet people, led by the party, achieved military and economic superiority over the enemy. Our superiority now determined the further course of the war. From this it followed that we had to map out ways to make the best use of this superiority.

The Stavka and the General Staff calculated all our capabilities, made a deep analysis of the state of the enemy throughout the entire strategic depth of the front from the Barents to the Black Sea. Analysis has shown that the turning point achieved in the course of the war opens up broad prospects for us.

The superiority in forces and means over the enemy, the initiative in the hands of the Soviet Armed Forces, the advantageous disposition of troops, large manpower and material reserves, and other favorable factors have now made it possible to solve strategic tasks on the Soviet-German front in a new way. The heroic and uninterrupted work of the Soviet rear ensured the systematic supply of the army with everything necessary. Now we could prepare and conduct major operations not in one or two directions, but consistently on the entire strategic front. At the same time, the enemy's ability to parry these blows was greatly reduced.

In a narrow circle of people who then gathered in the office of I.V. Stalin, the Supreme Commander raised the question of new form campaigns in 1944. Previously, he asked for the opinion of each of the participants.

The meeting, as usual, proceeded without minutes. They discussed exactly where forces and means should be concentrated for a new defeat of the main enemy forces and the final defeat of the fascist bloc. There were ten such districts on the entire strategic front. After discussion, the Supreme Commander ordered the General Staff to prepare preliminary calculations for carrying out strikes in these ten regions.

As soon as the main plan of each operation was outlined and the necessary forces and means were preliminarily calculated, the Headquarters, as usual, asked for the opinion of the commanders of those fronts where the operations of the 1944 winter campaign were planned. When the proposals were collected, a broad development of all operations was launched in the General Staff. In parallel, work was in full swing on the preparation of reserves, their training and armament. A great contribution was made by the heads of the central departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the head of the logistics of the Red Army.

The Supreme Commander tirelessly supervised the preparation of operations in 1944. He found in himself the strength and energy to always keep in sight all-round provision decisions taken, paying special attention to the tank troops, air force, artillery, organization of party political work at the front and in the rear.

Each period of the war and each major operation had its own characteristics. A distinctive feature of the operations of 1944 is the power of strikes and their suddenness in different areas strategic front. The calculation was made so that the enemy, maneuvering forces and means, would be late everywhere and so that he would weaken the density of troops exactly where our next strike was planned. I must say that the foresight of the Stavka was fully justified.

Particularly difficult tasks in the preparation of the campaigns of 1944 were assigned to intelligence of all kinds. She coped with her tasks, and the picture of the state of the enemy loomed quite fully.

The first blow to the Nazi troops was inflicted near Leningrad and Novgorod in January 1944. As a result of our victory near Leningrad, the city was completely liberated from the fascist blockade. Soviet troops liberated the Leningrad and part of the Kalinin region and entered the land of Estonia.

The second blow took place in the Right-Bank Ukraine. It was very complex and consisted of a series of large offensive operations, carried out mainly in February - March 1944 in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky region and on the Southern Bug. Then the German troops were defeated and driven back across the Dniester. As a result of this strike, the entire Right-Bank Ukraine was liberated, Soviet troops reached the lines favorable for the subsequent deep offensive in the southeastern regions of Europe, in the Balkans against Romania, where the dictatorship of the fascist I. Antonescu so far dominated, against Horthy Hungary and other enemy forces .

In April - May 1944, the Red Army struck a third blow in the region of Odessa and the Crimea. Odessa, Sevastopol and the entire Crimean peninsula were liberated from the Nazi occupation.

The fourth blow on the Karelian Isthmus and in the region of Ladoga and Onega lakes led to the liberation of a large part of Soviet Karelia and predetermined Finland's exit from the war on the side of Germany. For the Nazi troops in the Arctic, the situation was now extremely unfavorable.

The fifth blow was dealt in June-August 1944 against the German troops of Army Group Center in Belarus, covering the main and shortest routes to Germany. Having utterly defeated the German troops near Vitebsk, Mogilev and Bobruisk, our armed forces surrounded and destroyed more than 20 German divisions east of Minsk. In pursuit of the enemy, Soviet troops liberated Belarus, a significant part of eastern Poland and most of the Lithuanian SSR. The enemy himself assessed these events as a catastrophe for the German troops in Operation Bagration in Belarus.

The sixth blow was inflicted by the 1st Ukrainian Front in the Lvov region. The troops of the Red Army crossed the Vistula and formed a large bridgehead behind the Vistula, west of Sandomierz. At the same time, the 1st Belorussian Front created two bridgeheads south of Warsaw: one in the Magnuszew area, the other in the Pulawy area. Now the Soviet fronts have received favorable conditions for the development of a decisive blow - on Berlin.

The seventh blow led to the encirclement and defeat of the German-Romanian troops in the Chisinau-Iasi region. It ended with the liquidation of about 22 enemy divisions and the withdrawal of our troops to the central regions of Romania. As a result of this blow, which brought the liberation of the Moldavian SSR, Romania was withdrawn from the war and declared war on Nazi Germany. Following this, our 3rd Ukrainian Front and the forces of the Black Sea Fleet entered Bulgaria, where on September 9, 1944, a people's revolution took place. Bulgaria entered the war on the side of the anti-Hitler coalition.

The eighth blow took place in the autumn of 1944 in the Baltic. The entire Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic and most of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic were liberated. The remnants of the defeated German armies were pressed against the shores of the Baltic Sea in Courland. On September 19, Finland signed an armistice agreement.

In October-December 1944, offensive operations of the ninth strike were launched between the Tisza and the Danube in Hungary. As a result of this blow, Germany actually lost its last ally - Hungary. The Red Army provided direct assistance to Yugoslavia in the liberation of its capital, Belgrade. The tenth blow took place in October 1944 on the extreme northern sector of the Soviet-German front. It ended with the defeat and expulsion of the Nazi troops from the Soviet Arctic and the north-eastern part of Norway.

The major victories of the Soviet troops in 1944 were the best evidence of the correct method of strategic planning adopted by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command at this stage of the war, eloquent confirmation of the depth of foresight of our top military leadership. The main enemy forces suffered a severe defeat, and the Soviet troops reached favorable starting lines for the final campaign of the war.

Throughout the war, the methods and means of the Stavka's influence on the course of events were improved. The regrouping of forces and means was carried out more and more skillfully, the interaction of the fronts, ground forces with aviation, the fleet was getting better and better. Our operators have learned to direct troops to the target, assigning them expedient dividing lines and changing them if necessary.

The main means of a sudden radical change in the operational-strategic situation for the enemy were and remained throughout the war the reserves of the Headquarters. In the chapters of this book devoted to the heroic defense of Moscow, the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, Operation Bagration in Belarus, and in others, the reader will find a description of the specific circumstances of the use of strategic reserves and will see that their introduction into battle was carried out, as a rule, massively and on the main directions. This made it possible to achieve great results.

After all, no matter how good the ideas and plans set out on the maps were, they would remain mere paper if they were not provided with the appropriate forces and means. The success of campaigns and operations is directly dependent on the extent to which the troops are provided with reserves, weapons, ammunition, fuel and other materiel, and how the matter of treating the wounded and returning them to duty is organized.

The formation and preparation of reserves was far from simple and not easy. To guide and control the formation of reserves, spare and training units, to prepare marching replenishment, the Main Directorate for the Formation and Staffing of the Red Army Troops (Glavupraform) was formed in 1941, headed by Army Commissar 1st Rank E. A. Shchadenko. During the Civil War, Yefim Afanasyevich was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the First and Second Cavalry Armies. He was a demanding person and a skilled organizer.

Glavupraform concentrated in his hands the issues of recruiting and creating trained reserves of all branches of the armed forces (except for the Air Force, armored forces and artillery), as well as control over the direction of reinforcements from spare and training units to the fronts of the army in the field.

The Main Logistics Directorate was responsible for providing the troops with material resources. The activities of the organizers and leaders of the rear are worthy of wide coverage. It was difficult and not always noticeable, but the contribution of the rear of the Soviet Armed Forces to the victory was great and won the deep gratitude of the Soviet people. After I.V. Stalin's appeal on July 3, 1941 to the Soviet people and the special decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in mid-July 1941 "On the organization of the struggle in the rear of the German troops" everywhere and everywhere the Nazis invaded, partisan detachments began to actively operate, created and led by local party organizations. Already in 1941, 18 underground regional committees, more than 260 district committees, city committees, district committees and other underground party bodies, over 300 city committees and district committees of the Komsomol launched their work in the occupied territories ( History of the Second World War 1939-1945. M., Military Publishing, 1975, v. 4). The combat activities of the people's avengers and the secret front of underground work became a factor of great military and political significance, which had to be skillfully used to weaken and destroy the enemy.

If in the first year of the war there was still no proper organization and centralization in the leadership of the partisan movement, then in the subsequent year the Headquarters managed military operations behind enemy lines confidently and firmly. This was done through the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, created under her on May 30, 1942, headed by the secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Belarus P. K. Ponomarenko.

I have known Panteleimon Kondratievich for a very long time. A firm communist, he justified the confidence of the party and became a true organizer of the activities of the people's avengers.

In addition to the Central Headquarters, republican and regional headquarters of the partisan movement were created, and at the headquarters of the fronts - departments for relations with partisan forces. As a result, a real opportunity arose to direct the actions of all the forces of the partisan movement in the interests of the army, to coordinate the interaction of partisan detachments with the operations of the fronts.

The general tasks of the partisan forces were set by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. In accordance with the situation, they were specified locally by party organizations and organs of the partisan movement.

The tasks of the partisan movement were mainly to create an unbearable situation for the Nazis, to destroy the enemy's manpower, military equipment and materiel, to disorganize the work of his rear, to disrupt the activities of the military authorities and administrative bodies of the fascist occupiers. The actions of the guerrillas strengthened confidence Soviet people who found themselves in the temporarily occupied territories, in our final victory over the enemy and involved them in an active struggle against the invaders.

The war with partisans brought heavy losses to the enemy, suppressed his morale, disrupted the transportation and maneuvering of troops, which had a particularly detrimental effect on the operations carried out by the fascist German command. Despite the brutal measures taken to eliminate the partisans, the forces of the people's avengers multiplied and strengthened day by day, a burning hatred for the enemy and the desire of the Soviet people to quickly defeat the Nazi invaders grew.

The scope of the listed tasks of the partisans, their importance suggests that the partisans could only act in an organized manner, with entire formations and detachments. All partisan forces and underground organizations of the people's avengers participated in the implementation of these tasks.

The day-to-day leadership of the partisan forces in the localities was carried out by the underground organizations of our Party. The work of these underground party organizations can hardly be overestimated. Underground Komsomol organizations became active assistants to the party. Our young generation should know about the heroic work that the communists and Komsomol members carried out, organizing and inspiring the Soviet people, temporarily under the heel of the Nazis, to fight the enemy.

The central headquarters of the partisan movement existed until the end of 1943. When at the beginning of 1944 most of the Soviet territory was liberated, it was disbanded and the leadership of the partisan forces was completely transferred to the party bodies of the republics and regions.

In examining questions of political and military-strategic leadership of the war, special mention should be made of such important collective bodies of the party as the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army and the Chief Political Directorate of the Navy, the Military Councils and political directorates of the fronts and fleets. Their role, like all party-political bodies in ensuring the victory over German fascism during the Great Patriotic War, was enormous. It deserves a separate and detailed consideration and analysis.

This task is in Lately solved in a number of military-historical works. However, it is long overdue to create a fundamental scientific work, which would comprehensively explore the multifaceted activities of political bodies during the war years. The work of GLAVPURK became especially fruitful when, in mid-1942, it was headed by a prominent figure in the party and the state, a candidate member of the Politburo, secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Moscow Committee of the Party Alexander Sergeevich Shcherbakov.

JV Stalin treated Alexander Sergeevich with great respect and trust. Until 1945, A. S. Shcherbakov was also the head of the Soviet Information Bureau. During the period of the heroic defense of Moscow in 1941, A. S. Shcherbakov was one of those who knew how to kindle in the hearts of the defenders of the capital a fire of burning hatred for the Nazis, who were striving to take over Moscow at any cost.

All political work in the army, leadership and influence of the party on the masses of soldiers were carried out through political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations directly in the units and subunits. Troop commanders, commanders of all levels, relied extensively on this developed system of party political work. Political bodies, party and Komsomol organizations had a special responsibility for the state of each military unit and its combat capability. They tried to ensure that the Communists and Komsomol members led the fighters in a difficult and complex combat situation, resolutely fought against manifestations of confusion and disorganization. Party and political bodies popularized combat experience, examples of courage and courage, initiative and resourcefulness, and mutual assistance in battle. Political work in the troops improved all the time, giving positive results, and was of great importance for achieving victory.

The activity of the Headquarters is inseparable from the name of I. V. Stalin. During the war years, I often met with him. In most cases, these were official meetings at which issues of leadership in the course of the war were decided. But even a simple invitation to dinner has always been used for the same purposes. I really liked the work of I. V. Stalin complete absence formalism. Everything that he did through the Headquarters or the State Defense Committee was done in such a way that the decisions made by these high bodies began to be carried out immediately, and the progress of their implementation was strictly and steadily controlled personally by the Supreme Commander or, at his direction, by other leading persons or organizations.

The GKO and the Headquarters were two independent emergency bodies created by the decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for the period of the war. But since I. V. Stalin headed both the Committee and the Headquarters, the formality was usually not observed. Members of the Headquarters were often invited to meetings at the State Defense Committee, and, conversely, members of the State Defense Committee were present at the Headquarters when important issues were considered. Collaboration brought great benefits: no time wasted studying issues for their implementation, and the people who were part of these two state bodies were always in the know.

Of course, this practice of the Headquarters and the State Defense Committee was physically very difficult for their members, but during the war this was not thought of: everyone worked to the fullest extent of their strength and capabilities. Everyone looked up to I.V. Stalin, and he, despite his age, was always active and tireless. When the war ended and the days of comparatively planned work began, I. V. Stalin somehow immediately aged, became less mobile, even more silent and thoughtful. The past war and everything connected with it strongly and tangibly affected him.

Readers of the first edition of my book asked me more than once whether there were mistakes in the work of the Headquarters and JV Stalin as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief?

In those sections of the book that deal with the specific events of the war, I talked about some of the mistakes and miscalculations in the leadership of the armed forces that took place. I have already said above that with the accumulation of experience in warfare, mistakes and miscalculations were skillfully corrected, they became less and less.

JV Stalin made a great personal contribution to the victory over fascist Germany and its allies. His authority was extremely great, and therefore the appointment of Stalin as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was received with enthusiasm by the people and troops. Of course, at the beginning of the war, before the Battle of Stalingrad, the Supreme Commander had mistakes, which, as you know, everyone makes. He thought them through deeply and not only experienced them inwardly, but strove to gain experience from them and prevent them from happening in the future.

Relying on the all-round assistance of the Central Committee and the organizational activity of the party in the localities, the ardent patriotism of the Soviet people, who had risen to a holy war against fascism, the Supreme Commander skillfully coped with his duties in this high post.

Mikhail Sholokhov said very well in an interview with the newspaper “ TVNZ"On the days of the 25th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany:" You can not be stupid and belittle the activities of Stalin at that time. Firstly, it is dishonest, and secondly, it is harmful for the country, for the Soviet people, and not because the winners are not judged, but primarily because the "overthrow" does not correspond to the truth.

It is hardly possible to add anything to these words of M. A. Sholokhov. They are accurate and fair. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief did everything possible so that the Headquarters, its working apparatus - the General Staff and the Military Councils of the fronts - became truly wise and skillful military assistants to the party in achieving victory over fascist Germany.

JV Stalin usually worked in the Kremlin in his office. It was a spacious, rather bright room, the walls of which were sheathed in bog oak. There was a long table covered with green cloth. On the walls - portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin. During the war, in addition, portraits of Suvorov and Kutuzov appeared. Hard chairs, no extra items. A huge globe was placed in the next room, next to it was a table, various maps of the world were on the walls.

In the back of the office, near the closed window, stood JV Stalin's desk, always littered with documents, papers, and maps. There were high-frequency and intra-Kremlin telephones, and a stack of sharpened colored pencils. JV Stalin usually made his notes in blue pencil, wrote quickly, sweepingly, legibly.

The entrance to the office led through the passage room of A. N. Poskrebyshev and a small room of the head of the personal guard of the Supreme Commander. Behind the office is a small lounge. In the communication room there were telegraph machines for negotiations with the commanders of the fronts and representatives of the Headquarters.

Employees of the General Staff and representatives of the Headquarters unfolded maps on a large table and stood up and reported to the Supreme Commander the situation on the fronts, sometimes using notes. JV Stalin listened, usually pacing around the office with a slow, wide step, waddling. From time to time he came to big table and, bending down, intently examined the unfolded map. From time to time he returned to his table, took a box of Herzegovina Flor cigarettes, tore up several cigarettes, and slowly filled his pipe with tobacco.

The style of work, as a rule, was businesslike, without nervousness, everyone could express their opinion. The Supreme addressed everyone the same way - strictly and officially. He knew how to listen attentively when they reported to him competently. He himself was laconic and did not like the verbosity of others, often stopping those who were talking with remarks - “shorter!”, “Clearer!”. Meetings opened without introductory, introductory words. He spoke quietly, freely, only to the point. He was concise and expressed his ideas clearly.

Behind long years During the war, I became convinced that I. V. Stalin was not at all the kind of person who could not be asked sharp questions or argue with him, firmly defending his point of view. If anyone claims otherwise, I will say outright that their claims are false.

JV Stalin demanded daily reports on the state of affairs on the fronts. To report to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, one had to be well prepared. It was impossible to come, say, with maps on which there were at least some “white spots”, to report indicative or even more exaggerated data. He did not tolerate answers at random, he demanded exhaustive completeness and clarity.

The Supreme Commander had a special flair for weaknesses in reports or documents, he immediately found them and severely punished for fuzzy information. Possessing a tenacious memory, he remembered well what was said and did not miss the opportunity to reprimand rather sharply for what he had forgotten. Therefore, we tried to prepare staff documents with all the care that we were then capable of. Despite the severity of the situation on the fronts, especially at the beginning of the war, when the rhythm of life in combat conditions had not yet been finally worked out, to the credit of the leadership of the General Staff, I must say that, on the whole, a businesslike and creative atmosphere was immediately established in the General Staff, although tension work in those days reached its extreme limits.

Throughout the war, I did not lose any personal or official contact with the General Staff, which helped me a lot in front-line affairs, in the preparation and implementation of operations. The General Staff, as a rule, skillfully and promptly developed draft directives of the Supreme High Command, strictly monitored the implementation of its instructions, supervised the work of the headquarters of the branches of the armed forces and the headquarters of the military branches, and authoritatively reported big and important issues to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

I. V. Stalin built his judgments on important issues largely on the basis of the reports of the representatives of the Headquarters, which they sent to the troops, from the conclusions of the General Staff, the opinions and proposals of the command of the fronts and special messages.

I had a chance to communicate directly with I. V. Stalin starting from February 1941, when I began working as Chief of the General Staff. The appearance of I.V. Stalin has been written more than once. Short in stature and unremarkable in appearance, JV Stalin made a strong impression during the conversation. Deprived of posturing, he bribed his interlocutor with the simplicity of communication. A free manner of conversation, the ability to clearly formulate a thought, a natural analytical mind, great erudition and a rare memory made even very sophisticated and significant people internally gather and be on the alert during a conversation with him.

JV Stalin did not like to sit and during the conversation he slowly walked around the room, stopping from time to time, coming close to the interlocutor and looking directly into his eyes. His eyes were sharp and piercing. He spoke quietly, distinctly separating one phrase from another, hardly gesticulating. In his hands he most often held a Pipe, even an extinct one, with the end of which he liked to smooth his mustache. He spoke with a noticeable Georgian accent, but knew the Russian language perfectly and liked to use figurative comparisons, literary examples, metaphors. I. V. Stalin rarely laughed, and when he laughed, it was quiet, as if to himself. But he understood humor and knew how to appreciate wit and a joke. His eyesight was very sharp and he read without glasses at any time of the day. He usually wrote by hand. He read a lot and was a well-informed person in a wide variety of fields of knowledge. Amazing efficiency, the ability to quickly grasp the essence of the matter allowed him to view and assimilate in a day such a quantity of the most diverse material that only an outstanding person could do.

It is difficult to say what trait of character prevailed in him. A versatile and talented man, I. V. Stalin was not even. He had a strong will, a secretive and impulsive character. Usually calm and reasonable, at times he fell into acute irritation. Then objectivity betrayed him, he changed dramatically before his eyes, turned even paler, his eyes became heavy, hard. I did not know many daredevils who could withstand Stalin's wrath and parry the blow.

The daily routine of IV Stalin was somewhat unusual. He worked mainly in the evening and at night. I didn't get up until 12 noon. Adapting to the daily routine of I. V. Stalin, the Central Committee of the Party, the Council of People's Commissars, the people's commissariats and the main state and planning bodies worked until late at night. This pissed people off a lot.

In the pre-war period, it was difficult for me to assess the depth of knowledge and abilities of I. V. Stalin in the field of military science, in matters of operational and strategic art. I have already said above that when I happened to be in the Politburo or personally with I. V. Stalin, mainly organizational, mobilization and logistical issues were considered.

I can only say once again that even before the war I. V. Stalin dealt with the issues of armaments and military equipment a lot. He often called aviation, artillery and tank designers to his place and asked them in detail about the details of designing these types of military equipment in our country and abroad. We must give him his due, he was well versed in the qualities of the main types of weapons.

From the chief designers, directors of military factories, many of whom he knew personally, I.V. Stalin demanded the production of samples of aircraft, tanks, artillery and other important equipment in deadlines and in such a way that they are not only at the level of foreign ones, but also surpass them in quality.

Without the approval of I. V. Stalin, as I said, not a single type of weaponry was accepted or removed. On the one hand, this infringed on the initiative of the People's Commissar of Defense and his deputies, who were in charge of the armaments of the Red Army. However, on the other hand, it should be recognized that such an order in many cases helped to quickly introduce one or another new type of military equipment into production.

I am often asked whether I. V. Stalin was really an outstanding military thinker in the field of building the armed forces and an expert in operational-strategic issues?

I can firmly say that JV Stalin mastered the basic principles of organizing front-line operations and operations of groups of fronts and led them with knowledge of the matter, he was well versed in major strategic issues. These abilities of I.V. Stalin, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, were especially revealed starting from the Battle of Stalingrad.

The widely spread version that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief studied the situation and made decisions on the globe does not correspond to reality. Of course, he did not work with tactical maps, and he did not need to. But in operational maps with the situation printed on them, he understood well.

In leading the armed struggle as a whole, JV Stalin was helped by his natural mind, experience in political leadership, rich intuition, and broad awareness. He knew how to find the main link in a strategic situation and, seizing on it, to outline ways to counter the enemy, to successfully conduct one or another offensive operation. Undoubtedly, he was a worthy Supreme Commander.

Of course, I. V. Stalin did not delve into the entire sum of issues on which the troops and command of all levels had to painstakingly work in order to prepare well the operation of an army, front or group of fronts. It was not necessary for the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. In such cases, he, of course, consulted with members of the Stavka, the General Staff and specialists in artillery, armored, air and naval forces, on matters of logistics and supplies.

Personally, I. V. Stalin was credited with a number of fundamental developments of the foundations of military science, including methods of artillery offensive, gaining air supremacy, methods of encircling the enemy, dissecting encircled enemy groups and destroying them piecemeal, etc.

This is wrong. All these important questions are the result obtained by the troops in battles and battles with the enemy; they are the fruits of deep reflection and generalization of the experience of a large team of leading military leaders and commanders of the troops.

The merit of I. V. Stalin here is that he quickly and correctly perceived the advice of military specialists, supplemented and developed them and in a generalized form - in instructions, directives and instructions - immediately transferred to the troops for practical guidance.

In addition, in supporting operations, creating strategic reserves, in organizing the production of military equipment and in general in creating everything necessary for waging war, the Supreme Commander, frankly, proved to be an outstanding organizer. And it will be unfair if we do not give him his due in this.

But, of course, first of all, we must bow to the ground to our Soviet man, who, denying himself the most necessary - food and sleep, did everything in his power to fulfill the tasks that the Communist Party set before the people in order to defeat the enemy .

I will return to the activities of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and its bodies more than once in this book, speaking of those campaigns and operations in which I happened to participate. Here I also consider it necessary to say that each specific operation had its own characteristics, which were associated with the purpose of the action, the tasks of the troops, the specifics of the enemy - his intentions, composition, combat capability and disposition of forces and means, their maneuverability and, if I may say so , the ability to give us an unexpected surprise.

The operations also differed in their scope - the width of the zone of operations of the troops, the depth of the strikes, the pace of the offensive, if it was an offensive operation.

Each of our military campaigns or operations required deep reflection. The same was true of a well-thought-out plan, a precise definition of the general and particular goals of the troops participating in the operation, their tasks, corresponding to the goals and tasks of operational formation and battle formations.

In preparing the operation, the Headquarters attached particular importance to working out close interaction between fronts and armies, between branches of the armed forces and combat arms. All these data, indicating the number of troops and materiel, were placed primarily on the maps of the General Staff and the Military Councils of the fronts participating in the operation. But that is not all.

At the most crucial moments, representatives of the Headquarters directly in the area of ​​operations, not only on maps, but also on the ground, linked tasks, specific times and lines, forces and means, methods of action of the branches of the armed forces and combat arms, so that none of their capabilities would be wasted, not missed the target. According to the daily reports of their representatives on the work they personally did, the Headquarters could accurately judge the degree of readiness of the operation.

Among the main issues that were subjected to a comprehensive analysis were such as ways to gain air supremacy, the organization of all types of reconnaissance, and the development of data on the situation.

Much attention was paid to command and control. Apparently, having comprehended the mistakes in this matter, made in the first period of the war, the Supreme Commander spoke to A. M. Vasilevsky and me more than once, sending us to the fronts as representatives of the Headquarters, so that we would look with prejudice how this or that commander leads the troops.

I must say, to the credit of our commanders of the fronts and armies, that they always remembered the duty of the pepper to the Motherland, to the party, constantly stubbornly studied the complex art of generalship and became its true masters.

I do not know of a case when the Stavka would meet in its entirety. Even when discussing the most important operations in which 3-4 fronts participated, and military campaigns, only those members who were invited by the Supreme Commander, or those who performed a particularly responsible task in the operation in question, took part in the work of the Headquarters.

The attitude of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to the members of the Headquarters was far from the same. He had great respect, for example, for Marshal of the Soviet Union Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov. He called him only by his first name and patronymic and never raised his voice in conversation with him, even if he did not agree with his report. B. M. Shaposhnikov was the only person whom I. V. Stalin allowed to smoke in his office.

This attitude was well deserved. Boris Mikhailovich was one of the most profound military scientists of our state, combining knowledge of the theory of military science with extensive practical experience in operational-strategic issues. The release of B. M. Shaposhnikov from the post of Chief of the General Staff and his appointment as Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for the construction of fortified areas, when the second World War I personally think it's a mistake.

On July 30, 1941, when I was appointed commander of the Reserve Front, B. M. Shaposhnikov again became chief of the General Staff. Knowing the matter of the General Staff to the subtleties, he quickly carried out a number of organizational measures that contributed to the improvement of the work of this main working body of the Headquarters. The great personal industriousness and ability of B. M. Shaposhnikov to work with people had a noticeable influence on the growth of the general art of command and control in the army in the field, and especially on the part of the General Staff.

Unfortunately, age, heavy workload and especially illness did not allow him to work throughout the war in the General Staff. In May 1942, he handed over the post to his first and quite worthy deputy A. M. Vasilevsky, whom he highly appreciated. In June 1943, B. M. Shaposhnikov was appointed head of the Higher Military Academy named after K. E. Voroshilov.

I. V. Stalin also treated A. M. Vasilevsky with special respect. Alexander Mikhailovich was not mistaken in his assessments of the operational-strategic situation. Therefore, it was him that I.V. Stalin sent to the responsible sectors of the Soviet-German front as a representative of the Headquarters. During the war, his talent as a large-scale military leader and a deep military thinker unfolded in its entirety. In those cases when Stalin did not agree with the opinion of Alexander Mikhailovich, Vasilevsky was able to convince the Supreme Commander with dignity and weighty arguments that in a given situation no other decision than he proposed should be taken.

V. M. Molotov also enjoyed great confidence in I. V. Stalin. He was almost always present at Headquarters when operational-strategic and other important issues were considered. Disagreements and serious disputes often arose between them, during which the correct decision was formed.

With great attention the Supreme listened to the opinion of AI Antonov, even when he was not a member of the Headquarters, but temporarily served as Chief of the General Staff. The signature of Alexei Innokent'evich on the directives of the Headquarters often followed the signature of I. V. Stalin.

I consider it appropriate to speak here about the attitude of the Supreme Commander towards the commanders and chiefs of staff of the fronts. According to my observations, of the commanders of the fronts, I. V. Stalin most of all appreciated the Marshals of the Soviet Union K. K. Rokossovsky, L. A. Govorov, I. S. Konev and General of the Army N. F. Vatutin. From the commanders of the armies, the Supreme Commander singled out A. A. Grechko and K. S. Moskalenko, now Marshals of the Soviet Union, marshals of the armored forces P. S. Rybalko, P. A. Rotmistrov, General of the Army D. D. Lelyushenko, General of the Army I. I. Fedyuninsky.

Of the chiefs of staff of the fronts, the Supreme Commander distinguished V. D. Sokolovsky and M. V. Zakharov, who became Marshals of the Soviet Union after the war, and General of the Army M. S. Malinin.

I. V. Stalin had a good opinion about the commander of long-range aviation, Chief Marshal of Aviation A. E. Golovanov; commander of the artillery of the Red Army, Chief Marshal of Artillery N. N. Voronov. He usually assigned important tasks to them personally.

Of the naval commanders, I. V. Stalin highly valued Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union I. S. Isakov.

It is impossible not to say a kind word here about A. V. Khrulev, whose opinion the Supreme Commander very much considered and often consulted with him on a wide range of issues of supplying troops.

It is impossible to list all those who enjoyed the confidence of I.V. Stalin. I can only say one thing: he knew them well personally, valued them for their knowledge and dedication, and when a particularly responsible task arose, he first of all entrusted its solution to these people.

From the first to the last days of the war, I happened to take part in the work of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, to see the work of the General Staff, the People's Commissariat of Defense, and to be in close contact with the work of the State Defense Committee. I can firmly say that the Soviet military-strategic leadership was at an exceptionally high level.

In the course of the war, our Supreme High Command managed in a relatively short time to overcome the enormous difficulties that arose at the beginning of the war, as a result of which the Soviet Armed Forces defended Leningrad, defeated the Nazi troops near Moscow, Stalingrad, on the Kursk Bulge, in Belarus and Ukraine, wrested the enemy has a strategic initiative, then with crushing blows to bring the war to a victorious end.

All this suggests that the Soviet military art, based on Marxist-Leninist science, was higher than the German fascist strategy, the art of conducting operations and tactics. Our Supreme High Command subjected to a deep analysis of the current operational-strategic situation, developed and implemented effective measures to overcome the difficulties that arose, united the efforts of the front and rear, of the entire people for the final crushing of the enemy. Having treacherously attacked the Soviet Union, Hitler and his military entourage faced a new type of army, educated in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism, which had a clear goal - the defense of the first country of socialism. The Soviet soldier was distinguished by a deep consciousness of his liberation mission, a readiness to make self-sacrifice in the name of the freedom and independence of the Motherland, in the name of socialism.

In this connection, I consider it necessary to express my opinion about the supreme command of the German fascist troops. As noted above, after the capture of most of Europe, the Nazi political and military leadership self-confidently believed that the military art of Nazi Germany had reached the highest levels. This adventurous confidence was not accidental. It was based on the fascist ideology of racial superiority, on the traditional foundations of Prussian militarism, which more than once brought Germany to the brink of disaster. Having behind them a mobilized military-industrial complex not only in Germany, but also in almost all Western Europe, Hitler and his generals made their main bet on the lightning defeat of the Soviet Union. They overestimated their strength and capabilities and seriously underestimated the strength, means and potential opportunities Soviet state.

Hitler placed all the blame for the failure of the Barbarossa plan and other unsuccessful operations on his field marshals and generals: they, being mediocre, could not put into practice his "brilliant" plans.

After Hitler's death, everything went the opposite way: the accused turned into accusers. Now they openly declared that Hitler was the main culprit for the defeat of Germany in this war, “modestly” silent about the fact that all of them were active participants in the war with the Soviet Union, and many of them were direct participants in the atrocities that were committed by the Nazi troops on Soviet land.

For all this, the memory and judgment of the peoples nailed both the Nazi regime and its generals to the shameful pillar of history.

In developing plans for a war against the Soviet Union and operations for the implementation of the strategic plans of the Third Reich, the Nazi leadership was extremely concerned about maintaining the strictest secrecy of these events. It must be admitted that this task was a success. The "disinformation plan", developed under the leadership of Keitel and Jodl, which was intended to show that the Germans were allegedly preparing to invade England, was carried out not without benefit to Germany. At the beginning of the war, this seriously complicated the general situation for us.

However, it soon became clear that, on the whole, the Barbarossa plan turned out to be unrealistic. The main idea of ​​this plan was, as you know, the encirclement and destruction of the main forces of the Red Army, located in the border military districts. The enemy hoped that with the loss of them, the Soviet Supreme High Command would have nothing to defend Moscow, Leningrad, Donbass and the Caucasus. But the fascist German command failed to carry out these tasks.

The government of fascist Germany and the Nazi military leadership based their calculations on the mythical weaknesses of the Soviet Union. They never expected that in a moment of mortal danger the Soviet people, having rallied around the Communist Party, would stand in their way with an irresistible force. They immediately felt this in all strategic directions.

Without any grounds, the Hitlerite leadership believed that the Red Army would not stand against the Nazi troops for the reason that it was headed by young military leaders who had not yet experienced enough experience in modern battles.

A complete surprise for the Nazis was the war on the territory of the USSR, so to speak, on two fronts: on the one hand, against the regular troops of the Red Army, and on the other, against organized partisan forces in the rear.

After the defeat of the Nazi troops in the region of Stalingrad and in the North Caucasus, the Nazi high command proved unable to cope with the situation that had developed on the fronts. Having lost the initiative, it made such unreasonable decisions that only brought closer the hour of the final collapse of the Third Reich.

Soviet military science, based on the advantages of the socialist social and state system, was an essential factor in ensuring victory over fascist Germany. During the years of the Patriotic War, she made a big step forward and was enriched with the most valuable experience in the field of tactics, operational art and strategy. Until now, it has faithfully served and will continue to serve the training of the Soviet Armed Forces, strengthening the defense of our great Motherland.

Firmly remembering the instructions of V. I. Lenin that as long as imperialism exists, the danger of a new war remains, our Party pays special attention to the development of the armed forces, the development of methods and forms of armed struggle, in order to always have the army and navy at the height of state tasks. At the same time, the experience of the last war is also used. We, veterans of the Soviet Army, participants in the Great Patriotic War, are pleased to realize that our knowledge and experience are needed and useful for the socialist Motherland even in the age of rockets, radio electronics and the atom.

And now back to the harsh events of the Great Patriotic War.

By a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), an emergency body of the highest military administration was formed - the Headquarters of the High Command Armed Forces THE USSR. It was headed by People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko. The Headquarters included members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, Marshal of the Soviet Union K. E. Voroshilov, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny, People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov and Chief of the General Staff General of the Army G. K. Zhukov.

By the same resolution, an institute of permanent advisers was formed at the Headquarters, which included the Marshals of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov and G. I. Kulik, generals K. A. Meretskov, P. F. Zhigarev, N. F. Vatutin, N. N. Voronov, as well as A. I. Mikoyan, L. M. Kaganovich, L. P. Beria, N. A. Voznesensky, A. A. Zhdanov, G. M. Malenkov, L. Z. Mekhlis.

Throughout the war, the Headquarters was in Moscow, but with the start of the bombing, it was transferred from the Kremlin to a small mansion in the Kirov Gate area. A month later, an underground center for the strategic control of the armed forces was prepared on the platform of the Kirovskaya metro station. The offices of I. V. Stalin and B. M. Shaposhnikov were equipped there, as well as the operational group of the General Staff and the departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense.

On July 10, 1941, in order to ensure centralized and more efficient control of the armed struggle, by the decision of the USSR State Defense Committee No. 10, the Headquarters of the High Command was transformed into the Headquarters of the High Command. It was headed by the chairman of the State Defense Committee (GKO) I. V. Stalin. By the same decree, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov was introduced to the Headquarters.

August 8, 1941 Stalin was appointed Supreme Commander. Since that time, the Headquarters became known as the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SVGK).

At the final stage of the Great Patriotic War, by the decree of the GKO of the USSR of February 17, 1945, the composition of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was changed for the last time and was defined as follows: Marshals of the Soviet Union I. V. Stalin (Chairman - Supreme Commander), G. K. Zhukov (Deputy People's Commissar Defense) and A. M. Vasilevsky (Deputy People's Commissar of Defense), Army Generals N. A. Bulganin (member of the State Defense Committee and Deputy People's Commissar of Defense) and A. I. Antonov (Chief of the General Staff), Fleet Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov (People's Commissar of Defense) Navy of the USSR).

The activities of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command were large-scale and multifaceted. The headquarters made changes and clarifications to the structure and organization of the Armed Forces; carried out planning of campaigns and strategic operations; assigned tasks to the fronts and fleets and directed their combat activities; organized interaction between strategic groupings and operational formations of various types of the Armed Forces and partisans; distributed between the fronts the reserve formations and materiel at its disposal; exercised control over the progress of the tasks; led the study and generalization of the experience of the war.

The main working body of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and personally of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was the General Staff of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, which closely interacted with the departments of the people's commissariats of defense and the Navy.

Lit .: Danilov V.D. Headquarters of the Supreme High Command: Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, 1941-1945. M., 1991; Pavlenko I.D. Headquarters of the Supreme High Command // Great Soviet Encyclopedia. T. 24. Book. 1. M., 1976; Headquarters of the Supreme High Command // Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. M., 2002. T. 1. Ch. eleven; The same [Electronic resource]. URL : http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/zhukov1/11.html .

STATE OF THE SUPREME HIGH COMMAND - the highest body of strategic leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces during the war.

It was formed in accordance with the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on June 23, 1941 and was initially called the Headquarters of the High Command. It included: Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko (Chairman), Chief of the General Staff General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I.V. Stalin, his first deputy V.M. Molotov, marshals K.E. Voroshilov, S.M. Budyonny and People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov.

On July 10, 1941, it was transformed into the Headquarters of the High Command, and B.M. Shaposhnikov. After I.V. Stalin on August 8, 1941 became the Supreme Commander, the Headquarters became known as the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK). During the war years, it was reformed several times, in accordance with the tasks being solved, its composition changed, replenished with prominent statesmen and military figures.

In mid-February 1945, the members of the Supreme Command Headquarters were: I.V. Stalin, G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky, A.I. Antonov, N.A. Bulganin, N.G. Kuznetsov. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command gave a fundamental assessment of the military-political and strategic situation in connection with the situation that had developed on the fronts; made strategic and operational-strategic decisions on the conduct of combat operations, created groupings of troops for their conduct; resolved issues of interaction between groups of fronts, fronts and individual armies, between the active army and partisans. The competence of the Headquarters included the creation and training of strategic reserves, the logistics of the troops, and many other, more specific issues related to the organization of military operations. The preparation of recommendations on the strategic leadership of the troops, which were considered and approved by the Headquarters, was in charge of the General Staff subordinate to it. It turned into a working body of the Headquarters: it supplied the necessary information, processed it and prepared proposals, on the basis of which the Headquarters gave its directives. The preparation of proposals for conducting military campaigns, strategic operations and their discussion at meetings of the Stavka was carried out in close contact with the front commanders, major military leaders, state and party leaders, and the leaders of the most important people's commissariats (who solved the problems of material support for the troops). Approving plans for operations, setting strategic tasks for the troops and providing them with the necessary human and material forces and resources, the Stavka directly controlled the fronts, fleets, and long-range aviation. Communication with them of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff was carried out as technical means as well as through personal contacts. The commanders of the fronts (fleets) were called to meetings of the Headquarters; its own representatives - G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky, S.K. Timoshenko, N.G. Kuznetsov and others - repeatedly went to the place of hostilities to provide direct assistance in directing operations, monitoring their preparation and conduct, and resolving issues of coordinating efforts large connections. The Headquarters, relying on the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, carried out strategic leadership of the actions of the people's avengers behind enemy lines. Closely linking the solution of the tasks of the armed struggle of the Soviet people with the achievement of military-political and strategic goals in the war, she carried out her work in close cooperation with the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the State Defense Committee.

Speaking about the style of work of the Stavka, A.M. Vasilevsky recalled: “It is impossible to understand under the Headquarters the body that constantly met in the literal sense of the word under the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in the composition in which it was approved. After all, most of its members simultaneously performed responsible duties, often being far outside of Moscow, mainly at the front ... But here's what was constant: each of the members of the Stavka kept in touch with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Historical sources:

Russian archive: Great Patriotic War: General Staff during the Great Patriotic War: Doc. and materials of 1941 V.23 (12‑1). M., 1997;.

Russian archive: Great Patriotic War: General Staff during the Great Patriotic War: Documents and materials 1944‑1945. T.23(12‑4). M., 2001.

On June 22, 1941, the Great Patriotic War began. In its scale, violent nature and the number of victims, it has no equal in the history of mankind.

With the beginning of it, the Soviet state found itself in difficult situation. He had to solve a whole series of problems almost simultaneously. the most difficult tasks, including:

Suspend the rapid advance of the German troops;
- to conduct a general mobilization of those liable for military service and compensate for the losses in manpower suffered in the first days of the war;
- evacuate to the east industrial, primarily defense, enterprises, as well as the population and the most important property from areas threatened by the German occupation;
- to organize the production of weapons and ammunition in the quantity necessary for the Armed Forces.

The solution of these and other issues required a fundamental change in the entire system of political, state and military leadership.

The country's constitution at that time did not provide for the procedure for the implementation of state and military administration in wartime conditions, and the structure of the relevant bodies was not fixed. Therefore, with the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the general leadership of the armed struggle of the Soviet people was carried out by the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, or rather its Central Committee, headed by I.V. Stalin. In accordance with the Constitution of the USSR in force, the supreme body of state power in the country was the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

The body reporting to him - the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, headed by M. I. Kalinin - was endowed with the right to declare a state of war, general or partial mobilization, martial law in the interests of the country's defense and state security.

The highest executive and administrative body of state power - the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR headed by V.M. general construction Armed Forces.

Under the Council of People's Commissars, there was a Defense Committee headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union K. E. Voroshilov. He supervised and coordinated the issues of military construction and direct preparation of the country for defense. Military administration, as envisaged before the war, was to be exercised by the Chief Military Council, headed by the People's Commissar of Defense.

Such a system of state and military administration essentially corresponded to the experience of the First World War and the Civil War. However, the very first days of the war showed that it did not meet the new requirements for armed struggle, did not provide the necessary centralization of leadership of the state and the Armed Forces in a complex and rapidly changing situation, the forced withdrawal of Soviet troops, and the mobilization of all the forces and resources of the country. As a result, the reorganization of the highest bodies of state and military administration took place already during the war, which was often associated with certain miscalculations.

The issue of reorganizing the system of state power was resolved on June 30, 1941, when the decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR created the State Defense Committee - the extraordinary supreme state body of the USSR, concentrating all power in the country. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I. V. Stalin became the chairman of the committee, and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov became his deputy. The GKO included L.P. Beria, K.E. Voroshilov, G.M. Malenkov, L.M. Kaganovich, later N.A. Bulganin, N.A. Voznesensky, A.I. Mikoyan were introduced. Each of them was in charge of a certain range of issues.

The State Defense Committee was endowed with broad legislative, executive and administrative functions. He united the military, political and economic leadership and had full power in the country. The decrees and orders of the State Defense Committee had the force of wartime laws and were subject to unquestioning execution by all party, state, military, economic and trade union bodies.

At the same time, the constitutional bodies of state administration - the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, its Presidium, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, people's commissariats - continued to operate, implementing the decrees and decisions of the State Defense Committee. Thus, the Supreme Soviet met three times during the war years: on June 18, 1942, from January 28 to February 14, 1944, and from April 24 to April 27, 1945. At these sessions, the country's budgets were approved, the treaty between the USSR and Great Britain was ratified, and the Law on the expansion of the rights of the union republics was adopted.

The following tasks were entrusted to the State Defense Committee:
- directing the activities of state departments and institutions, directing their efforts to the full use of the material, spiritual and military capabilities of the country to achieve victory over the enemy;
- addressing issues of restructuring the economy on a war footing;
- mobilization of the country's human resources for the needs of the front and the national economy;
- training of reserves and personnel for the Armed Forces and industry;
- evacuation of industrial facilities from threatened areas and transfer of enterprises to liberated areas;
- restoration of the economy destroyed by the war;
- determination of the volume and terms of deliveries of military products by the industry.

In addition, the State Defense Committee set military-political tasks for the military leadership, improved the structure of the Armed Forces, determined the general nature of their use in war, and assigned leading cadres.

In its activities to lead the country, the State Defense Committee relied on the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, people's commissariats and departments, local party and government bodies, and city defense committees. The working bodies of the GKO on military issues, as well as the direct organizers and executors of its decisions in this area, were the people's commissariats of defense and the Navy.

Already in the first weeks of the war, a number of measures were taken to improve the management of the national economy, primarily the military industry. New people's commissariats were created, responsible for certain branches of military production - the tank industry, mortar weapons and others. By a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of July 1, 1941, the rights of people's commissariats were expanded in wartime conditions.

For evacuation industrial enterprises and the population from the front-line areas to the east, under the GKO, a Council for Evacuation Affairs is being created. In addition, in October 1941, the Committee for the Evacuation of Food Stocks, Industrial Goods and Industrial Enterprises was formed. In October 1941, these bodies were reorganized into the Directorate for Evacuation Affairs under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

As a result of the efforts made, the output of military products in March 1942 only in the eastern regions of the country reached the pre-war level of its output throughout the entire territory of the Soviet Union. The industry, reoriented towards a military way, relying on the country's production capacities, began the mass production of modern aircraft, tanks, weapons and ammunition.

The problems of providing the national economy with trained personnel required the creation in 1941 under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of the Committee for the Accounting and Distribution of Labor. At the same time, bureaus for the mobilization of the able-bodied population were created under the regional and regional executive committees. These measures made it possible to significantly strengthen the Armed Forces already in the first weeks of the war. In the first week of the war alone, 5.3 million people were mobilized into the army.

In order to improve the management of the most important sectors of the economy, which ensured an increase in the production of weapons, military equipment, ammunition, equipment, on December 8, 1942, the Operations Bureau of the State Defense Committee was created. He was entrusted with control over the current work of all people's commissariats of the defense industry, as well as overseeing the preparation and execution of plans for the production and supply of industries and transport.

Thus, the State Defense Committee became the main link in the mechanism of centralized management of the mobilization of the country's human and material resources for defense and armed struggle against the enemy.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the military administration was also reorganized.

On the second day of the war, June 23, 1941, by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Headquarters of the High Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR was created. It was headed by People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko. It included members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, Marshal of the Soviet Union K. E. Voroshilov, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny, People's Commissar of the Navy Admiral of the Fleet N. G. Kuznetsov and Chief of the General Staff General of the Army G. K. Zhukov.

By the same resolution, an institute of permanent advisers was formed at the Headquarters, which included the Marshals of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov and G. I. Kulik, generals K. A. Meretskov, P. F. Zhigarev, N. F. Vatutin, N. N. Voronov, as well as A. I. Mikoyan, L. M. Kaganovich, L. P. Beria, N. A. Voznesensky, A. A. Zhdanov, G. M. Malenkov, L. Z. Mekhlis.

It should be noted that the question of creating the Headquarters of the High Command of the People's Commissariat of Defense raised before I.V. Stalin in the spring of 1941. At the same time, it was supposed to conduct strategic command and staff exercises with its participation at the turn of Valdai, Orsha, Gomel, the Psyol River. Unfortunately, apart from reconnaissance of these exercises, nothing could be done. The issue of the Civil Code rate also remained unresolved.

The very first days showed that the appointment of the people's commissar of defense as chairman of the Headquarters of the High Command turned out to be erroneous. The dynamism of military operations, the rapid and abrupt changes in the situation on a huge front, required high efficiency in command and control of troops. Meanwhile, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko could not independently, without the consent of J. V. Stalin, make any serious decisions on the leadership of the Armed Forces. He did not even have the right to make decisions on the preparation and use of strategic reserves, not to mention the issues of material and technical support related to the management of the national economy of the country.

In order to ensure centralized and more efficient control of the armed struggle, by the Decree of the USSR State Defense Committee No. 10 of July 10, 1941, the Headquarters of the High Command was transformed into the Headquarters of the High Command. It was headed by the chairman of the GKO I. V. Stalin. By the same decree, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov was introduced to the Headquarters.

On August 8, 1941, I. V. Stalin was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Since that time, the Headquarters became known as the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Thus, only on the 48th day of the war, by trial and error, the supreme body of strategic leadership was finally formed.

The last time the composition of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was radically revised on February 17, 1945. By the decision of the State Committee of Defense of the USSR, it included the Marshals of the Soviet Union I. V. Stalin (chairman), G. K. Zhukov and A. M. Vasilevsky, army generals N. A. Bulganin and A. I. Antonov, Admiral of the Fleet N. G. Kuznetsov. It was this "composition of winners" that led the armed struggle of the Soviet people at the final stage of the Second World War.

Initially, the members of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command gathered in the Kremlin office of I.V. Stalin. But with the beginning of the bombing, she was transferred from the Kremlin to a small mansion on Kirov Street (now Myasnitskaya). In addition, an underground strategic control center for the Armed Forces was prepared at the Kirovskaya metro station. The offices of I. V. Stalin and B. M. Shaposhnikov were equipped there. The operational group of the General Staff and the departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense was also located here.

The activities of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command were large-scale and multifaceted. She carried out the strategic leadership of the Red Army, the Navy, the border and internal troops, and partisan forces. Its activities consisted in assessing the military-political and military-strategic situation, making strategic and operational-strategic decisions, organizing strategic regroupings and creating groupings of troops, organizing interaction and coordinating actions during operations between groups of fronts, fronts, individual armies, as well as between active army and partisan detachments. The Stavka supervised the formation and preparation of strategic reserves, the material and technical support of the Armed Forces, exercised control over the progress of the fulfillment of assigned tasks, supervised the study and generalization of war experience, and resolved other issues related to military operations.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command led the fronts, fleets and long-range aviation, assigned them tasks, approved plans of operations, provided them with the necessary forces and means, and led the partisans through the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement.

The main working body of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and personally of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was the General Staff of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, closely interacting with the departments of the people's commissariats of defense and the Navy.

The work of the General Staff during the war was complex and multifaceted. Its functions included the collection and processing of operational-strategic information about the situation developing on the fronts, the preparation of operational calculations, conclusions and proposals for the use of the Armed Forces, the direct development of plans for military campaigns and strategic operations in theaters of military operations. On the basis of the decisions of the Headquarters and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the General Staff prepared directives for the commanders of the fronts, fleets and types of the Armed Forces and their headquarters, orders of the People's Commissar of Defense, supervised their execution, led military intelligence, monitored the condition and provision of troops, as well as the preparation of strategic reserves and their correct use. The General Staff was also entrusted with the task of generalizing the advanced combat experience of formations, formations and units. The General Staff developed the most important provisions in the field of military theory, prepared proposals and applications for the production of military equipment and weapons. He was also responsible for coordinating the fighting of the partisan formations with the formations of the Red Army.

The Chief of the General Staff began to unite the activities of all departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense, as well as the People's Commissariat of the Navy. He was empowered to sign together with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief orders and directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, to issue orders on her behalf. During the Great Patriotic War, the General Staff was successively headed by four military figures - Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, B.M. Shaposhnikov, A.M. Vasilevsky and General of the Army A.I. Antonov. Each of them is a unique military personality. It was they who had the greatest influence on the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, it was their thinking that literally nourished his decisions and will during the war years. Therefore, it was these commanders who were the most frequent visitors to I.V. Stalin during the war years.

Before becoming an effective working body of the Supreme High Command, the General Staff went through the path of searching for its place and role in strategic leadership, its organizational structure and methods of work. In the initial period of the war, under conditions of an unfavorable situation on the fronts, the volume and content of the work of the General Staff increased enormously. In this regard, in order to concentrate the efforts of the General Staff on the operational-strategic leadership of the Armed Forces, it was relieved of a number of functions not directly related to this activity. By Decree of the State Defense Committee No. 300 of July 28, 1941, the functions of mobilization, commissioning, conscription, organization of the Armed Forces, supplies, military transportation, and management of military educational institutions were removed from him. The organizational and mobilization management, the department for the arrangement and staffing of troops, the road department, the department for the arrangement of the rear, weapons and supplies, as well as the communications center. Subsequently, the negative aspects of this decision became visible, and most of these units again became part of the General Staff.

There have been necessary changes in management. In particular, directions were created for each active front, consisting of the head of the direction, his deputy and 5-10 officer-operators. In addition, a corps of representative officers of the General Staff was created. It was intended to maintain continuous communication with the troops, verify the implementation of directives, orders and instructions from higher command and control bodies, provide the General Staff with prompt and accurate information about the situation, and also provide timely assistance to headquarters and troops.

An important place in the work of the General Staff, especially in the last period of the war, was occupied by the organization of communication and interaction with the headquarters of the allied armies. Almost from the beginning of the war, the military missions of the Allied powers were accredited to the General Staff: from the USA led by General Dean, from Great Britain - by General Berluz, from the government of the fighting France - by General Lattre de Tassigny. There were missions from Norway, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and other countries. In turn, Soviet military missions were established at the headquarters of the allied armies, which, through the General Staff, were subordinate to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and were not within the competence of the ambassadors.

The improvement of the organizational structure of the General Staff was carried out throughout the war, but the changes were not of a cardinal nature.

As a result of the reorganization carried out, the General Staff became a command and control body capable of promptly and adequately responding to changes in the situation on the fronts. Organizational restructuring, due to the nature and content of the combat situation on the fronts, allowed him to focus on solving mainly operational-strategic issues, developing and preparing the necessary data for decision-making by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

However, in the first years of the war, JV Stalin himself underestimated the role of the General Staff. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief not only ignored his suggestions, but often made decisions contrary to all his advice. In the first year of the war alone, five chiefs of the leading department of the General Staff, the operational one, were replaced. Many generals from among the leadership of the General Staff, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, were sent to the active army. In a number of cases, this was indeed caused by the objective need to reinforce the headquarters of the fronts and armies with experienced workers. Only towards the end of the first period of the war did Stalin's relations with the General Staff normalize to a large extent. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief began to rely more on the General Staff, even to perceive it as an important body of strategic leadership. Yes, and the General Staff by this time gained rich experience, began to work more organized. Therefore, it is no coincidence that from the second half of 1942, JV Stalin, as a rule, did not take a single decision without first hearing the opinion of the General Staff.

For a well-coordinated and fruitful activity, the work of the General Staff, its departments and departments had to be streamlined in accordance with the requirements of wartime. A certain order of work was needed around the clock. This routine developed gradually. It finally took shape with the arrival of General A. I. Antonov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Pedantic in the good sense of the word, the general outlined his proposals for improving the activities of the General Staff on three sheets. Having familiarized himself with them, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, without saying a word, approved them.

To a large extent, it was tied to the regulations of the Supreme Commander himself. Reports to I. V. Stalin were made, as a rule, three times a day. The first of them was done at 10-11 o'clock in the afternoon by phone, from 16.00 to 17.00 the second was held, and from 21.00 to 3.00 the final report for the day was carried out at Headquarters. In the course of it, in addition to the situation, draft directives, orders and orders were reported. Documents for the report were carefully worked out, the wording was perfected. They were sorted into multi-colored folders according to their importance. Priority documents were placed in the red folder - directives, orders, plans. The documents of the second order were intended for the blue folder. The contents of the green folder were mainly submissions for titles and awards, orders for movements and appointments. Documents were signed as important.

Along with the reorganization of the bodies of strategic leadership, there was a continuous search for ways to increase the efficiency of command and control and to establish closer cooperation between the fronts. Already in the first days of the war, when in the conditions of a rapidly changing situation, in the absence of stable communication with the fronts and timely reliable information about the situation of the troops, the military leadership was systematically late in making decisions, the need to create an intermediate command authority between the Headquarters and the fronts became obvious. For these purposes, it was decided to send the leading people of the People's Commissariat of Defense to the front, but these measures did not produce results. Therefore, by the decree of the State Defense Committee of July 10, 1941, three Main Commands of the troops of strategic directions were created.

On the High Command of the Troops of the North Western direction headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union K. E. Voroshilov, the coordination of the actions of the Northern and North-Western Fronts, as well as the Northern and Baltic Fleets was entrusted. The main command of the troops of the Western direction, headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko, coordinated the actions of the Western Front and the Pinsk military flotilla, and later - the Western Front, the Front of Reserve Armies and the Central Front. The high command of the troops of the South-Western direction, headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny, was to coordinate the actions of the South-Western, Southern, and later the Bryansk fronts. In his operational subordination was also the Black Sea Fleet. In August 1941, the staff of the field administration of the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Forces was approved.

The task of the High Commands included studying and analyzing the operational-strategic situation in the direction zone, informing the Headquarters about the situation on the fronts, directing the preparation of operations in accordance with the plans and plans of the Headquarters, coordinating the actions of troops in the strategic direction, and directing the partisan struggle behind enemy lines.

The introduction of intermediate bodies of strategic leadership in the difficult conditions of the first period of the war was justified. The main commands had the opportunity to ensure more reliable, accurate command and control of troops and the organization of interaction between the fronts, and to respond more quickly to enemy actions. At the same time, there were many shortcomings in the activities of the High Commands. The commanders-in-chief not only did not have clearly defined functions and sufficiently broad powers, but also did not have the necessary reserve of forces and material resources to actively influence the course of hostilities of troops subordinate to them. Therefore, all their activities were often reduced to the transfer of information from the fronts to the Headquarters and, conversely, orders from the Headquarters to the fronts. Often, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command exercised direct control over the combat activities of fronts, fleets and armies, bypassing the High Commands. As a result of these and other reasons, the Commanders-in-Chief of the troops of the strategic sectors failed to improve the leadership of the fronts.

At the same time, experience in command and control of the troops of the command and staffs of the fronts was accumulating, the connection between the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the front departments became more and more reliable and stable, the situation at the front was more and more stabilized. Under these conditions, the main commands of the troops of the strategic directions were abolished one by one. On September 10, 1941, the High Command of the troops of the Western direction ceased to exist, on September 29 - the North-West, and in December - the South-West.

However, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command did not completely abandon them. Already in February 1942, she assigned to the commander of the Western Front, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, the duties of Commander-in-Chief of the Western Direction. He was tasked with coordinating fighting Western and Kalinin fronts during the Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation. Soon the High Command of the troops of the South-Western direction was restored. Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko, commander of the Southwestern Front, was appointed commander-in-chief. He was supposed to coordinate the actions of his and the neighboring Bryansk Front.

On April 21, 1942, to direct the actions of troops on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, the High Command of the troops of the North Caucasus direction was formed, headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny. The Crimean Front, the Sevastopol defensive region, the North Caucasian military district, the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov military flotilla were subordinate to him.

As practice has shown, combining the positions of Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Troops and Commander of the Front turned out to be inexpedient. Although such a combination gave the Commanders-in-Chief relative independence in resolving operational issues, their ability to coordinate the actions of other fronts narrowed. Ultimately, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command had to deal with this. Soon, such a control system had to be abandoned. In May 1942, the Main Commands of the Western and North Caucasian troops were abolished, and in June - the South-Western direction.

A similar system of strategic leadership, but in a more perfect form, was resorted to by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command only in 1945 during the military campaign in the Far East. Given the remoteness of the theater of operations from the center, the High Command of the Soviet troops in the Far East was formed, headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky. Unlike the previously created High Commands of the Strategic Directions, it had large forces and means at its disposal and was endowed with greater independence in resolving issues of preparing and conducting military operations. At the same time, here, too, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command retained the right to control the fronts and the Pacific Fleet.

Since the spring of 1942, the institution of representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command appeared, which became widespread during the Great Patriotic War. Representatives of the Stavka were appointed by it from among the most trained military leaders. They had broad powers and were usually sent to where, according to the plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the main tasks at the moment were being solved.

The functions of the Stavka representatives did not remain unchanged. Until the summer of 1944, they boiled down mainly to assisting the command of the fronts in the preparation and conduct of operations, coordinating the efforts of the fronts, and monitoring the implementation of the decisions of the Supreme High Command. But representatives of the Headquarters did not have the right to make fundamentally new decisions during the operation without the sanction of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. In the future, the powers of the Stavka representatives were expanded. So, in the Belarusian offensive operation, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov directly supervised the actions of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts, and Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky - of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts.

Representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on the fronts at different times were G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevsky, S. K. Timoshenko, S. M. Budyonny, K. E. Voroshilov, A. I. Antonov, N. G. Kuznetsov, N. N. Voronov, A. A. Novikov, A. E. Golovanov, Ya. N. Fedorenko, G. A. Vorozheykin, S. M. Shtemenko, I. T. Peresypkin and others. JV Stalin personally assigned them tasks before leaving for the front and received them with reports upon arrival. If necessary, he called them to Headquarters during operations, especially when something went wrong. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief demanded from his representatives constant reports on the progress of the assigned tasks, presenting a high demand for omissions and failures.

The creation of the institution of representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command contributed to an increase in the effectiveness of strategic management. The Supreme High Command was able to coordinate efforts on the spot and maintain close interaction between the fronts, branches of the Armed Forces, branches of the armed forces and partisan formations, and use them more rationally in ongoing operations.

The institute of representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command lasted almost until the end of the war. Only in the final operations, due to a significant reduction in the front and a decrease in the number of front-line formations, the need for it disappeared.

On June 29, 1941, the Main Directorate for the Formation and Staffing of Troops (Glavupraform) was created in the People's Commissariat of Defense to manage the formation of reserves, prepare marching replacements, and manage spare and training units. It was headed by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union G. I. Kulik, but on August 6 of the same year he was replaced by E. A. Shchadenko.

The scale of the activity of this governing body is evidenced by the fact that only in 1941 it formed 286 rifle divisions, more than 500 brigades. The creation of such a governing body allowed the Supreme High Command to quickly resolve the issues of preparing marching replacements and creating reserves for the army in the field.

With the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, general military training of the working people was widely developed in the country on the job and in schools. In September 1941, by decision of the State Defense Committee, universal compulsory military training for men aged 16 to 50 was introduced according to a 110-hour program. For the centralized management of this type of military training, on September 17, 1941, the Main Directorate of General Military Training (GUVVO) was created as part of the People's Commissariat of Defense. In the military districts, republican, territorial and regional military commissariats, departments of general military training are being formed. These measures ensured the continuous replenishment of the active army with trained manpower.

To coordinate the work of the Logistics of the Armed Forces, the Main Directorate of Logistics was formed, and the post of chief of the Logistics of the Red Army was established with the headquarters of the Logistics, reporting directly to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Throughout the war, General A.V. Khrulev was the head of the Logistics.

On July 16, 1941, in order to strengthen the combat power of the army and navy, to raise the level of organizational and ideological work in the Armed Forces, the institution of military commissars was introduced. At the same time, the organs of political propaganda are being reorganized into political organs - the Main Political Directorate of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (GlavPU RKKA) and the Main Political Directorate of the Navy (GlavPU VMF). The powers of the political agencies were expanded - they began to manage both mass political and organizational-party work in the army and navy. These measures made it possible to intensify the activities of political agencies to ensure the implementation of orders and directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, to increase their role in solving combat missions, and to improve the leadership of party and Komsomol organizations.

In connection with the expansion of the scale of the armed struggle, the increase in the number of formations and units of the branches of the Armed Forces and branches of service in the army in the field and the need for their more effective use in the course of hostilities, the positions of commanders of the types and branches of the troops were established with the appropriate governing bodies - military councils and headquarters: chief, and from November 1942 - commander of artillery of the Red Army, commanders of guards mortar units, armored and mechanized troops, Air Force, air defense troops, long-range aviation, airborne troops with their direct subordination to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, as well as the chief engineering troops.

Some commanders were elevated to the rank of deputy people's commissar of defense, but in 1943 they were deprived of it. By that time, the people's commissar already had about two dozen deputies, which began to create difficulties in the activities of the people's commissariat. As a result, the People's Commissar of Defense had only two deputies left - Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.

Already in the first period of the war, popular resistance to the enemy was widely developed in the occupied territory of the country. The scope of this popular movement was enormous. So, only in the summer and autumn of 1942, during the period of fierce battles for the Caucasus and Stalingrad, the fascist German command was forced to use up to 25 divisions to protect their rear and fight partisans.

However, the centralized control of the struggle of the Soviet people behind enemy lines was not established immediately, but as it unfolded. The beginning of the centralization of the leadership of the partisan movement was laid by the decision of the State Defense Committee of May 30, 1942. In accordance with this resolution, the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TSSHPD) was created at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. It was headed by a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Belarus P. K. Ponomarenko. The headquarters established contact with partisan formations, coordinated their activities, supplied the partisans with weapons, ammunition, medicines, trained personnel, and carried out interaction between partisan formations and regular units of the Red Army.

For the direct leadership of partisan detachments under the Military Councils of the fronts, the headquarters of the partisan movement were created: Ukrainian, Bryansk, Western, Kalinin, Leningrad and Karelian-Finnish.
On September 6, 1942, in order to further expand the partisan movement and increase its effectiveness, the post of Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement was established. Marshal of the Soviet Union K. E. Voroshilov, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a member of the State Defense Committee and the Supreme Command Headquarters, was appointed to this post. The Central Headquarters of the partisan movement was subordinate to him.

Soon, in accordance with the GKO decree of September 28, 1942, the headquarters of the partisan movement, which operated under the Military Councils of the fronts, were reorganized. They were transformed into representative offices of the TsSHPD at the fronts, and their leaders were included in the Military Councils of the fronts. The GKO determined the disorganization of the rear of the enemy as the main task of the struggle of the partisans. The measures taken made it possible to overcome the fragmentation that reigned in the partisan movement and reduced its effectiveness.

True, at the beginning of March 1943, the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement was disbanded, and the leadership of the actions of the partisans was entrusted to the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics and the regional committees of the CPSU (b). But the fallacy of such a decision became obvious almost immediately, and in April the headquarters was restored.

From the very beginning of the war, the rapidly changing operational-strategic situation on the flanks of the Soviet-German front required close cooperation between the fleets and the troops of the fronts operating on the coastal axes. Initially, fleets and flotillas for this purpose were transferred to the operational subordination of the fronts. However, their commanders often did not pay due attention to the fulfillment of independent tasks by the fleets in maritime theaters, and did not always fully orient the fleets about the general tasks and prospects for their activities. In connection with this, and also in view of the complication of the situation at sea, a need arose for a radical improvement in the operational-strategic leadership of the forces of the fleets.

The directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of March 31, 1944 established the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces of the USSR. People's Commissar of the Navy Admiral of the Fleet N. G. Kuznetsov was appointed to this position. By the same directive, the Baltic Fleet remained operationally subordinate to the Leningrad Front, while the Northern and Black Sea Fleets were directly subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. The directive stated that henceforth the tasks of the fleets would be set directly by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. From now on, the use of naval aviation in the interests of the ground forces was allowed only in exceptional cases and only with the permission of the Headquarters. Responsibility for the defense of the coast in coastal areas was assigned to the commanders of the fronts, and at the same time the degree of participation and responsibility of the fleets in solving these problems was determined. From now on, front commanders were forbidden to interfere in tactical naval matters and the internal service of the fleets transferred to them under operational control. The new command and control system of the Naval Forces gave the naval leadership more independence, which made it possible to more successfully solve the problems of defeating the enemy at sea.

At the beginning of the war, the Soviet Armed Forces were supposed to act according to pre-war operational plans. They provided for the conduct of defensive battles for three to four weeks by covering troops, and then, with the introduction of the second echelons of the border fronts and the approaching strategic reserves, it was supposed to go on the counteroffensive. But the situation on the fronts did not allow the implementation of these plans. The strategic initiative was entirely in the hands of the German troops. Under these conditions, contrary to the military doctrine adopted in the prewar period, the Soviet military leadership was forced to make a decision to switch to strategic defense.

As the front stabilized and the system of strategic leadership was reorganized, troop command and control improved. The planning of operations began to be characterized by more coordinated efforts of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the General Staff and the headquarters of the fronts. A feature of the strategic leadership of armed struggle was the combination of collegiality in the development of decisions with sole responsibility for their implementation. Campaign plans were accepted on joint meetings Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, State Defense Committee and Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The commanders of the fronts, branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms took the most active part in further work on the preparation of operations. All this made it possible to consider issues deeply and comprehensively, to develop expedient solutions, and to quickly implement them.

However, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command did not come to this immediately. In the first period of the war, and especially in its first months, the principle of collegiality was practically not respected. But as experience was gained, a relatively coherent system of preparation and adoption of both fundamental long-term and private current decisions took shape. Clear principles of strategic planning, development of ideas and plans for military campaigns, strategic and front-line operations were developed and mastered. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff successively moved from solving individual urgent strategic tasks in an administrative manner to advance planning of front operations, then strategic operations of groups of fronts, and, finally, military campaigns.

An indicator of the increased level of leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces was the concreteness and purposefulness of the plans for military campaigns in the second and third periods of the war. Unlike the first period, the campaigns of which were conducted without a clearly defined plan, subsequent campaigns were developed in advance on the basis of a deep and comprehensive analysis of the military-political and military-strategic situation, taking into account the goals put forward by the political leadership, the prospects for war and the real capabilities of the troops.

The activities of the State Defense Committee, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and other higher authorities during the war years were distinguished by their scale and diversity. Most of them were headed by I. V. Stalin, in whose image the state military and political leadership merged to a large extent. Therefore, the style of work of the highest bodies of state and military administration was largely determined by the style of work of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Often it was impossible to determine which body was in session: members of the Politburo, the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command were gathering in the office of I.V. Stalin at the same time. However, the unifying body in the conditions of the most severe war, apparently, was still the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. It was she who became the core of the entire policy of the Kremlin during the war years. Here, in addition to plans for operations, military-political, economic and many other issues were discussed. For this, state and military figures of the highest rank were invited, as well as ordinary soldiers, partisans and workers.

JV Stalin knew how to make people act. The mode of operation of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was practically round-the-clock. The tone was set by the Supreme Commander himself, who worked 12-16 hours a day, and, as a rule, in the evening and at night. He paid the main attention to operational-strategic issues, problems of weapons, training of human and material resources.

Constantly in the field of view of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command was the training of the highest military leadership - commanders, chiefs of staff and members of the Military Councils of fronts, armies, and sometimes corps and divisions. Often, I.V. Stalin, noticing a commander or commander who had shown himself, met with him, and then closely followed his career growth. As a result, during the war years, a new generation of commanders emerged, whose names are known all over the world.

The priority in resolving military issues belonged, of course, to the General Staff. Therefore, during the war, his superiors visited I.V. Stalin almost daily, becoming his main experts, consultants and advisers. After the heavy defeats of the first months of the war, the Supreme Commander was so imbued with the importance of the General Staff that he willingly listened to the opinions of ordinary General Staff officers.

Often, commanders of the fronts visited the Headquarters. Usually these visits were connected with the preparation of major operations or with the appointment of a new position. Sometimes members of the Military Councils came with them, less often - the chiefs of staff.

People's Commissar of the Navy N. G. Kuznetsov and the head of the Logistics of the Red Army A. V. Khrulev were regular visitors to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Repeatedly, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief met with the heads of the Main Directorates of the People's Commissariat of Defense, commanders and heads of military branches. On issues related to the adoption of military equipment or its supply to the troops, people's commissars of the aviation, tank industry, weapons, ammunition and others came with them. Often, leading designers of weapons and military equipment were invited to discuss these issues.

Ordinary soldiers were also invited to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command - pilots, tankers, artillerymen, partisans. In the Kremlin, one could meet military writers, directors of defense factories, workers, collective farmers, and even priests.

On May 5, 1945, the State Defense Committee was abolished by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ceased its activities in October 1945.

In general, the military command and control system by 1945 basically corresponded to the nature of military operations, general requirements politics and military strategy. It ensured reliable and effective command and control of troops and forces, and the successful fulfillment of military-political and strategic tasks.

Thus, during the years of the Great Patriotic War, a coherent system of state and military leadership in wartime took shape in the USSR. It took shape gradually, with the accumulation of experience and the growth of the art of management in the highest levels of power. This system effectively managed the country and its military organization, which ultimately helped to achieve victory over the enemy.

At the same time, some negative features of the existing management system should also be noted. The main one was that in the very first months of the war, JV Stalin concentrated immense power in his hands. He, remaining the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), headed the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the State Defense Committee, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the People's Commissariat of Defense. At that cruel time, such a concentration of power was largely justified, objectively necessary. But gradually, the negative aspects of such centralization began to emerge more and more fully.